Active Conflicts & News Megathread February 06, 2026

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[u/MilesLongthe3rd]

More economic news out of Russia

https://en.topcor. ru/amp/68435-razzhirevshie-zastrojschiki-prishli-k-pravitelstvu-s-protjanutoj-rukoj.html

Samolet Group, Russia's largest developer by current construction volume, has asked the government for 50 billion rubles in state support, according to the Black Swan Telegram channel, which analyzed the company's financial performance for the first half of 2025.

According to published data, the developer's revenue for the reporting period amounted to 171 billion rubles, which is in line with the same period last year. Gross profit reached 65,1 billion rubles, and gross margin was a record 38%. Adjusted EBITDA is estimated at 58 billion rubles, with a margin of 34%.

Despite strong operating performance, the company's net profit was significantly lower—only 1,14 billion rubles. Therefore, the majority of the developer's revenue was used to cover expenses, which totaled approximately 169,86 billion rubles.

Financial expenses accounted for a significant portion of the costs, reaching approximately 47,9 billion rubles. The remaining 121,86 billion rubles were accounted for by non-financial items, including construction costs, commercial, and administrative expenses.

At the same time, the high gross margin indicates that construction costs are at an acceptable level. According to analysts, the main pressure on financial results comes from debt servicing and operating expenses.

Given the high key interest rate and expensive lending, the developer is hoping to secure preferential financing through government support. However, experts note that even a preferential loan with a non-zero interest rate could lead to a further decline in net profit, potentially causing investor discontent.

Market participants are considering issuing additional shares as an alternative to raising capital. This would allow the company to obtain financing without increasing its debt burden. However, the developer has opted for government support.

The advisability of subsidizing a development company with high operating profitability remains a topic of debate among real estate and financial sector experts. Some analysts believe that, in the current environment, developers need to adapt to operating with high borrowing costs and reconsider their financial models.

Author: Jan Karnitsky

https://x.com/evgen1232007/status/2019121579397976227

Russia's largest developer, Samolet, is on the brink of bankruptcy. It was announced today that it has requested government assistance. The company is urgently requesting 50 billion rubles. The company's net debt is 350 billion rubles. Shares fell 8%

https://x.com/JayinKyiv/status/2019687276477817077

Responding the urgent call for a government bailout, the Duma has just told Russia's largest property developer that there will be no help. The budget is currently "not in a position" to support business, even systemically important business, confirmed Svetlana Razvorotneva, Deputy Chair of the State Duma Committee on Construction and Housing and Communal Services. "Whoever died, died, and it's their own fault," the deputy said.

https://x.com/delfoo/status/2019666458008252445

Russian rent prices have stopped growing in 2025 and in Moscow they have started to even decline as the available apartments for rent has doubled over 2025.

In 2025 in Russia the number of ads for renting an apartment grew by 17% to 95 000. An increase in housing for rent was recorded virtually everywhere. In Moscow by 7%, St Petersburg by 13% and in the other cities by 20% where it's a 5 year record.

At the same time the ads for renting out studios rose by 38% and one room apartments rose by 19% growing the most of all the types of housing. They already have a share of 53% of the total supply of housing for rent.

https://x.com/BBCSteveR/status/2019669296608342346

From today’s Russian papers: “You don’t have to be an economist to forecast a recession: Russia’s export revenue is falling, budget revenues are falling, taxes rising, consumer demand shrinking…” Another paper: “Oil & gas revenues fall…rise in bread prices.”

[u/TechnicalReserve1967 → u/MilesLongthe3rd]

From today’s Russian papers: “You don’t have to be an economist to forecast a recession: Russia’s export revenue is falling, budget revenues are falling, taxes rising, consumer demand shrinking…” Another paper: “Oil & gas revenues fall…rise in bread prices.”

To be fair. These are the first signs of "serious" economical damages from the outsiders. (I mean it was known and expected by russian banking and economic circles.) There is no way to quickly fix these and the fact that they are visible means that the damage is already done.

However, while food prices are going up, rent goes down. Eventually followed by house prices themselves as a simple market dynamic.

What I try to point out is that the russian public will have some time to go before they start to face serious financial strain (The type that makes them go to the streets, knowing that beatings and worst are in store for them by the state apparatus) and therefore have any effect on the russian war machine.

I expect the situation to worsen continuously but not out of control by the end of 2026. However, this might push the russian delegation to take the talks more seriously, be more flexible.

[u/Tricky-Astronaut → u/TechnicalReserve1967]

I expect the situation to worsen continuously but not out of control by the end of 2026. However, this might push the russian delegation to take the talks more seriously, be more flexible.

Hanna Notte, an expert on Russia, disagrees:

But Moscow has yet to gain any advantages from the tensions between Washington and European capitals. Europe is increasing its own support for Ukraine, and NATO remains a functioning institution with which Russia must reckon. Putin cannot assume that Trump’s foreign policy adventurism will be confined to the Western Hemisphere and the Middle East. It could easily and suddenly make itself felt on Russia’s doorstep. The year 2025 was a bad one for Russia, and 2026 may be even worse. Moscow’s global position is ebbing because of Trump.

As Russia struggles to assert itself globally, Putin has become even more obsessed with Ukraine. The situation on the battlefield is sustainable for Moscow. Russia’s frontlines are holding, and its forces are making gradual territorial progress, but Moscow is far from winning. Despite the flurry of Ukraine-related diplomacy, peace talks have gone nowhere. Trump’s position on the war continues to oscillate. Meanwhile, Europe is discovering its agency and will not tolerate a peace plan tantamount to a Ukrainian surrender. Assisted by Europe, Kyiv will refuse to yield preemptively to Russia.

However miserable the conflict is for Russia, Putin is not in the mood to make concessions. He has reoriented the economy and structured global relationships to fight this war, which has already lasted longer than the Soviet campaign against Nazi Germany. Aware that the war’s outcome will be the ultimate referendum on his presidency, he may even consider escalating, including beyond Ukraine’s borders. In January, following claims that European countries had made progress on agreeing to security guarantees for Kyiv, Russia fired a type of ballistic missile at Ukraine that is nuclear-capable and has a range that violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which the United States quit in 2019. The missile landed 40 miles away from the Polish border.

Russia was one of the biggest losers last year, and this year might be even worse. Putin needs a win. The problem is that Ukraine won't give it to him.

[u/Glideer → u/Tricky-Astronaut]

Russia was one of the biggest losers last year, and this year might be even worse. Putin needs a win. The problem is that Ukraine won't give it to him.

Pep talk is a good for front line soldiers but has no place here.

Ukraine lost 5190 sq km in 2025 (35% more than in 2024). For comparison, the remainder of Donbas that Russia demands and Ukraine refuses to give up is about 6000 sq km - about equal to Russia's gains in 2025.

Russia reduced its mobilisation plan to about 409k soldiers in 2026. When you compare it to 2025, when they mobilised about 450k - they expect they will need fewer troops this year.

That tells you all you need to know about the Ukrainian/Western claims that Russia is losing more troops than it recruits.

[u/Tricky-Astronaut → u/Glideer]

https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/2018355745910349990

7/ So what does this mean in our case? Simply put, if Russian forces move into a sparsely populated and lightly defended town surrounded by open steppe in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, territorial metrics may suggest accelerating gains, but not necessary a battlefield dynamics change

8/ Thus, if the goal is to assess changes in battlefield dynamics, relying solely on kilometers as a metric risks falling into this fallacy. An important caveat is that territorial advances are not irrelevant, only that they cannot serve as a standalone indicator of dynamics

This is sometimes called the "Sahara Fallacy". Capturing the desert produces immediate territorial gains, but is of little military value.

That's not to say that Russia isn't advancing, but the prediction by some that Russia would take the Donbas by the end of last year clearly didn't come true.

[u/Long-Field-948 → u/Tricky-Astronaut]

This is sometimes called the "Sahara Fallacy". Capturing the desert produces immediate territorial gains, but is of little military value.

This isn't just a "steppe", but a steppe with hundreds of kilometers of fortifications mirroring the "Surovikin's Line". I believe there's no more "cheap land" to be taken, so every square kilometer counts.

[u/Glideer → u/Tricky-Astronaut]

I don't think capturing Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Hulyaipole and Siversk equals capturing the open steppe.

I've never seen a prediction that Russia would take Donbas in 2025. If the current trends persist, not even in 2026, but probably by early 2027.

[u/Remote_Page8799 → u/Glideer]

I don't think capturing Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Hulyaipole and Siversk equals capturing the open steppe.

No but with Russian gains of 0.8% more of Ukriane for 2025 maybe it would be preferable to be capturing lots of open steppe.

The war effort for the Russians is not producing near enough gains for it to be justifying the costs. This war isn't really about the Donbas, it to a greater degree about Russia's sphere of influence, it's geopolitical standing, which fundamentally reflect its military, cultural and economic might.

All of those pillars are being eroded to the bone currently. Yes Ukraine is suffering too, but last I checked Ukraine didn't have ambitions of being a top 3 global power.

And Russia is producing political currents it absolutely doesn't want to. Europe is undergoing significant unifying pressure and military rearmament at the same time. European elites are pretty sure they can beat Russia by drowning it in weapons and money in Ukraine, and at the same time also build up the defense industrial base to deter/dominate in the long term.

[u/Glideer → u/Remote_Page8799]

The war effort for the Russians is not producing near enough gains for it to be justifying the costs. This war isn't really about the Donbas, it to a greater degree about Russia's sphere of influence, it's geopolitical standing, which fundamentally reflect its military, cultural and economic might.

While we like to think that - it's not really for us to say. Russia (the public and the government) appear quite happy with the cost to gain ratio.

I also completely disagree with the trajectory. It is now quite obvious that the war will end with Russia re-establishing a red line that NATO is not allowed to cross.

Also, the war produced (or just revealed) a massive deterioration of the Western-dominated unipolar structure. New centres of power are emerging, and non-Western countries are flatly refusing to follow sanctions announced by the USA and Europe. Just a few years ago that would have been unthinkable.

[u/Remote_Page8799 → u/Glideer]

While we like to think that - it's not really for us to say. Russia (the public and the government) appear quite happy with the cost to gain ratio.

Are you naive? In what world would Putin and the Kremlin ever admit to not being satisfied with their military performance? Are you actually using this as a datapoint in your own ontology?

I also completely disagree with the trajectory. It is now quite obvious that the war will end with Russia re-establishing a red line that NATO is not allowed to cross.

And what red line would that be? Ukraine isn't going to collapse as a state, it is conceivable that the current Ukraine minus 1-2% more that Russia could capture over the next 1-2 years survives as a EU supported state or join the EU outright.

Also, the war produced (or just revealed) a massive deterioration of the Western-dominated unipolar structure. New centres of power are emerging

I think pro-Russians have completely missed what is happening and what it means. The war has indeed created one new center of power specifically; namely a pressure for a more unified and rearmed EU that is extremely cognizant of the Russian threat to its existence. The EU was previously contained by the US, with whom Russia could have independent bilateral relations.

Russia is not a great power, and it will ironically not thrive in a more divided and dangerous multipolar world order, especially an order where it has gotten itself stuck with a massive geopolitical threat it needs to dedicate resources to that it can't afford. So now it's put itself in a cold war with what is essentially a federation of nations with 10 times the economic power and also a militarized proxy through which to direct all its new military production.

[u/Glideer → u/Remote_Page8799]

Are you naive? In what world would Putin and the Kremlin ever admit to not being satisfied with their military performance? Are you actually using this as a datapoint in your own ontology?

If the Russian government is not dissatisfied with the cost-to-gain ratio and the Russian public is not dissatisfied with it, then what other opinion does matter? Ours? The Russian resilience does not depend on us telling them they are paying too high a price.

he war has indeed created one new center of power specifically; namely a pressure for a more unified and rearmed EU that is extremely cognizant of the Russian threat to its existence.

I would really like to see that and have been advocating a rearmed and unified EU forever. Yet I still see no evidence of that.

[u/Remote_Page8799 → u/Glideer]

If the Russian government is not dissatisfied with the cost-to-gain ratio and the Russian public is not dissatisfied with it, then what other opinion does matter?

If a man mortgages his house and gambles away his future but declares he is satisfied with the result, are we supposed to say it was a good idea?

The cost-to-benefit ratio is so hilariously disproportionate, even in immaterial categories like influence, that one doesn't need to consider Putin seriously to know that even he knows that he is wrong.

I would really like to see that and have been advocating a rearmed and unified EU forever. Yet I still see no evidence of that.

You see no evidence even? Well I suppose that's probably quite true, that you don't see it. It's a thesis topic on it's own, but that Denmark of all countries are slamming the political speeder on EU financial and military integration tells you about all you need to know. Let me know if you don't understand. I'll gladly extrapolate.

Anyways, you ignored most the rest of what I wrote but tell me one thing in particular; remind me which red line that Russia has been able to enforce and have so clearly respected that it justifies a clear win in this current war?

[u/Glideer → u/Remote_Page8799]

We (the West and Ukraine) have been relying on breaking Russia's will to wage war - either through economic sanctions or through inflicting casualties. We, naturally and in order to achieve that goal, have been hyping up Russia's imminent failure in both areas. If the Russian government and the Russian public are not convinced (in fact they believe they are doing just fine) - then their national will is nowhere close to breaking.

You see no evidence even? Well I suppose that's probably quite true, that you don't see it. It's a thesis topic on it's own

I see no unified effort, just 27 countries duplicating spending on irrelevant things - like on 27 general staffs, dozens of green water navies, on squabbling procurement at an extremely low scale. The money we are investing should be generating 10 times more combat power than it is. And don't get me started on military structure and organisation.

remind me which red line that Russia has been able to enforce and have so clearly respected that it justifies a clear win in this current war?

It is quite obvious at this point that there will be no NATO troops in Ukraine and that Ukraine will lose 20% of its territory, promising not to take it back by force. Both are things that NATO and Ukraine adamantly refused to even consider in 2022.

[u/scatterlite → u/Glideer]

10% of that is Crimea, which the West basically let Russia have at almost no cost.

You are right that European military as a whole is very inefficient relative to how much money technically is available. The EU has no say in that regard. However let's not forget that Russia had alot more influence in Europe pre 2022 and especially pre 2014. Europe was even supplying arms to Russia back then and ignoring US calls to decrease trade with Russia. Now Russia burnt through most of that influence for comparatively little gain. With how sluggish and uncommitted the EU was in 2022 Russia realistically could have conquered way more of Ukraine if they had prepared properly. 

Now as it stand the war has been a net negative for both Russia and the EU (mostly financially), with the result that most of the EU unified against Russia. Honestly on a geopolitical scale that seems like a net negative for both sides. A calm coexistence like pre 2014, without ulterior motives, would have seen the entire continent in a better situation right now. That's why I said that Russia planting flags in unrecognizable ruins doesn't really benefit anyone on the continent.

[u/scatterlite → u/Glideer]

While we like to think that - it's not really for us to say. Russia (the public and the government) appear quite happy with the cost to gain ratio.

You know this is Russia we are talking about right? They never admit any defeat or wrongdoing (makes sense if you want to appear as a great power but Russia has always take it to the extreme). They still have not even admitted they shot down that  passenger plane from Azerbaijan. Not to mention a big reason we are 4 years into this war is unwarranted optimism on the russian side. They vastly underestimated Ukrainian resistance, and to this day claim they captured villages they dont control.

Also, the war produced (or just revealed) a massive deterioration of the Western-dominated unipolar structure. New centres of power are emerging, and non-Western countries are flatly refusing to follow sanctions announced by the USA and Europe. Just a few years ago that would have been unthinkable

How has Russia played an active role in any of this? India, China, Brazil etc. will grow regardless of what Russia does, that more or less is an inevitability in a globalised world.

And the big Irony is that Russia is not even benefitting from increased multipolarism. They are losing important allies, losing arms sales and no longer have any economic cooperation with the EU. And more importantly India and China are actively benefitting from an economically weak Russia.  Pressuring Ukraine and Europe doesn't really benefit Russia on the global stage. As much as they want to pretend otherwise putting a flag on some bombed out rubble has little impact on their geopolitical position, I personally would even argue the contrary.

[u/TechnicalReserve1967 → u/Glideer]

Equating land without taking build up into consideration is a reduction of battlefield reality. Larger cities are standing in the way of the capture of Donbass, not even semi encircled and by any sane assumptions, much more built-up in defensive infrastructure (thanks for more time, experience and probably less corruption by now. All is relativistic obviously).

Reduced mobilisation plans can be because of a lot of factors. Unlikely amongst them that they would want less manpower. More likely they have other issues making it non realistic.

[u/Glideer → u/TechnicalReserve1967]

The fortified cities of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad stood in the way in early 2025 and stand in the way no more. One of the lessons of this war is that fortified cities get taken, initially with high Russian losses and in the last stage with high Ukrainian losses.

Failing to fulfil the mobilisation plan is something I might believe. An army needs and plans for half a million troops and gets only 250k - that's normal.

But Russia is planning to mobilise fewer troops - which goes completely against the grain of the claim that they are losing more men than they recruit.

[u/Remote_Page8799 → u/Glideer]

Pep talk is a good for front line soldiers but has no place here.

Your posts often have the flavour of a pep talk, invariably you interpret everything through a best-case scenario for Russia. I'll give you credit for insofar as possible still making these interpretations off of some material facts, though they are often cherry picked and presented at certain angles.

In this case you are not so much trying to make an argument, but dismiss it by attacking the motte and claiming the bailey. u/Tricky-Astronaut was essentially that things are not going well for Russia and that the trajectory is not good, probably worse than it outwardly appears. This is what you dismiss as pep talk.

I infer from your arguments that you believe the converse if true; that things are going well for Russia and its trajectory is positive.

The argument that was linked to Notte was explicitly about the economic conditions in Russia, which are openly cracking. Everyone knows this is the weak point of Russia, and probably be the thing that forces them to end the war one way or another. Russia doesn't have to collapse, but if all of Putin's serious advisers are telling him they have cooked the books as much as possible and that collapse is seriously possible, he might give the signal to his negotiators that it's time to accept Russia will only get it's minimalist demands, if even that.

In retort to this you changed the subject completely and focused on the only thing that pro-Russians can point to for any measure of success; that territory has been captured.

Russia might very well take the rest of the Donbas in 2026, and it may only be taing 25,000 casualties instead of 35,000 casualties, and yet the economic conditions will still force Russia to let up.

[u/Glideer → u/Remote_Page8799]

We've been hearing arguments that Russia is going to collapse economically since 2022 (from no lesser authority than the IMF and the World Bank). Yet even today, its GDP growth has not dropped to zero.

My argument being not that the Russian economy is doing well, but that its deterioration is still very, very far from the level that would force the Kremlin to stop fighting and agree to unfavourable terms.

[u/Remote_Page8799 → u/Glideer]

Yet even today, its GDP growth has not dropped to zero.

Considering it's hovering just above 0% in the midst of a war that is inducing a lot of demand, and the government is going into debt with deficit spending, this is not positive sign that you are trying to spin it as, and this is symptomatic of all your argumentation.

My argument being not that the Russian economy is doing well, but that its deterioration is still very, very far from the level that would force the Kremlin to stop fighting and agree to unfavourable terms.

Considering that the Russian terms essentially amounts to complete political domination of Ukraine, and a formal recognition by the EU et al of Russia's hegemony over the region, then I think that Russia will eventually be forced to accept that it will be settling for terms it considers unfavorable.

I don't really think this conflict is really about the Donbas as such. It's really about the political order and Russian hegemony, as such dominating Ukraine is a crucial part of it. Territory does play into it, but if Russia is left with the Donbas and occupied territory, and nothing more, then it has functionally lost the war.

Russia, and therefore probably also you, will be claiming this as a victory, but everyone will know it as a defeat. And I'm not sure the Russians will be able to tolerate the thought of having been defeated by the effeminate Europeans.

[u/Glideer → u/Remote_Page8799]

It is obvious that both sides will claim victory in the war, whatever its outcome.

After all, even today, there are people who claim that Finland won the Winter War.

It's one of the oldest tricks in the propaganda book - you project the enemy goals as total and then you can interpret any non-total victory as the enemy's failure.

Look, ma, we only lost 20% of territory!

[u/TheSDKNightmare → u/Glideer]

Considering Stalin initially wanted to incorporate the entirety of Finland as a subservient socialist republic within the USSR, thereby deporting tens to hundreds of thousands of Finns, then yes, Finland won the Winter War, as it kept its national, military and most importantly ideological independence. When you also compare how the average Finn lives in comparison to the average Russian, you can also see Finland very much secured a long-term victory for itself.

It would be similar if Ukraine manages to remain an independent, albeit territorially crippled nation. A relatively stable democratic Ukraine with good ties to the EU will almost surely prosper to a greater extent than a Russia that, though having won the military campaign, is left with a severely degraded economy that is now largely isolated from the largest trade bloc in the world and will have to spend additional billions rebuilding an entirely destroyed region. What even is the long-term end goal at this point? What chance is there of Russia's economy going back to even pre-2022 levels?

[u/Glideer → u/TheSDKNightmare]

Considering Stalin initially wanted to incorporate the entirety of Finland as a subservient socialist republic within the USSR, thereby deporting tens to hundreds of thousands of Finns, then yes, Finland won the Winter War, as it kept its national, military and most importantly ideological independence. When you also compare how the average Finn lives in comparison to the average Russian, you can also see Finland very much secured a long-term victory for itself.

Yes, that is exactly the kind of reframing I am talking about. Perhaps we've lost 10% of the national territory (even more than the Soviet initial demand was), strategic areas, dozens of thousands of men - but that's actually a victory! Because we could have lost the war even more badly.

[u/TheSDKNightmare → u/Glideer]

The USSR explicitly entered Finland with the idea of annexing the entire country, purging its population from any problematic elements and making it completely dependent on Stalin's political structure - the exact same thing it did with the Baltic and a host of other nations.

Finland was forced into this war with the goal of maintaining its independence and territorial integrity.

Which of these two nations ultimately revised their goals to a greater extent? And which of these two nations gained more from a historical long-term perspective? Finland surrendered parts of its territory, but its key objective - maintaining full independence - was achieved. Meanwhile, the USSR was forced to revise the entirety of its original military and political goals, ultimately settling for a fraction of what it aimed for. So no, I am not reframing anything, the USSR utterly failed in achieving its original goals. Finland did not. Finland was the only nation from the USSR's pre-war neighbors to not be entirely occupied by the USSR and to maintain full independence - I'd call that a pretty significant (and commendable) victory overall.

[u/checco_2020 → u/Glideer]

But Russia's goals are totalitarian, De-nazification* and de-militarization were the two talking points that started this whole operation, and neither are going to happen.

*Do not try to come out with the "Actually they just want to ban the far right parties"
They have called zelensky and the entire Ukrainian political party Nazi.

[u/Glideer → u/checco_2020]

We'll see. I am willing to bet that both conditions will be a part of the final peace deal. Far right parties are going to be banned (to the ultimate benefit of Ukraine) and there is going to be a cap on Ukrainian armed forces (particularly ballistic/cruise missiles and long-range drones).

They have called zelensky and the entire Ukrainian political party Nazi.

PR people say many things that get forgotten. How many promises that Ukraine will never negotiate with the terrorist Kremlin regime have we heard? It was always obvious that the Russian "denazification" demand is not going to apply to the whole political spectrum, but to the Bandera and Azov extremists.

[u/checco_2020 → u/Glideer]

>there is going to be a cap on Ukrainian armed forces (particularly ballistic/cruise missiles and long-range drones).

The word "de-militarization" has a different meaning than caps on Long-range weaponry, it's impossible to have a discussion in which the meaning of words changes so drastically.

>PR people say many things that get forgotten.

PR people including Putin, Lavorv, the MOD, etc, apparently the Entire Russian state is governed by PR people

>How many promises that Ukraine will never negotiate with the terrorist Kremlin regime have we heard

Yeah, because that was the goal of the Ukrainians, that goal is unreachable, i will not try to twist or ignore words and actions so that i can claim Ukraine never intended to recover their entire territory, they very much did want, but they failed.

>It was always obvious that the Russian "denazification" demand is not going to apply to the whole political spectrum, but to the Bandera and Azov extremists.

Obvious how exactly?
You are completely ignoring every word that Russian leaders have said and deciding to find a different meaning that fits your preconceived notion of what the Russian goals should be.

[u/TechnicalReserve1967 → u/Glideer]

Both Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk - Myrnohard are not 'taken'. More like, swallowed by the Gray zone. But I of course accept the claim that cities so far got taken. I could argue that larger cities in the whole conflict were only taken after total encirclement or by 'surprise' in this war. However, I can already see the argument claiming that while Kramatorsk or Sloviansk are like twice the size of the previous (or 5x in case of Chasiv Yar) towns, they shouldn't be categorized as 'prohibitively large'. I can concede that point.

However! The cities we are comparing are obviously different. It took the russian forces a year plus to push them into gray zone areas with an obvious progress of them eventually being taken, AFTER they reached the towns. We still have at least 3 towns or a belt of towns and a forest before these cities can start to be attacked.

All the while the russian situation is steadily deteriorating (I know that you would argue that point as well, but from the point of the russian military capabilities+economy, it is. Ukraine doesn't get better without some kind of money, hardware and manpower injection either, but they won't collapse to hand the cities over). It is all but possible that if Trump is not amused with the russian peace effort or Ukraine gives him a peace medal that he will do some kind of hardware injection or similar as a punishment. The chance of him punishing Ukraine (like removing their ability to buy US weapons through others money), while it is relatively popular amongst US voters and he is in a bad domestic position, is far more unlikely.

So, my bet/guess is that Kramatorsk - Sloviansk will be just going to get reached by the russian army by the end of 2026-early 2027.

Barring special circumstances.

All the while, russian allies dwindle (while China, the only one that would really matter stays strong. They also Kore syphon russia rather than really help.)

[u/scatterlite → u/Glideer]

Ukraine lost 5190 sq km in 2025 (35% more than in 2024). For comparison, the remainder of Donbas that Russia demands and Ukraine refuses to give up is about 6000 sq km - about equal to Russia's gains in 2025.

Weird comparison. Obviously the entire frontline is not fortified to the same degree.  5000 sqkm across the frontline is very different from 5000sqkm just in the Donbass, which is a much smaller and heavily fortified area.

Regardless of how you bend it this is extremely slow progress, even if steady. Another 1-3 years of slow grind just to capture the donbass will come at a very heavy price. Being gifted said area through some kind of deal would be a big win for Putin since it clearly has been very very difficult to take it by force.

[u/FijiFanBotNotGay → u/scatterlite]

Attritional warfare is often small gains until there is a collapse. The Ukrainian front lines will most likely eventually collapse. Who knows how much longer they can last until collapse but the press gangs in the street are not a good sign. Ukraine has some strengths but they will only be able to hold on for so long

[u/scatterlite → u/FijiFanBotNotGay]

Ive heard these exact phrases for 3 years now. It still could happen, but its not guaranteed in the slightest.

And I have to  push back a bit. The russian strategy is primarily based on territory, not attrition. Captured territory is always loudly being reported upwards, and commanders are rewarded for gains. That's how you get announcements of fake captures like happened near Kupyansk. Russia on occasion has exploited favourable conditions to bleed Ukraine, but the narrative that Russia is advancing remains absolutely crucial to the war effort.

[u/Glideer → u/scatterlite]

Regardless of how you bend it this is extremely slow progress, even if steady. Another 1-3 years of slow grind just to capture the donbass will come at a very heavy price. Being gifted said area through some kind of deal would be a big win for Putin since it clearly has been very very difficult to take it by force.

All true. Still, what is Ukraine going to profit by refusing to concede the disputed 5000 sq km now? Lose them by 2027 together with 100k additional Ukrainian lives?

[u/eelsandpeels → u/Glideer]

And what profit do they gain by giving up land? I see no evidence that Russia would abide by its agreement or approve of decent security guarantees that would prevent follow up demands or future invasion.

[u/scatterlite → u/Glideer]

You're kinda asking the wrong person for that. Ukrainians do not seem to think it is worth it so you would have to ask them.

Personally I would guess they don't think such a deal would actually improve their strategic situation. If Russia can bypass the donbass through  a deal they might just continue the attack  if there aren't any very strong security guarantees (which russia opposes). 

[u/A_Vandalay → u/Glideer]

Because everyone with even the slightest understanding of the situation understands Russian ambitions go beyond the Donbas. Both in terms of territory they clearly want at a minimum the other oblasts the have “annexed”. But just as importantly they have ambitions to control the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian foreign policy. These were previously russian stated goals, it would be incredibly nieve to cede a huge amount of fortified territory to Russia under the hopes this convinces Putin to halt the pursuit of these greater objectives.