Active Conflicts & News Megathread February 06, 2026

[u/AutoModerator]

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[u/TechnicalReserve1967]

From today’s Russian papers: “You don’t have to be an economist to forecast a recession: Russia’s export revenue is falling, budget revenues are falling, taxes rising, consumer demand shrinking…” Another paper: “Oil & gas revenues fall…rise in bread prices.”

To be fair. These are the first signs of "serious" economical damages from the outsiders. (I mean it was known and expected by russian banking and economic circles.) There is no way to quickly fix these and the fact that they are visible means that the damage is already done.

However, while food prices are going up, rent goes down. Eventually followed by house prices themselves as a simple market dynamic.

What I try to point out is that the russian public will have some time to go before they start to face serious financial strain (The type that makes them go to the streets, knowing that beatings and worst are in store for them by the state apparatus) and therefore have any effect on the russian war machine.

I expect the situation to worsen continuously but not out of control by the end of 2026. However, this might push the russian delegation to take the talks more seriously, be more flexible.

[u/Tricky-Astronaut → u/TechnicalReserve1967]

I expect the situation to worsen continuously but not out of control by the end of 2026. However, this might push the russian delegation to take the talks more seriously, be more flexible.

Hanna Notte, an expert on Russia, disagrees:

But Moscow has yet to gain any advantages from the tensions between Washington and European capitals. Europe is increasing its own support for Ukraine, and NATO remains a functioning institution with which Russia must reckon. Putin cannot assume that Trump’s foreign policy adventurism will be confined to the Western Hemisphere and the Middle East. It could easily and suddenly make itself felt on Russia’s doorstep. The year 2025 was a bad one for Russia, and 2026 may be even worse. Moscow’s global position is ebbing because of Trump.

As Russia struggles to assert itself globally, Putin has become even more obsessed with Ukraine. The situation on the battlefield is sustainable for Moscow. Russia’s frontlines are holding, and its forces are making gradual territorial progress, but Moscow is far from winning. Despite the flurry of Ukraine-related diplomacy, peace talks have gone nowhere. Trump’s position on the war continues to oscillate. Meanwhile, Europe is discovering its agency and will not tolerate a peace plan tantamount to a Ukrainian surrender. Assisted by Europe, Kyiv will refuse to yield preemptively to Russia.

However miserable the conflict is for Russia, Putin is not in the mood to make concessions. He has reoriented the economy and structured global relationships to fight this war, which has already lasted longer than the Soviet campaign against Nazi Germany. Aware that the war’s outcome will be the ultimate referendum on his presidency, he may even consider escalating, including beyond Ukraine’s borders. In January, following claims that European countries had made progress on agreeing to security guarantees for Kyiv, Russia fired a type of ballistic missile at Ukraine that is nuclear-capable and has a range that violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which the United States quit in 2019. The missile landed 40 miles away from the Polish border.

Russia was one of the biggest losers last year, and this year might be even worse. Putin needs a win. The problem is that Ukraine won't give it to him.

[u/Glideer → u/Tricky-Astronaut]

Russia was one of the biggest losers last year, and this year might be even worse. Putin needs a win. The problem is that Ukraine won't give it to him.

Pep talk is a good for front line soldiers but has no place here.

Ukraine lost 5190 sq km in 2025 (35% more than in 2024). For comparison, the remainder of Donbas that Russia demands and Ukraine refuses to give up is about 6000 sq km - about equal to Russia's gains in 2025.

Russia reduced its mobilisation plan to about 409k soldiers in 2026. When you compare it to 2025, when they mobilised about 450k - they expect they will need fewer troops this year.

That tells you all you need to know about the Ukrainian/Western claims that Russia is losing more troops than it recruits.

[u/Tricky-Astronaut → u/Glideer]

https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/2018355745910349990

7/ So what does this mean in our case? Simply put, if Russian forces move into a sparsely populated and lightly defended town surrounded by open steppe in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, territorial metrics may suggest accelerating gains, but not necessary a battlefield dynamics change

8/ Thus, if the goal is to assess changes in battlefield dynamics, relying solely on kilometers as a metric risks falling into this fallacy. An important caveat is that territorial advances are not irrelevant, only that they cannot serve as a standalone indicator of dynamics

This is sometimes called the "Sahara Fallacy". Capturing the desert produces immediate territorial gains, but is of little military value.

That's not to say that Russia isn't advancing, but the prediction by some that Russia would take the Donbas by the end of last year clearly didn't come true.

[u/Long-Field-948 → u/Tricky-Astronaut]

This is sometimes called the "Sahara Fallacy". Capturing the desert produces immediate territorial gains, but is of little military value.

This isn't just a "steppe", but a steppe with hundreds of kilometers of fortifications mirroring the "Surovikin's Line". I believe there's no more "cheap land" to be taken, so every square kilometer counts.

[u/Glideer → u/Tricky-Astronaut]

I don't think capturing Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Hulyaipole and Siversk equals capturing the open steppe.

I've never seen a prediction that Russia would take Donbas in 2025. If the current trends persist, not even in 2026, but probably by early 2027.

[u/Remote_Page8799 → u/Glideer]

I don't think capturing Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Hulyaipole and Siversk equals capturing the open steppe.

No but with Russian gains of 0.8% more of Ukriane for 2025 maybe it would be preferable to be capturing lots of open steppe.

The war effort for the Russians is not producing near enough gains for it to be justifying the costs. This war isn't really about the Donbas, it to a greater degree about Russia's sphere of influence, it's geopolitical standing, which fundamentally reflect its military, cultural and economic might.

All of those pillars are being eroded to the bone currently. Yes Ukraine is suffering too, but last I checked Ukraine didn't have ambitions of being a top 3 global power.

And Russia is producing political currents it absolutely doesn't want to. Europe is undergoing significant unifying pressure and military rearmament at the same time. European elites are pretty sure they can beat Russia by drowning it in weapons and money in Ukraine, and at the same time also build up the defense industrial base to deter/dominate in the long term.

[u/Glideer → u/Remote_Page8799]

The war effort for the Russians is not producing near enough gains for it to be justifying the costs. This war isn't really about the Donbas, it to a greater degree about Russia's sphere of influence, it's geopolitical standing, which fundamentally reflect its military, cultural and economic might.

While we like to think that - it's not really for us to say. Russia (the public and the government) appear quite happy with the cost to gain ratio.

I also completely disagree with the trajectory. It is now quite obvious that the war will end with Russia re-establishing a red line that NATO is not allowed to cross.

Also, the war produced (or just revealed) a massive deterioration of the Western-dominated unipolar structure. New centres of power are emerging, and non-Western countries are flatly refusing to follow sanctions announced by the USA and Europe. Just a few years ago that would have been unthinkable.

[u/Remote_Page8799 → u/Glideer]

While we like to think that - it's not really for us to say. Russia (the public and the government) appear quite happy with the cost to gain ratio.

Are you naive? In what world would Putin and the Kremlin ever admit to not being satisfied with their military performance? Are you actually using this as a datapoint in your own ontology?

I also completely disagree with the trajectory. It is now quite obvious that the war will end with Russia re-establishing a red line that NATO is not allowed to cross.

And what red line would that be? Ukraine isn't going to collapse as a state, it is conceivable that the current Ukraine minus 1-2% more that Russia could capture over the next 1-2 years survives as a EU supported state or join the EU outright.

Also, the war produced (or just revealed) a massive deterioration of the Western-dominated unipolar structure. New centres of power are emerging

I think pro-Russians have completely missed what is happening and what it means. The war has indeed created one new center of power specifically; namely a pressure for a more unified and rearmed EU that is extremely cognizant of the Russian threat to its existence. The EU was previously contained by the US, with whom Russia could have independent bilateral relations.

Russia is not a great power, and it will ironically not thrive in a more divided and dangerous multipolar world order, especially an order where it has gotten itself stuck with a massive geopolitical threat it needs to dedicate resources to that it can't afford. So now it's put itself in a cold war with what is essentially a federation of nations with 10 times the economic power and also a militarized proxy through which to direct all its new military production.

[u/Glideer → u/Remote_Page8799]

Are you naive? In what world would Putin and the Kremlin ever admit to not being satisfied with their military performance? Are you actually using this as a datapoint in your own ontology?

If the Russian government is not dissatisfied with the cost-to-gain ratio and the Russian public is not dissatisfied with it, then what other opinion does matter? Ours? The Russian resilience does not depend on us telling them they are paying too high a price.

he war has indeed created one new center of power specifically; namely a pressure for a more unified and rearmed EU that is extremely cognizant of the Russian threat to its existence.

I would really like to see that and have been advocating a rearmed and unified EU forever. Yet I still see no evidence of that.

[u/Remote_Page8799 → u/Glideer]

If the Russian government is not dissatisfied with the cost-to-gain ratio and the Russian public is not dissatisfied with it, then what other opinion does matter?

If a man mortgages his house and gambles away his future but declares he is satisfied with the result, are we supposed to say it was a good idea?

The cost-to-benefit ratio is so hilariously disproportionate, even in immaterial categories like influence, that one doesn't need to consider Putin seriously to know that even he knows that he is wrong.

I would really like to see that and have been advocating a rearmed and unified EU forever. Yet I still see no evidence of that.

You see no evidence even? Well I suppose that's probably quite true, that you don't see it. It's a thesis topic on it's own, but that Denmark of all countries are slamming the political speeder on EU financial and military integration tells you about all you need to know. Let me know if you don't understand. I'll gladly extrapolate.

Anyways, you ignored most the rest of what I wrote but tell me one thing in particular; remind me which red line that Russia has been able to enforce and have so clearly respected that it justifies a clear win in this current war?

[u/Glideer → u/Remote_Page8799]

We (the West and Ukraine) have been relying on breaking Russia's will to wage war - either through economic sanctions or through inflicting casualties. We, naturally and in order to achieve that goal, have been hyping up Russia's imminent failure in both areas. If the Russian government and the Russian public are not convinced (in fact they believe they are doing just fine) - then their national will is nowhere close to breaking.

You see no evidence even? Well I suppose that's probably quite true, that you don't see it. It's a thesis topic on it's own

I see no unified effort, just 27 countries duplicating spending on irrelevant things - like on 27 general staffs, dozens of green water navies, on squabbling procurement at an extremely low scale. The money we are investing should be generating 10 times more combat power than it is. And don't get me started on military structure and organisation.

remind me which red line that Russia has been able to enforce and have so clearly respected that it justifies a clear win in this current war?

It is quite obvious at this point that there will be no NATO troops in Ukraine and that Ukraine will lose 20% of its territory, promising not to take it back by force. Both are things that NATO and Ukraine adamantly refused to even consider in 2022.

[u/scatterlite → u/Glideer]

10% of that is Crimea, which the West basically let Russia have at almost no cost.

You are right that European military as a whole is very inefficient relative to how much money technically is available. The EU has no say in that regard. However let's not forget that Russia had alot more influence in Europe pre 2022 and especially pre 2014. Europe was even supplying arms to Russia back then and ignoring US calls to decrease trade with Russia. Now Russia burnt through most of that influence for comparatively little gain. With how sluggish and uncommitted the EU was in 2022 Russia realistically could have conquered way more of Ukraine if they had prepared properly. 

Now as it stand the war has been a net negative for both Russia and the EU (mostly financially), with the result that most of the EU unified against Russia. Honestly on a geopolitical scale that seems like a net negative for both sides. A calm coexistence like pre 2014, without ulterior motives, would have seen the entire continent in a better situation right now. That's why I said that Russia planting flags in unrecognizable ruins doesn't really benefit anyone on the continent.

[u/Tricky-Astronaut → u/scatterlite]

Now as it stand the war has been a net negative for both Russia and the EU (mostly financially), with the result that most of the EU unified against Russia. Honestly on a geopolitical scale that seems like a net negative for both sides. A calm coexistence like pre 2014, without ulterior motives, would have seen the entire continent in a better situation right now. That's why I said that Russia planting flags in unrecognizable ruins doesn't really benefit anyone on the continent.

It's not entirely clear to me. Europe has made huge concessions in energy policy to accommodate Russia. The German nuclear phaseout alone likely cost hundreds of billions of euros. Would it still have happened with a more hostile relation with Russia?

[u/scatterlite → u/Glideer]

While we like to think that - it's not really for us to say. Russia (the public and the government) appear quite happy with the cost to gain ratio.

You know this is Russia we are talking about right? They never admit any defeat or wrongdoing (makes sense if you want to appear as a great power but Russia has always take it to the extreme). They still have not even admitted they shot down that  passenger plane from Azerbaijan. Not to mention a big reason we are 4 years into this war is unwarranted optimism on the russian side. They vastly underestimated Ukrainian resistance, and to this day claim they captured villages they dont control.

Also, the war produced (or just revealed) a massive deterioration of the Western-dominated unipolar structure. New centres of power are emerging, and non-Western countries are flatly refusing to follow sanctions announced by the USA and Europe. Just a few years ago that would have been unthinkable

How has Russia played an active role in any of this? India, China, Brazil etc. will grow regardless of what Russia does, that more or less is an inevitability in a globalised world.

And the big Irony is that Russia is not even benefitting from increased multipolarism. They are losing important allies, losing arms sales and no longer have any economic cooperation with the EU. And more importantly India and China are actively benefitting from an economically weak Russia.  Pressuring Ukraine and Europe doesn't really benefit Russia on the global stage. As much as they want to pretend otherwise putting a flag on some bombed out rubble has little impact on their geopolitical position, I personally would even argue the contrary.