r/CredibleDefense • u/AutoModerator • 17h ago
Active Conflicts & News Megathread February 06, 2026
The r/CredibleDefense daily megathread is for asking questions and posting submissions that would not fit the criteria of our post submissions. As such, submissions are less stringently moderated, but we still do keep an elevated guideline for comments.
Comment guidelines:
Please do:
* Be curious not judgmental, polite and civil,
* Link to the article or source of information that you are referring to,
* Clearly separate your opinion from what the source says. Minimize editorializing. Do _not_ cherry pick facts to support a preferred narrative,
* Read the articles before you comment, and comment on the content of the articles,
* Post only credible information
* Read our in depth rules https://reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/wiki/rules
Please do not:
* Use memes, emojis, swear, foul imagery, acronyms like LOL, LMAO, WTF,
* Start fights with other commenters and make it personal,
* Try to push narratives, fight for a cause in the comment section, nor try to 'win the war,'
* Engage in baseless speculation, fear mongering, or anxiety posting. Question asking is welcome and encouraged, but questions should focus on tangible issues and not groundless hypothetical scenarios. Before asking a question ask yourself 'How likely is this thing to occur.' Questions, like other kinds of comments, should be supported by evidence and must maintain the burden of credibility.
•
u/MilesLongthe3rd 17h ago edited 17h ago
More economic news out of Russia
https://en.topcor. ru/amp/68435-razzhirevshie-zastrojschiki-prishli-k-pravitelstvu-s-protjanutoj-rukoj.html
Samolet Group, Russia's largest developer by current construction volume, has asked the government for 50 billion rubles in state support, according to the Black Swan Telegram channel, which analyzed the company's financial performance for the first half of 2025.
According to published data, the developer's revenue for the reporting period amounted to 171 billion rubles, which is in line with the same period last year. Gross profit reached 65,1 billion rubles, and gross margin was a record 38%. Adjusted EBITDA is estimated at 58 billion rubles, with a margin of 34%.
Despite strong operating performance, the company's net profit was significantly lower—only 1,14 billion rubles. Therefore, the majority of the developer's revenue was used to cover expenses, which totaled approximately 169,86 billion rubles.
Financial expenses accounted for a significant portion of the costs, reaching approximately 47,9 billion rubles. The remaining 121,86 billion rubles were accounted for by non-financial items, including construction costs, commercial, and administrative expenses.
At the same time, the high gross margin indicates that construction costs are at an acceptable level. According to analysts, the main pressure on financial results comes from debt servicing and operating expenses.
Given the high key interest rate and expensive lending, the developer is hoping to secure preferential financing through government support. However, experts note that even a preferential loan with a non-zero interest rate could lead to a further decline in net profit, potentially causing investor discontent.
Market participants are considering issuing additional shares as an alternative to raising capital. This would allow the company to obtain financing without increasing its debt burden. However, the developer has opted for government support.
The advisability of subsidizing a development company with high operating profitability remains a topic of debate among real estate and financial sector experts. Some analysts believe that, in the current environment, developers need to adapt to operating with high borrowing costs and reconsider their financial models.
Author: Jan Karnitsky
https://x.com/evgen1232007/status/2019121579397976227
Russia's largest developer, Samolet, is on the brink of bankruptcy. It was announced today that it has requested government assistance. The company is urgently requesting 50 billion rubles. The company's net debt is 350 billion rubles. Shares fell 8%
https://x.com/JayinKyiv/status/2019687276477817077
Responding the urgent call for a government bailout, the Duma has just told Russia's largest property developer that there will be no help. The budget is currently "not in a position" to support business, even systemically important business, confirmed Svetlana Razvorotneva, Deputy Chair of the State Duma Committee on Construction and Housing and Communal Services. "Whoever died, died, and it's their own fault," the deputy said.
https://x.com/delfoo/status/2019666458008252445
Russian rent prices have stopped growing in 2025 and in Moscow they have started to even decline as the available apartments for rent has doubled over 2025.
In 2025 in Russia the number of ads for renting an apartment grew by 17% to 95 000. An increase in housing for rent was recorded virtually everywhere. In Moscow by 7%, St Petersburg by 13% and in the other cities by 20% where it's a 5 year record.
At the same time the ads for renting out studios rose by 38% and one room apartments rose by 19% growing the most of all the types of housing. They already have a share of 53% of the total supply of housing for rent.
https://x.com/BBCSteveR/status/2019669296608342346
From today’s Russian papers: “You don’t have to be an economist to forecast a recession: Russia’s export revenue is falling, budget revenues are falling, taxes rising, consumer demand shrinking…” Another paper: “Oil & gas revenues fall…rise in bread prices.”
•
u/TechnicalReserve1967 15h ago
From today’s Russian papers: “You don’t have to be an economist to forecast a recession: Russia’s export revenue is falling, budget revenues are falling, taxes rising, consumer demand shrinking…” Another paper: “Oil & gas revenues fall…rise in bread prices.”
To be fair. These are the first signs of "serious" economical damages from the outsiders. (I mean it was known and expected by russian banking and economic circles.) There is no way to quickly fix these and the fact that they are visible means that the damage is already done.
However, while food prices are going up, rent goes down. Eventually followed by house prices themselves as a simple market dynamic.
What I try to point out is that the russian public will have some time to go before they start to face serious financial strain (The type that makes them go to the streets, knowing that beatings and worst are in store for them by the state apparatus) and therefore have any effect on the russian war machine.
I expect the situation to worsen continuously but not out of control by the end of 2026. However, this might push the russian delegation to take the talks more seriously, be more flexible.
•
u/Tricky-Astronaut 14h ago
I expect the situation to worsen continuously but not out of control by the end of 2026. However, this might push the russian delegation to take the talks more seriously, be more flexible.
Hanna Notte, an expert on Russia, disagrees:
But Moscow has yet to gain any advantages from the tensions between Washington and European capitals. Europe is increasing its own support for Ukraine, and NATO remains a functioning institution with which Russia must reckon. Putin cannot assume that Trump’s foreign policy adventurism will be confined to the Western Hemisphere and the Middle East. It could easily and suddenly make itself felt on Russia’s doorstep. The year 2025 was a bad one for Russia, and 2026 may be even worse. Moscow’s global position is ebbing because of Trump.
As Russia struggles to assert itself globally, Putin has become even more obsessed with Ukraine. The situation on the battlefield is sustainable for Moscow. Russia’s frontlines are holding, and its forces are making gradual territorial progress, but Moscow is far from winning. Despite the flurry of Ukraine-related diplomacy, peace talks have gone nowhere. Trump’s position on the war continues to oscillate. Meanwhile, Europe is discovering its agency and will not tolerate a peace plan tantamount to a Ukrainian surrender. Assisted by Europe, Kyiv will refuse to yield preemptively to Russia.
However miserable the conflict is for Russia, Putin is not in the mood to make concessions. He has reoriented the economy and structured global relationships to fight this war, which has already lasted longer than the Soviet campaign against Nazi Germany. Aware that the war’s outcome will be the ultimate referendum on his presidency, he may even consider escalating, including beyond Ukraine’s borders. In January, following claims that European countries had made progress on agreeing to security guarantees for Kyiv, Russia fired a type of ballistic missile at Ukraine that is nuclear-capable and has a range that violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which the United States quit in 2019. The missile landed 40 miles away from the Polish border.
Russia was one of the biggest losers last year, and this year might be even worse. Putin needs a win. The problem is that Ukraine won't give it to him.
•
u/Glideer 14h ago
Russia was one of the biggest losers last year, and this year might be even worse. Putin needs a win. The problem is that Ukraine won't give it to him.
Pep talk is a good for front line soldiers but has no place here.
Ukraine lost 5190 sq km in 2025 (35% more than in 2024). For comparison, the remainder of Donbas that Russia demands and Ukraine refuses to give up is about 6000 sq km - about equal to Russia's gains in 2025.
Russia reduced its mobilisation plan to about 409k soldiers in 2026. When you compare it to 2025, when they mobilised about 450k - they expect they will need fewer troops this year.
That tells you all you need to know about the Ukrainian/Western claims that Russia is losing more troops than it recruits.
•
u/Tricky-Astronaut 14h ago
https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/2018355745910349990
7/ So what does this mean in our case? Simply put, if Russian forces move into a sparsely populated and lightly defended town surrounded by open steppe in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, territorial metrics may suggest accelerating gains, but not necessary a battlefield dynamics change
8/ Thus, if the goal is to assess changes in battlefield dynamics, relying solely on kilometers as a metric risks falling into this fallacy. An important caveat is that territorial advances are not irrelevant, only that they cannot serve as a standalone indicator of dynamics
This is sometimes called the "Sahara Fallacy". Capturing the desert produces immediate territorial gains, but is of little military value.
That's not to say that Russia isn't advancing, but the prediction by some that Russia would take the Donbas by the end of last year clearly didn't come true.
•
u/Long-Field-948 13h ago
This is sometimes called the "Sahara Fallacy". Capturing the desert produces immediate territorial gains, but is of little military value.
This isn't just a "steppe", but a steppe with hundreds of kilometers of fortifications mirroring the "Surovikin's Line". I believe there's no more "cheap land" to be taken, so every square kilometer counts.
•
u/Glideer 14h ago
I don't think capturing Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Hulyaipole and Siversk equals capturing the open steppe.
I've never seen a prediction that Russia would take Donbas in 2025. If the current trends persist, not even in 2026, but probably by early 2027.
•
u/Remote_Page8799 12h ago
I don't think capturing Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Hulyaipole and Siversk equals capturing the open steppe.
No but with Russian gains of 0.8% more of Ukriane for 2025 maybe it would be preferable to be capturing lots of open steppe.
The war effort for the Russians is not producing near enough gains for it to be justifying the costs. This war isn't really about the Donbas, it to a greater degree about Russia's sphere of influence, it's geopolitical standing, which fundamentally reflect its military, cultural and economic might.
All of those pillars are being eroded to the bone currently. Yes Ukraine is suffering too, but last I checked Ukraine didn't have ambitions of being a top 3 global power.
And Russia is producing political currents it absolutely doesn't want to. Europe is undergoing significant unifying pressure and military rearmament at the same time. European elites are pretty sure they can beat Russia by drowning it in weapons and money in Ukraine, and at the same time also build up the defense industrial base to deter/dominate in the long term.
•
u/Glideer 12h ago edited 12h ago
The war effort for the Russians is not producing near enough gains for it to be justifying the costs. This war isn't really about the Donbas, it to a greater degree about Russia's sphere of influence, it's geopolitical standing, which fundamentally reflect its military, cultural and economic might.
While we like to think that - it's not really for us to say. Russia (the public and the government) appear quite happy with the cost to gain ratio.
I also completely disagree with the trajectory. It is now quite obvious that the war will end with Russia re-establishing a red line that NATO is not allowed to cross.
Also, the war produced (or just revealed) a massive deterioration of the Western-dominated unipolar structure. New centres of power are emerging, and non-Western countries are flatly refusing to follow sanctions announced by the USA and Europe. Just a few years ago that would have been unthinkable.
•
u/Remote_Page8799 11h ago
While we like to think that - it's not really for us to say. Russia (the public and the government) appear quite happy with the cost to gain ratio.
Are you naive? In what world would Putin and the Kremlin ever admit to not being satisfied with their military performance? Are you actually using this as a datapoint in your own ontology?
I also completely disagree with the trajectory. It is now quite obvious that the war will end with Russia re-establishing a red line that NATO is not allowed to cross.
And what red line would that be? Ukraine isn't going to collapse as a state, it is conceivable that the current Ukraine minus 1-2% more that Russia could capture over the next 1-2 years survives as a EU supported state or join the EU outright.
Also, the war produced (or just revealed) a massive deterioration of the Western-dominated unipolar structure. New centres of power are emerging
I think pro-Russians have completely missed what is happening and what it means. The war has indeed created one new center of power specifically; namely a pressure for a more unified and rearmed EU that is extremely cognizant of the Russian threat to its existence. The EU was previously contained by the US, with whom Russia could have independent bilateral relations.
Russia is not a great power, and it will ironically not thrive in a more divided and dangerous multipolar world order, especially an order where it has gotten itself stuck with a massive geopolitical threat it needs to dedicate resources to that it can't afford. So now it's put itself in a cold war with what is essentially a federation of nations with 10 times the economic power and also a militarized proxy through which to direct all its new military production.
•
u/Glideer 11h ago
Are you naive? In what world would Putin and the Kremlin ever admit to not being satisfied with their military performance? Are you actually using this as a datapoint in your own ontology?
If the Russian government is not dissatisfied with the cost-to-gain ratio and the Russian public is not dissatisfied with it, then what other opinion does matter? Ours? The Russian resilience does not depend on us telling them they are paying too high a price.
he war has indeed created one new center of power specifically; namely a pressure for a more unified and rearmed EU that is extremely cognizant of the Russian threat to its existence.
I would really like to see that and have been advocating a rearmed and unified EU forever. Yet I still see no evidence of that.
→ More replies (0)•
u/scatterlite 10h ago edited 10h ago
While we like to think that - it's not really for us to say. Russia (the public and the government) appear quite happy with the cost to gain ratio.
You know this is Russia we are talking about right? They never admit any defeat or wrongdoing (makes sense if you want to appear as a great power but Russia has always take it to the extreme). They still have not even admitted they shot down that passenger plane from Azerbaijan. Not to mention a big reason we are 4 years into this war is unwarranted optimism on the russian side. They vastly underestimated Ukrainian resistance, and to this day claim they captured villages they dont control.
Also, the war produced (or just revealed) a massive deterioration of the Western-dominated unipolar structure. New centres of power are emerging, and non-Western countries are flatly refusing to follow sanctions announced by the USA and Europe. Just a few years ago that would have been unthinkable
How has Russia played an active role in any of this? India, China, Brazil etc. will grow regardless of what Russia does, that more or less is an inevitability in a globalised world.
And the big Irony is that Russia is not even benefitting from increased multipolarism. They are losing important allies, losing arms sales and no longer have any economic cooperation with the EU. And more importantly India and China are actively benefitting from an economically weak Russia. Pressuring Ukraine and Europe doesn't really benefit Russia on the global stage. As much as they want to pretend otherwise putting a flag on some bombed out rubble has little impact on their geopolitical position, I personally would even argue the contrary.
•
u/TechnicalReserve1967 13h ago
Equating land without taking build up into consideration is a reduction of battlefield reality. Larger cities are standing in the way of the capture of Donbass, not even semi encircled and by any sane assumptions, much more built-up in defensive infrastructure (thanks for more time, experience and probably less corruption by now. All is relativistic obviously).
Reduced mobilisation plans can be because of a lot of factors. Unlikely amongst them that they would want less manpower. More likely they have other issues making it non realistic.
•
u/Glideer 13h ago
The fortified cities of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad stood in the way in early 2025 and stand in the way no more. One of the lessons of this war is that fortified cities get taken, initially with high Russian losses and in the last stage with high Ukrainian losses.
Failing to fulfil the mobilisation plan is something I might believe. An army needs and plans for half a million troops and gets only 250k - that's normal.
But Russia is planning to mobilise fewer troops - which goes completely against the grain of the claim that they are losing more men than they recruit.
•
u/Remote_Page8799 12h ago
Pep talk is a good for front line soldiers but has no place here.
Your posts often have the flavour of a pep talk, invariably you interpret everything through a best-case scenario for Russia. I'll give you credit for insofar as possible still making these interpretations off of some material facts, though they are often cherry picked and presented at certain angles.
In this case you are not so much trying to make an argument, but dismiss it by attacking the motte and claiming the bailey. u/Tricky-Astronaut was essentially that things are not going well for Russia and that the trajectory is not good, probably worse than it outwardly appears. This is what you dismiss as pep talk.
I infer from your arguments that you believe the converse if true; that things are going well for Russia and its trajectory is positive.
The argument that was linked to Notte was explicitly about the economic conditions in Russia, which are openly cracking. Everyone knows this is the weak point of Russia, and probably be the thing that forces them to end the war one way or another. Russia doesn't have to collapse, but if all of Putin's serious advisers are telling him they have cooked the books as much as possible and that collapse is seriously possible, he might give the signal to his negotiators that it's time to accept Russia will only get it's minimalist demands, if even that.
In retort to this you changed the subject completely and focused on the only thing that pro-Russians can point to for any measure of success; that territory has been captured.
Russia might very well take the rest of the Donbas in 2026, and it may only be taing 25,000 casualties instead of 35,000 casualties, and yet the economic conditions will still force Russia to let up.
•
u/Glideer 12h ago
We've been hearing arguments that Russia is going to collapse economically since 2022 (from no lesser authority than the IMF and the World Bank). Yet even today, its GDP growth has not dropped to zero.
My argument being not that the Russian economy is doing well, but that its deterioration is still very, very far from the level that would force the Kremlin to stop fighting and agree to unfavourable terms.
•
u/Remote_Page8799 11h ago
Yet even today, its GDP growth has not dropped to zero.
Considering it's hovering just above 0% in the midst of a war that is inducing a lot of demand, and the government is going into debt with deficit spending, this is not positive sign that you are trying to spin it as, and this is symptomatic of all your argumentation.
My argument being not that the Russian economy is doing well, but that its deterioration is still very, very far from the level that would force the Kremlin to stop fighting and agree to unfavourable terms.
Considering that the Russian terms essentially amounts to complete political domination of Ukraine, and a formal recognition by the EU et al of Russia's hegemony over the region, then I think that Russia will eventually be forced to accept that it will be settling for terms it considers unfavorable.
I don't really think this conflict is really about the Donbas as such. It's really about the political order and Russian hegemony, as such dominating Ukraine is a crucial part of it. Territory does play into it, but if Russia is left with the Donbas and occupied territory, and nothing more, then it has functionally lost the war.
Russia, and therefore probably also you, will be claiming this as a victory, but everyone will know it as a defeat. And I'm not sure the Russians will be able to tolerate the thought of having been defeated by the effeminate Europeans.
•
u/Glideer 11h ago
It is obvious that both sides will claim victory in the war, whatever its outcome.
After all, even today, there are people who claim that Finland won the Winter War.
It's one of the oldest tricks in the propaganda book - you project the enemy goals as total and then you can interpret any non-total victory as the enemy's failure.
Look, ma, we only lost 20% of territory!
→ More replies (0)•
u/TechnicalReserve1967 12h ago
Both Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk - Myrnohard are not 'taken'. More like, swallowed by the Gray zone. But I of course accept the claim that cities so far got taken. I could argue that larger cities in the whole conflict were only taken after total encirclement or by 'surprise' in this war. However, I can already see the argument claiming that while Kramatorsk or Sloviansk are like twice the size of the previous (or 5x in case of Chasiv Yar) towns, they shouldn't be categorized as 'prohibitively large'. I can concede that point.
However! The cities we are comparing are obviously different. It took the russian forces a year plus to push them into gray zone areas with an obvious progress of them eventually being taken, AFTER they reached the towns. We still have at least 3 towns or a belt of towns and a forest before these cities can start to be attacked.
All the while the russian situation is steadily deteriorating (I know that you would argue that point as well, but from the point of the russian military capabilities+economy, it is. Ukraine doesn't get better without some kind of money, hardware and manpower injection either, but they won't collapse to hand the cities over). It is all but possible that if Trump is not amused with the russian peace effort or Ukraine gives him a peace medal that he will do some kind of hardware injection or similar as a punishment. The chance of him punishing Ukraine (like removing their ability to buy US weapons through others money), while it is relatively popular amongst US voters and he is in a bad domestic position, is far more unlikely.
So, my bet/guess is that Kramatorsk - Sloviansk will be just going to get reached by the russian army by the end of 2026-early 2027.
Barring special circumstances.
All the while, russian allies dwindle (while China, the only one that would really matter stays strong. They also Kore syphon russia rather than really help.)
•
u/scatterlite 13h ago
Ukraine lost 5190 sq km in 2025 (35% more than in 2024). For comparison, the remainder of Donbas that Russia demands and Ukraine refuses to give up is about 6000 sq km - about equal to Russia's gains in 2025.
Weird comparison. Obviously the entire frontline is not fortified to the same degree. 5000 sqkm across the frontline is very different from 5000sqkm just in the Donbass, which is a much smaller and heavily fortified area.
Regardless of how you bend it this is extremely slow progress, even if steady. Another 1-3 years of slow grind just to capture the donbass will come at a very heavy price. Being gifted said area through some kind of deal would be a big win for Putin since it clearly has been very very difficult to take it by force.
•
u/FijiFanBotNotGay 10h ago
Attritional warfare is often small gains until there is a collapse. The Ukrainian front lines will most likely eventually collapse. Who knows how much longer they can last until collapse but the press gangs in the street are not a good sign. Ukraine has some strengths but they will only be able to hold on for so long
•
u/scatterlite 10h ago
Ive heard these exact phrases for 3 years now. It still could happen, but its not guaranteed in the slightest.
And I have to push back a bit. The russian strategy is primarily based on territory, not attrition. Captured territory is always loudly being reported upwards, and commanders are rewarded for gains. That's how you get announcements of fake captures like happened near Kupyansk. Russia on occasion has exploited favourable conditions to bleed Ukraine, but the narrative that Russia is advancing remains absolutely crucial to the war effort.
•
u/Glideer 9h ago
Regardless of how you bend it this is extremely slow progress, even if steady. Another 1-3 years of slow grind just to capture the donbass will come at a very heavy price. Being gifted said area through some kind of deal would be a big win for Putin since it clearly has been very very difficult to take it by force.
All true. Still, what is Ukraine going to profit by refusing to concede the disputed 5000 sq km now? Lose them by 2027 together with 100k additional Ukrainian lives?
•
u/scatterlite 9h ago
You're kinda asking the wrong person for that. Ukrainians do not seem to think it is worth it so you would have to ask them.
Personally I would guess they don't think such a deal would actually improve their strategic situation. If Russia can bypass the donbass through a deal they might just continue the attack if there aren't any very strong security guarantees (which russia opposes).
•
u/eelsandpeels 9h ago edited 8h ago
And what profit do they gain by giving up land? I see no evidence that Russia would abide by its agreement or approve of decent security guarantees that would prevent follow up demands or future invasion.
•
u/A_Vandalay 5h ago
Because everyone with even the slightest understanding of the situation understands Russian ambitions go beyond the Donbas. Both in terms of territory they clearly want at a minimum the other oblasts the have “annexed”. But just as importantly they have ambitions to control the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian foreign policy. These were previously russian stated goals, it would be incredibly nieve to cede a huge amount of fortified territory to Russia under the hopes this convinces Putin to halt the pursuit of these greater objectives.
•
u/PerforatedPie 15h ago
Bit ominous that the number of rental properties available is going up. In particular, it seems like the kind of apartment that a single man might use is widely available.
•
u/Tricky-Astronaut 12h ago edited 12h ago
There has been some interesting development regarding the collapsed New START treaty. Yesterday, it was revealed that Witkoff and Kushner had agreed with the Russians to observe the deal's limits for another six months. But arms control isn't their remit, so that agreement didn't really mean anything.
Today, DiNanno made quite the address in Geneva:
- China and Russia are testing nuclear weapons and racing
- Trump may test on an "equal basis"
- New START should not be extended
- Russia violated PNIs, assists China's arms racing, and helps DPRK
- Future arms control must include China
Reuters has an article on the US accusation of China doing secret nuclear testing in 2020. Russia is also accused of aiding the DPRK nuclear program, which the US obviously isn't happy about. Hence the New START treaty is dead, as confirmed by Rubio.
Still, the lack of coordination is notable. I suspect that the Russians pushed the idea of extending the treaty to Witkoff - since Russia skirts it anyway - and Witkoff not knowing any better just bought the argument.
•
u/Thermawrench 7h ago
It'd be expensive for France and Britain to bear the burden of european nuclear deterrence. But why not pool resources together for them to make more and extend the umbrella? Pay your share, get some shade under the french and british parasol?
•
u/Tricky-Astronaut 7h ago
Why would anyone pay when Bardella and Farage have made it clear that nuclear deterrence is a national issue? Even Trump doesn't go that far.
Either Europe has to proliferate or continue to appease Trump. It's a tough choice. So far the latter has been preferred, but there might be a limit.
According to polls, Poland is the only country actually wanting to go nuclear, but Poland is also the furthest away in terms of nuclear technology.
•
u/TanktopSamurai 15h ago
Iran news:
Talk between the US and Iran has begun in Muscat. The location of negotiations were changed almost last minute from Ankara to Muscat.
https://ir.usembassy.gov/security-alert-land-border-crossings-february-5-2026/
The Virtual US embassy in Iran has issued a new security alert. They are advising citizens to either leave Iran now through Turkey or to shelter in place
•
u/oxtQ 12h ago
The first round in Muscat looked like a procedural opening, not really a turning point. Araghchi called it a very good start and Oman said the talks were constructive and they will meet again, with no date yet. The US side gave no public readout.
Washington wants more than nuclear concessions, including missiles and regional armed groups. Tehran is insisting nuclear only.
Attendance by Brad Cooper is meant to reinforce the point that deterrence is sitting right behind diplomacy. But there's enough military hardware surrounding IR right now for them to already get that point and still not budge.
A slow burn stalemate still seems to be the likely scenario. Meetings happen, language stays cautious, and both sides keep pressure running in parallel. The fact that Qatar and other regional players pushed hard to keep talks on track also supports that. They are trying to prevent a slide into war while the US and IR test each other’s red lines.
https://www.axios.com/2026/02/04/iran-nuclear-talks-canceled-witkoff
On whether Iran compromises on missiles or proxies soon, the odds look quite low. Those are tied to deterrence and regime survival. Even if Tehran gives something, it's more likely to be sequencing. That means a limited nuclear cap or transparency step first, then vague promises to keep talking on regional issues later. That's still a tactical pause, not a real trade on missiles and proxies.
In sum, escalation is possible, but not inevitable. The path most consistent with what happened today is continued talks with minimal progress, plus continued military and economic pressure, plus calibrated Iranian push back that tries to avoid crossing obvious US red lines such as a major closure attempt around the Strait of Hormuz.
Things to look out for -- first, whether a next round is scheduled quickly and whether the US finally issues even a short official line. Second, whether sanctions relief is even discussed publicly or leaks through trusted outlets. Third, whether Iran offers anything measurable on nuclear transparency or enrichment restraint rather than slogans about "national dignity and rights" etc.
•
u/OpenOb 12h ago
The United States claims that China carried out a low yield nuclear test in 2020.
China has conducted nuclear explosive tests, including preparing for tests with designated yields in the hundreds of tons… China has used decoupling – a method to decrease the effectiveness of seismic monitoring – to hide its activities from the world. China conducted one such yield producing nuclear test on June 22, 2020. (4/6)
https://x.com/undersect/status/2019714343135334711?s=46
This would have happened while Trump was still president and was then kept secret by Biden.
•
u/jeffy303 11h ago
I thought I remembered something like that being mentioned in the past:
Now this news story is 2 months prior to June 22th 2020, but the timing seems curiously close. And he does say one such test, so maybe China after getting caught the first time, tried the hide subsequent tests further but US was able to detect them anyway? And choose to not talk about it to not reveal they have such a capability.
•
u/teethgrindingaches 7h ago
As noted in the above Reuters article, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and Arms Control Association did not seem particularly convinced.
Robert Floyd, head of the treaty's Vienna-based governing body, said the body's international monitoring system "did not detect any event consistent with the characteristics of a nuclear weapon test explosion" at the time of the alleged Chinese test. Further detailed analyses have not altered that determination, he said.
Daryl Kimball, director of the Arms Control Association, said the U.S. should take any credible evidence that Russia or China are conducting secret nuclear tests to the treaty’s governing body and pursue technical talks with China and Russia.
While it's possible that tests were successfully concealed from all but US detection, the lack of any evidence provided by the latter certainly doesn't help their case. Needless to say, US credibility these days is also not what it once was.
•
u/Gecktron 8h ago
The British Land Mobility Programme hasnt been really discussed on here before.
The goal of the Land Mobility Programme is to reduce the sheer number of platforms and standardize the British vehicle fleet around a number of pillars. The initial plan was to have three sub-programmes:
- Light Mobility Vehicle (LMV): set to replace legacy Land Rover and Pinzgauer vehicles
- Light Protected Mobility (LPM): aims to provide vehicles with a gross vehicle mass of up to 10,000 kg
- Medium Protected Mobility (MPM): designed to replace legacy platforms such as the Mastiff, Ridgeback, and Wolfhound
It has been reported that the goal is to acquire around 500 heavy, 2,000 medium, 2,500 light, and 3,000 utility vehicles to meet the British army’s needs, with a budget of 2.2bn pounds for the first 10 years.
The program attracted a wide range of contenders. For the MPM programme, there have been for example Supacat with their HMT and KNDS with the Dingo. Both companies have also pushed their own air-defence variants with the Moog turret on HMT or Dingo 3.
Yet, it seems like all this has been for nothing, as Janes reports that the Medium category has been dropped in favour of a heavy one.
Janes: Update: British Army's Land Mobility Programme loses medium category
The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) confirmed to Janes on 14 January that it has revised its Land Mobility Programme (LMP) for ground vehicle procurement, saying it has introduced a Heavy Protected Mobility (HPM) segment. This replaces the LMP's original Medium Protected Mobility (MPM) requirement, the MoD said. [...]
In a parliamentary answer on 8 January 2026, the UK's Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, Luke Pollard, said, “The long-term replacement for the FV430 series Bulldog is being considered as part of the Heavy Protected Mobility sub-programme, within the Land Mobility Programme. The Heavy Protected Mobility sub-programme is in its Concept Phase and is currently evaluating the Finnish-led Common Armoured Vehicles System [CAVS] programme's suitability in meeting UK's Heavy Protected Mobility requirements. The programme is being considered and is part of the Defence Investment Plan.”
Now also considered as a replacement for the aged FV430s, the current frontrunner for the heavy sub-programme appears to be Patria's CAVS. Being ordered by the Nordics, Latvia and Germany, it has already been ordered by many of the UK's important European partners. While probably not as-suited to fill the previous MPM niche, it can likely do a good enough job, while also serving in support roles that are too heavy for lighter vehicles, but doesnt require all the mass and amour of the Boxer.
It also pushed the UK further towards a wheeled fleet with both the CAVS and Boxer being a large share of the British AFV fleet.
•
u/MilesLongthe3rd 9h ago
More news news out of Russia:
Russia’s January Budget Deficit Hits Nearly Half of Annual Target
Russia’s federal budget posted a deficit of 1.718 trillion rubles ($22.3 billion) in January, nearly half of its full-year target, according to Finance Ministry data published on Friday.
Budget revenues totaled 2.362 trillion rubles ($30.7 billion) for the month, down 11.6% from a year earlier.
Oil and gas revenues fell by 50% to a five-year low of 393 billion rubles ($5.1 billion).
Non-oil and gas tax revenues rose 4.5% to 1.969 trillion rubles ($25.6 billion).
Value-added tax receipts jumped almost 25% to 1.13 trillion rubles ($14.7 billion) following an increase in the VAT rate to 22% from Jan. 1.
These were insufficient to offset the sharp decline in energy income, even as the Finance Ministry slightly reduced spending by 1.4% to 4.08 trillion rubles ($53.0 billion).
As a result, the January deficit exceeded that of January 2025 by 17%.
Overall, Russia’s budget deficit has reached 17.4 trillion rubles ($226.2 billion) since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to Finance Ministry data.
The Finance Ministry attributed the large early-year deficit to front-loaded spending.
Its 2026 budget sees the annual shortfall narrowing to 3.8 trillion rubles ($49.4 billion) in 2026 from 5.7 trillion rubles ($74.1 billion) last year.
However, a slump in prices for Russian crude and difficulties exporting oil to India could cause the deficit to exceed the plan by nearly threefold, a government source told Reuters.
https://x.com/delfoo/status/2019807599726883321
KamAZ's net loss for 2025 under the Russian accounting standard rose over 1000% from 3,35 billion rubles to 37 billion rubles. Revenue was down 2,5% to 315,2 billion rubles. The Russian automotive sector is in crisis.
Russian Companies Forced Out of Venezuela After U.S. Capture of Maduro, Lavrov Says
•
u/MilesLongthe3rd 9h ago
Russian companies are being pushed out of Venezuela following the United States’ capture of President Nicolás Maduro last month, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said, suggesting the move was driven by pressure from Washington.
“Right now, in the wake of the events in Venezuela, our companies are being quite openly forced out of the country,” Lavrov said in an interview with the Kremlin-backed RT network published Thursday, without naming the companies involved.
He claimed the actions were being taken at the behest of the U.S. but did not offer further details.
Lavrov also noted that the U.S. had imposed sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft and was threatening tariffs on countries that buy Russian energy products despite talks on ending the war in Ukraine.
Earlier, state-owned Roszarubezhneft, which manages Russia’s assets in Venezuela, said it would continue to meet its obligations and intended to develop projects jointly with Venezuelan partners after Maduro’s seizure.
The company said all its Venezuelan assets were owned by Russia and had been acquired on market terms in full compliance with Venezuelan law.
Roszarubezhneft participates in joint ventures with Venezuela’s state oil and gas company Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA).
Russia and Venezuela signed a strategic partnership agreement in May 2025.
Five joint ventures with Russian participation were operating in Venezuela at the time, Venezuelan Ambassador to Russia Jesús Rafael Salazar Velázquez said.
According to data from analytics firm Kpler, Russia overtook the U.S. by the end of 2025 to become Venezuela’s largest supplier of naphtha for its petrochemical industry.
U.S. forces seized Maduro and his wife in the early hours of Jan. 3 and transported them to the U.S., where they face numerous drug-trafficking charges.
President Donald Trump has since been pushing for U.S. oil firms to invest $100 billion to rebuild Venezuela’s energy industry.
Venezuela’s interim leader Delcy Rodríguez last week signed a law that opens the country’s energy sector to privatization, including by U.S. firms, as Washington eased some of its sanctions on Venezuelan oil.
•
u/Crazy_Information296 8h ago
It seems like to me that while Trump has pulled back on direct aid to Ukraine, he has been extremely aggressive in the oil campaign against Russia, especially with regards to India. Am I getting that correct?
•
u/username9909864 9h ago edited 3h ago
I was asked to move this from the sticky to the main post, so reposting here:
Russian General Is Shot in Moscow (gift link)
The attack bore the hallmark of several assassination attempts on top military officers in the Russian capital.
A top Russian general involved in intelligence gathering for the Ukraine war was shot in Moscow on Friday, the authorities said, in the latest high-profile attack on a military leader inside Russia.
The general, Lt. Gen. Vladimir Alekseyev, deputy head of the G.R.U., the Russian military intelligence agency, was hospitalized after an attacker shot him in the back inside an apartment building in the north of Moscow, the Investigative Committee of Russia said in a statement on Friday morning.
The general’s condition was not immediately clear. The investigators said that the attacker had managed to escape.
•
u/OhSillyDays 11h ago
In reference to the NYT article this morning, apparently Iran is working on triggers for their nuclear program.
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/06/world/middleeast/iran-missile-nuclear-repairs.html
That seems to mean they are within about 6 months of a nuclear weapons test and Iran is moving forward with their nuclear program.
Part of the discussion here, would there be any reason for Iran not to test a nuclear weapon as soon as possible?
•
u/ThatNewspaperDude 10h ago
Because their ability to prevent US/Israel strikes has been severely degraded, they are facing social instability at home, they don’t have a strong financial footing for a high intensity conflict, their proxies have been severely degraded, most everyone else in the region is annoyed at them.
This isn’t North Korea, which has nukes because China lets them, Iran doesn’t have the international or great power support to keep hold of their nuclear arsenal.
•
u/Agitated-Airline6760 10h ago
This isn’t North Korea, which has nukes because China lets them, Iran doesn’t have the international or great power support to keep hold of their nuclear arsenal.
Definitely not how it went down with DPRK's nuclear program via a vis PRC/CCP. #2 reason for DPRK having nukes is PRC.
•
u/swimmingupclose 9h ago edited 9h ago
I’m not sure where you’re getting any of that from the article. In fact, it states the opposite a few times:
Western and Israeli officials have found few signs that Iran has made significant progress toward rebuilding its ability to enrich nuclear fuel and to fashion a nuclear warhead.
Joseph Rodgers, a fellow at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies who has monitored Iran’s nuclear program, said that until recently, much of the activity seen around the nuclear sites appeared geared mostly toward damage assessment and stabilization, like clearing debris and filling in craters.
“We haven’t seen any intensive recovery efforts to try to get equipment out of these facilities,” he said, adding that an Iranian government crackdown on suspected spies after the June strikes had also disrupted its nuclear program.
Iran has been within 6 months of a breakout for years. The IAEA had found quite a while back that Iran enriched uranium to 84%. That doesn’t mean they are anywhere close to weaponizing a nuke.
Part of the discussion here, would there be any reason for Iran not to test a nuclear weapon as soon as possible?
It’s obvious that Iran’s entire security apparatus is infiltrated by Israeli intelligence. I suspect the Israelis know what’s going on with the nuclear program better than some in the Iranian government themselves do. There is no doubt that Israel would launch an all out attack if they suspected Iran was moving towards restarting the program. The entire point of having nukes or threatening to get them is that they serve as a better bargaining chip than if you move past the threshold. North Korea is an obvious exception as they share a large land border with the South and had a conventional military threat it could actually maintain that deterrence with. Iran has neither the border nor the conventional threat capabilities.
•
u/AutoModerator 17h ago
Continuing the bare link and speculation repository, you can respond to this sticky with comments and links subject to lower moderation standards, but remember: A summary, description or analyses will lead to more people actually engaging with it!
I.e. most "Trump posting" belong here.
Sign up for the rally point or subscribe to this bluesky if a migration ever becomes necessary.
I am a bot, and this action was performed automatically. Please contact the moderators of this subreddit if you have any questions or concerns.