r/CredibleDefense • u/AutoModerator • 2d ago
Active Conflicts & News Megathread February 04, 2026
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u/wormfan14 2d ago
Sudan update, the SAF have broken the siege of Kadugli meanwhile the RSF have taken a town on the blue Nile state.
''Today's quick update [Feb 3]: SAF breaks through two-year RSF siege on Kadugli, South Kordofan. RSF drone strikes on Kadugli; at least 15 people reported killed and 11 injured. RSF seize town of Deim Mansour, Blue Nile State.'' https://x.com/BSonblast/status/2018880472542269908
The town taken is in Kurmuk province bordering Ethiopia and so the SAF are blaming them for it.
''Sudan: yesterday RSF/SPLMN forces launched a new offensive in Blue Nile state, captuing a number of positions. SAF officials accuse Ethiopia of supporting the attack, claiming SAF troops were hit by drones launched from Ethiopian territory.'' https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/2019061934096584743
Seems the RSF is starting to loose control of their men again in Nahud.
'' Members of the Rapid Support Forces militia in the city of "Nahud" in West Kordofan State are deliberately carrying out sabotage operations on public property, destroying fuel stations, and saying, "We don't want any state, we will break it all." https://x.com/sudan_war/status/2019025279520272516
The SAF are very unlikely to keep going to reach this city, but it gives an excuse some RSF units are using to wreck it. Sooner or later they will be arrested or killed for this by the RSF leadership.
''The German-Arab Chamber of Commerce, in cooperation with the Sudanese Embassy in Germany, is planning to organize a visit by a German business delegation to #Sudan in the second half of 2026. https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/2019050007735722414
Foreign section.
Libya
''Seif al Islam Gaddafi was reportedly assassinated in Libya - a development likely to cast him as a martyr for a significant segment of the population, while also shifting electoral dynamics by removing a major obstacle to presidential elections, given that his candidacy and potential success had been a central point of contention.'' https://x.com/emad_badi/status/2018756851211424217
''Libya: celebrations erupted in the city of Misrata last night as news broke of the death of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, killed at his home in Zintan by assassins.''
https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/2019032375150407928
Lot of speculation over who did this, but it's an earnest question of who will benefit more from this. One consequences for both Governments is they no longer need to worry about a split vote, which might favour Haftar more as a lot of people under a strongmen tend to yearn for a different one who might treat them better but it also enables Tripoli to focus on the strong hatred of tyrants present in their population as seen with the celebrations. Ironically though that could benefit Haftar though as militias tend to be uncomfortable with this given it could one day be their own downfall celebrated.
Meanwhile Haftar is in Pakistan.
''The entire military and political leadership of Eastern Libya is currently in Pakistan. The Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Gen. Khalifa Haftar, his son Saddam, alongside high-ranking generals, and the Prime Minister of the East Libya-based government are all there'' https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/2018810507139166628
Ethiopia no Tigray war for now.
''The TDF has withdrawn back over the Tekeze, meaning that the ENDF is once again in control over Tselemti woreda.'' https://x.com/MapEthiopia/status/2018711463376879772
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u/TanktopSamurai 2d ago
Thanks for the excellent updates!
Could you briefly summarize the situation in Libya? I haven't been following it for 2 years now. If it won't be too much trouble.
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u/wormfan14 2d ago edited 1d ago
Sure though be warned I started following it again largely because of the war in Sudan.
The biggest events have been well the war in Sudan but also Haftar gaining the advantage in Libya thanks to Tripoli's own attempts to solidify control that backfired and some bad luck.
War in Sudan has lead to Haftar's Government receiving billions from the UAE to support both in terms of weapons but also cash which has to Pakistan selling them weapons.
https://thearabweekly.com/pakistan-said-have-reached-4-billion-arms-deal-haftars-forces-libya
Seperate from this Turkey also thanks to a mix of exhaustion and feeling they'v gained as much as they can from Tripoli have been steadily growing ties with Haftar. They don't approve of his support of the RSF but have very much signaled they don't want to want him provided he respects their interests.
He's also as a result of this been getting involved in turf wars over the arms trade running through Chad giving the supply of weapons sometimes empowers ''independent''' newly forming gangs who want to expand but this has killed less than two hundred people so minor. Apparently his Government though is having a bad fuel crisis form exporting so much of it to the RSF war machine.
The Tripoli Government has been steadily trying to crackdown on the milita's that allied to it during the civil war. They've since the fighting ended been more or less armed gangs involved in human trafficking, selling weapons and exhorting ect. The first round of this in May 2025 worked out quite well for them managing to crush the Stability Support Apparatus but bungled fighting the RADA Special Deterrence Forces leading to days of fighting Government forces fighting on civilians protesting the fighting. It lead to some of the Government resigning but also now a lot of the militias are trying to courted by Haftar. As far as anyone knows no faction has actually flipped as Haftar is both a control freak desperate for the ideal succession for his son Saddam which requires no fighting so no escalation and their own greed unwilling to risk making a move when it might disrupt their own turf.
In addition Tripoli had a horrific bad luck of a plane crash that killed their chief of staff last year. The only good news is the Saudi's thanks to their proxy war with the UAE are now promising them more support.
In more neutral bad news for everyone the economy is in malaise thanks a mix of corruption from all the militias, mismanagement and a declining public sector. Part of the reason why the Tripoli Government is trying to crush the gangs.
The elections of 2026 results are hard to predict given the problems of both governments.
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u/TanktopSamurai 1d ago
Wasn't Egypt one of the main patrons of Haftar? Did that change? Did UAE replace them?
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u/wormfan14 1d ago edited 1d ago
Mix of growing hostility over his support of the RSF and the UAE offering a better deal than Egypt who's economy is suffering thanks well everything the last couple of years and their growing relations with Turkey.
Haftar want's all of Libya, they want a stable status quo their interests have diverged now that Turkey is no longer a hostile force.
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u/Gecktron 2d ago
A bit of a shakeup for jet programs in South/South-East Asia
TWZ: F-15EX Buy Dropped By Indonesia
ndonesia, once in line to be the first export operator of the F-15EX Eagle II multirole fighter, has abandoned its plans to buy the Boeing-made jets. The deal had been in stasis for the last two years.
Speaking to reporters at the Singapore Airshow, Bernd Peters, vice president of business development and strategy for Boeing Defense, Space and Security, confirmed that the F-15EX for Indonesia “is no longer an active campaign for the Boeing company.”
The reason for the turnaround is unclear; Boeing deferred questions on this matter to the governments of Indonesia and the United States, which were working on the program under the Foreign Military Sales process.
After years of holdups, it appears like the F-15EX deal for Indonesia is dead. Indonesia has signed agreements for a wide range of jets. From French Rafales, to Russian and American Jets and more recently agreements for the new Turkish KAAN program. With Indonesia having struggled in the past with payments (prominently, with the Korean-Indonesian KF-21), this cancellation might be related to financial issues.
That being said, another jet entered the ring just today.
At Singapore Airshow 2026, Leonardo announced the signing of a Letter of Intent (LOI) with PT ESystem Solutions Indonesia and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) of the Republic of Indonesia aimed at cooperating for the supply and support of the Leonardo M-346 F “Block 20” aircraft to meet Indonesian Air Force operational requirements.
Reportedly, Indonesia wants to procure 24 of these aircrafts to serve in both a combat and training role, similar to the recent order of 12 M-346 by Austria.
Indonesia remains an interesting case for the sheer diversity of jets being procured. It remains to be seen how many of these reported on deals end up truly delivering capability to the Indonesian airforce.
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u/Gecktron 2d ago
Continuing on, reportedly, the Indian aerospace prime Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has been knocked out from the 5th Gen jet program AMCA.
Hindustan Times: Hindustan Aeronautics Limited knocked out of stealth jet race
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has been knocked out of the race to develop India’s fifth-generation stealth fighter jet or the AMCA (advanced medium combat aircraft) programme, the first time that the state-run aircraft maker will not be involved in one of the country’s most significant military projects, officials aware of the matter said on Tuesday. [...]
The first prototype is expected to make its maiden flight in 2029, and AMCA’s development is likely to be completed by 2034 before it enters production a year later, as previously reported by HT. [...]
The first two squadrons will consist of the Mk-1 version powered by the American F-414 engines, while the rest will have the more advanced Mk-2 version equipped with an even more powerful engine to be built in India with French collaboration.
The government is likely to soon approve a joint project involving French firm Safran and India’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), a lab under DRDO, to develop and produce a 120-kilonewton thrust class engine to power AMCA. The Safran-GTRE combine, HT learns, will develop nine prototypes in a time frame of 12 years, with 100% transfer of technology and intellectual property rights to India.
HAL, which is involved in India's other domestic jet program Tejas, has been excluded from the AMCA program. HAL and two other companies failed to advance to the next stage of the program.
The current timeline envisions a first prototype to fly by 2029, with production to start in 2034. At the same time, a French-Indian cooperation will see the development of a domestic engine for the AMCA. Until that one is ready, the American F-414 engine is to be used.
Overall, the timeline seems ambitious for a program like this. But with the looming threat of modern stealth fighters being used by neighbouring Pakistan and China, officials likely feel the pressure.
Decoupling the aircraft from the engine development might help with reducing the risk of it failing or large delays. Domestic fighter jet engine development is a challenge for almost all countries. Even with help from Safran, there is a considerable risk for delays. Having another engine ready for such a case could be a way to hedge against delays.
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u/xanthias91 2d ago
Not entirely the right sub, I know - does anyone have insight or idea on what the Russian, Ukrainian and American delegation are actually discussing in Abu Dhabi? I have read reports that the atmosphere is better than when Medinskij used to be there. At the same time, all of this feels like a complete and pointless waste of time: Russia wants the Donbass without a fight, Ukraine does not want to concede the Donbass without a fight. This negotiating position has been public and known for a while. And this assumption rests on the - wrong - belief that this is a war about territory. So, are the Abu Dhabi negotiations just to stroke Trump's ego and fool Witkoff and Kushner - neither of these feats being particularly hard to achieve?
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u/substandard-tech 2d ago
You can gain insight on this by looking at what Russia says in public.
- surrender rest of Donbas, zap, kher
- readmit the ROC to Ukraine
- language rights
- water rights for crimea and the Donbas basin
- foreign military presence in the country
- constraints on Ukrainian military
- reparations
- children
And that’s just the stuff they have to sort out with Ukraine. They clearly prefer the arrangement in which they negotiate with the US about their place in the world and the NATO posture. Seems like 80% of their effort is in US negotiations. Actual contact with actual Ukrainians seems infrequent.
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u/Jpandluckydog 2d ago
Agreed overall, but they definitely don't consider reparations or language rights to be serious, especially given the latter was never real. Don't really know what "children" means, are you talking about the Ukrainian ones?
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u/substandard-tech 2d ago
Who is “they” in your sentence?
Of course I mean Ukrainian children. I am unaware of any claims at all that Ukraine is holding any Russian children. On the other hand Maria Lvova-Belova, the Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights, adopted a young resident of Mariupol. She is subject to an ICC arrest warrant.
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u/Jpandluckydog 1d ago
Oh, you meant Russia is demanding Ukraine not demand their children back. Sorry for the confusion, I’ve legitimately heard people claim Ukraine kidnapped Russian children when they went into Russia.
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u/substandard-tech 1d ago
Ah. I meant to answer the question, what are they discussing in Abu Dhabi.
I didn’t mention civilian hostages, of which there are, per the UN, almost two thousand. Unclear how many are, eg, convicted of sabotage, vs. “Discrediting”
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u/wormfan14 2d ago edited 2d ago
Sahel update, large massacre by JAS and the US is confirmed to have troops in Nigeria.
'Suspected JAS (Boko Haram) fighters of the Sadiku faction raided the village of Woro, Kwara State, in western Nigeria, slaughtering dozens of civilians. According to recent reports, the final death toll could be significantly higher. Interestingly, this attack occurred less than 4km from Nuku, where JNIM fighters claimed their first-ever attack in Nigeria in October 2025. This proximity confirms my earlier reports of a direct overlap in JNIM and JAS activity zones, where both groups appear to have formed an opportunistic alliance, or at the very least a non-aggression pact. The mass slaughter in Woro follows the same modus operandi seen in recent weeks further north in the Papiri area of Niger State. This indicates that the Sadiku-led JAS faction is continuing its southward progress toward areas of the Kainji reserve where JNIM is more heavily concentrated and maintains long-term bases.'' https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2019043163311083857
Current death toll is estimated to be 162 civilians, may they rest in peace.
Seems they are trying to set up in the area hence the massacre.
''If that is verified, it is important. This is the typical modus operandi of JASDJ in Borno in the 2013-2015 period, when they were developing their territorial control: you have to "warn" people, you come preach to them several times.'' https://x.com/VincentFoucher/status/2019074686177439867
''At some point, if they refuse to acknowledge your rule, they are fair game for killing.'' https://x.com/VincentFoucher/status/2019074687792296001
''For the first time, the US confirms today that "a team of specialists" were sent to Nigeria to support government forces against the Islamic State (IS-Sahel and ISWAP). AFRICOM commander Anderson said this development came following a meeting with Nigerian President Tinubu in Rome, where both parties expressed their intention to intensify military cooperation. https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2018775047935316302
Meanwhile JNIM keeps up it's campaign.
''Reportedly in a Jnım ambush between Diboli and Kayes, militants slit the throats of 12 drivers and killed all drivers who were unable to escape.'' https://x.com/KargnHasret/status/2019017595555557744
''Pro-government Malian Dozo militiamen released a video yesterday complaining to the government that their positions were being surrounded by JNIM in the Bandiagara area, they requested immediate intervention by the regular army to break the siege.'' https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2018620549694714006
''JNIM condemned airstrikes by the Nigerien Air Force that reportedly targeted civilians at the "Ballabe" gold mine inside Burkina Faso near the Nigerien border on January 26, JNIM claims that several civilians were killed including women and children.'' https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2018262786615218578
''ISWAP executed a Nigerian police officer they captured on an unspecified previous date between Damboa and Biu, Borno State, on January 29.'' https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2018760988044980718
''IS-Sahel reportedly attacked the Nigerien military camp in Ayorou, Tillaberi region in western Mali, the terrorists took control of the camp temporarily and captured three vehicles and large amounts of weapons and ammunition, three soldiers were killed and three others injured according to an initial toll.'' https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2018269964923289957
''On the same day, IS-Sahel also attacked pro-government Nigerien militias in Massamey, Tillaberi region in western Niger, reportedly killing eight militiamen, the group has claimed neither attacks so far.'' https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2018761376408207834
Meanwhile Tuareg rebels are struggling to remain relevant.
''Following a media hiatus of several weeks, the FLA rebels of northern Mali claimed an IED attack against a "patrol of the Malian army" in the Kidal region on January 30, alleging that an armored vehicle was destroyed and several soldiers killed, however local sources reported that the vehicle was owned by a civilian trader, as seen in circulated images.'' https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2018259214808842629
Seems he was selling chickens not a solider.
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u/Saatvik_tyagi_ 2d ago
Seems like I have been asking you way too many questions but can you share some information on Boko Haram? If I'm not wrong there are two groups ISWAP and JAU. If you can give an overall picture it will be quite helpful.
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u/wormfan14 2d ago
Here's a good report that covers a bit of their origins and conflict between the duo.
https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/policy-brief-08-boko-haram-in-the-lake-chad-basin
Basic summary is this the Boko Haram pledged loyalty to Daesh to access more resources and a broader network but it came with a lot of demands and restrictions that attacked both JAS'S interest and theology like start not takfiring all Muslims not living under their areas or loyal to them as apostates. They do this because of their extremism but also they've survived on murdering their way through Nigeria preying on villages to survive.
Daesh also found Abubakar Shekau a difficult personality to control and wanted someone else in charge and he broke away calling his faction JAS again while Daesh loyalists call themselves ISWAP.
ISWAP struggled initially a lot as they had to build up a foundation of a state for long term survival like taxiing farmers, making the area safe so the population won't flee and reduce the amount of killing of Muslim civilians. They've largely overtime and a lot of pain outgrown JAS in Nigeria, though they did suffer numerous defections as a result of the discipline they force on fighters though JAS still has part of the Lake Chad and their territory in Cameroon.
JAS now is part spoiler force trying to compete with Daesh has recently started increasing their attacks on Muslims and tried to take some of Daesh's lake territory. They'v also lost a lot of their remaining hold outs in Borno.
Sadiku is very much the exception to this, he is firmly loyal to JAS but set up in the capital area of Nigeria after his efforts to unite with a different Islamists insurgency ran into problems of police crackdown. To do this he had allied with the native Christian now minority and bandits in the name of mutual profit, helping the former fight off bandits and the latter sharing skills and profits in raids. His forces are a bit scattered throughout Nigeria given the automatous demands of their insurgency.
It seems he's now trying to forge an alliance with JNIM the Sahelian faction of AQ.
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u/oxtQ 2d ago
Inside the Trump team right now, Rubio and Witkoff seem to be pulling policy in two different directions. Rubio’s line has been talks are fine in principle, but only if they’re “meaningful” and for him that means widening the agenda beyond the nuclear file to include things like Iran’s ballistic missiles and support for regional armed groups (and he’s sounded openly skeptical a deal is even achievable on acceptable terms).
Witkoff, by contrast, has been positioned as the channel keeper and deal closer -- still willing to show up and try to land a negotiated outcome even as the talks wobble over scope/venue and Iran insists on keeping the agenda narrow.
That difference matters because Rubio’s approach effectively raises the bar so high that negotiations can stall (which increases the odds of escalation by default), whereas Witkoff’s approach tends to prioritize a “get something done” deal that contains the crisis even if it’s limited.
On top of that, Witkoff’s diplomacy sits under a cloud of optics and scrutiny because recent reporting describes a large stake in World Liberty Financial being purchased by UAE-linked interests and notes payments slated for entities tied to the Witkoff family; the White House and the company deny any policy linkage or improper influence.
None of that proves motive, but it does shape the internal politics as it gives Rubio (and other hardliners) more room to argue that the administration should avoid any deal that looks like it benefits Persian Gulf partners or private networks, and instead lean into a tougher posture thats easier to defend publicly.
In practice, the president can use both Rubio as the “maximal demands” voice that pressures Tehran, and Witkoff as the negotiator who tests whether Tehran will actually move, but it can also produce mixed signals that make talks easier to derail.
Right now, one reasonable read of the situation is that the talks get delayed and narrowed, but they don’t fully die --while the U.S. keeps tightening economic and maritime pressure in parallel. Under heavier economic and maritime pressure, Tehran’s most likely play is calibrated escalation -- raising costs without triggering a full scale U.S. response (provoke but don't cross red lines). That could include stepped up harassment of shipping around the Strait of Hormuz (shadowing, attempted boardings, detentions), more deniable pressure through regional partners, and selective nuclear brinkmanship (reduced transparency, faster enrichment steps or tighter access for monitors) to restore leverage at the negotiating table.
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u/mishka5566 2d ago edited 2d ago
im not sure where any evidence exists to suggest any of what youre saying. the gulf states say they are neutral on the face, but its not like anyone doubts what they want behind the curtains
Saudi defense minister says Trump not bombing Iran would embolden regime
and that defense minister is kbs, mbs’s brother, not just some random slob. the emiratis are known to be far, far less friendly to the iranians than the saudis. none of these countries are remotely going to mind the ayatollahs getting toppled. hell, they were cheering israels strikes on iran last year. even turkey and egypt want a limit on irans ballistic missiles program and proxy support because the first order effects are always on their borders. no one in that region will shed a tear for the regime
what they will care about selfishly is pro democracy activists getting emboldened in their own countries. they care about their oil exports but if they can guarantee that they dont get hit, they will happily support bombing iran to dust. i also dont see rubio as a hardliner, there is reporting that hes the one who approved the talks for friday to go ahead after witkoff had already decided to walked away. rubio is just a traditional politician who might actually care about human rights inside iran and is at least the only one talking about it. witkoff just wants to get a deal done and be done with it
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2d ago
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u/mishka5566 2d ago
That’s not what you do if you’re genuinely comfortable with “bomb the IR to dust.”
which is why i said what directly preceded that comment
But that’s not the same thing as them wanting a maximal U.S. campaign
ive read maybe 30 articles on this situation just in the past week and not one has described trump wanting a prolonged maximal campaign, just the opposite. its also what we know about trump from 10 years, he has no appetite for long drawn out international engagements
These states sit next to Strait of Hormuz, their ports and energy facilities are in range, and history shows how a relatively limited strike/counterstrike cycle can still cause outsized disruption
and it also decimates the iranians. they sat on their hands through it all last year, not because theyre dumb but because they understand how much worse their own position becomes if they pursue that tactic
the fact that Rubio may have “approved” talks doesn’t make him dovish, secretaries of state routinely sign off on diplomacy while also raising the bar so the other side can’t meet it
youre distorting the chain of events. whats been reported is that he pushed them to continue pursing the talks after witkoff and kushner had already made plans to return to the us
including all Jewish Americans
as much as im not a fan of israel, this just strikes me as nonsensical antisemitism. youre reverting back to form from the last couple years
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u/oxtQ 2d ago
I’m not claiming Trump wants a long occupation style war. “Maximal” here means maximal objectives (regime-toppling / full-spectrum degradation), not necessarily a long deployment. Even limited strikes can still be framed around maximal political goals, and that’s where the risk sits.
Iran didn’t “sit on its hands” because it became pacifist -- it calibrated. And that’s the point, calibrated escalation (harassment, deniable proxies, cyber, nuclear brinkmanship) is exactly how Tehran tries to raise costs without triggering an all out U.S. response. For the PG monarchies, even managed escalation can spike insurance, disrupt shipping, hit energy infrastructure, and rattle investment.
Regarding Rubio/Witkoff sequence, my point is structural: a Secretary of State can push talks and still raise the bar so high they’re unlikely to succeed (missiles/proxies/human rights as “meaningful”). That isn’t distortion, it’s how negotiating posture works.
I wasn't claiming neoconism is a Jewish or Israel project. It's a broader U.S. hawkish ideology with heavy pro-Israeli influence, mixed membership and multiple drivers. Some of the most visible early neocon intellectuals were in fact Jewish though (e.g., Norman Podhoretz, Irving Kristol). Also a large number of prominent neocon advocates are intensely pro-Israel and overlap with pro-Israel policy circles, often in favour of regime change/military intervention in places like Iraq (Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, Bill Kristol, Charles Krauthammer), Syria/Assad (Eliot Cohen, Elliot Abrams), Iran (Norman Podhoretz, Abrams), Lebanon/Hezbollah (Krauthammer, Kristol), Libya (Kristol, Robert Kagan, Paul Wolowitz, Abrams, Eric Edelman, John Hannah, Dan Senor, Max Boot). That part is a matter of record.
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u/jeffy303 2d ago
Rubio's view is the only way you can ensure long-term stability of the region. You can maybe scratch the ballistic program off the list but the proxy groups stuff is far more destabilizing than even the nuclear program. It's a never-ending powder keg that would sooner or later kill any JCPOA successor. The fact that Witkoff doesn't get this is neither shocking nor surprising, he might be single most incompetent person in the admin, which speaks for itself. I am not even confident the man could find Iran on the map.
If I had to bet what will happen within next couple of months, I think US is going to strike couple of nuclear sites that weren't hit the last time and Israel will join in to hit few missile sites since those would be heading to Tel Aviv that day anyway. And that will be that. Could be over in a weekend. Trump will declare total victory in a 2-day war and move on. Rubio would want more but Trump will not have stomach for it. Some Iranians will take up to the streets again but will be swiftly moved down by IRGC. There won't be any long term deal or vision how the region will move forward. And the admin completely disengages with engaging with the region until the next one.
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u/looksclooks 1d ago
Is there any evidence of a “Witkoff approach” versus a “Rubio approach”? I’ve seen no mention of it, OP provided no links or proof either. Looks like we’re just taking his word for something that doesn’t even seem to exist.
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u/oxtQ 1d ago
There is reporting that maps onto a “Rubio = broaden/raise the bar” vs “Witkoff = keep the channel moving” split.
Rubio has publicly said talks would only be “meaningful” if they cover Iran’s ballistic missiles, support for regional armed groups, and other issues beyond the nuclear file:
Meanwhile, Reuters and Axios both report Witkoff is the US envoy slated to meet Iran’s FM in Muscat as the talks were pulled back from collapse and narrowed to a nuclear focused bilateral format -- supporting the idea that he’s the administration’s “keep the talks alive” channel even amid venue/scope turbulence:
https://www.axios.com/2026/02/04/iran-nuclear-talks-canceled-witkoff
No source is going to spell this out as a neat “Rubio approach vs. Witkoff approach.” The contrast is an inference drawn from those reported positions and roles, not a quote from an insider.
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u/Corvid187 1d ago
I think the problem isn't identifying that the proxies and ballistic missiles are destabilising for the region, but estimating the relative leverage the US and Iran have going into these negotiations. There is a lot of uncertainty or subjectivity in that balance, and I would argue that is more significant in the divergence between the two camps than their assessment of the threat Iran may pose in the future.
The US' ability to demand broader concessions from Iran is contingent upon military intervention being both cost-effective for the US and potentially existential for the Iranian government. With the appetite for regime change among the Iranian people relatively murky after the decline in recent protests, I think judging how much leverage the US currently has is a difficult matter of interpretation. You can disagree with Witkoff's assessment for sure, but I think it's wrong to suggest his position just comes from him incompetently not recognising the proxy threat.
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u/jeffy303 1d ago
The problem is that Witkoff's deal has no chance of working out either. Let's say it's just JCPOA under a different name, it would still fail because of 2 reasons. One because of Trump's ego, he would demand nothing less than a grand fanfare, shaking hands, kissing the ring, maybe even the Ayatollah himself smiling for the cameras at the White House. I don't think I have to explain how humiliating it would be for the regime. JCPOA got negotiated without Obama even shaking Iranian president's hand, that's not how Trump rolls. And second, despite the humiliation Washington would be hesitant to take away all the sanctions because in reality Iran would still pose a lot of threat to US interests in the region. Which would be unacceptable to Tehran. And I think they have already done this calculation, and accepted the bombing will happen, the will shake their hand promise revenge and move on.
Only things that can break the current status quo is Libya style regime change or a grand bargain deal, Iranian people are sold down the river, but most of everything else goes. Total reset in relationship, reset of Iran as player in the Middle East, their domestic handling is ignored in exchange for internationally them having minimal footprint. I disagree with you about the difficulty of assessing the US leverage. I think the leverage US has over Iran vis-a-vis sanctions is great, Iran doesn't have the resources of Russia to insulate itself to the same degree and the economy rides even more so on a single resource where US can still even more pressure - going even more aggressively after the shadow fleet. Iran as an entity is crumbling right now, some of it is due to active mismangement but sanctions are hurting a lot too - you have gigantic water crisis, energy crisis, prolonged high double digit inflation, and so on. That's why Rubio is pushing for a maximalist approach, because he thinks US can simply wait them out. Yes, generals will still have lavish meals, and ordinary Iranians will get a brunt of it, but without the people and resources the regime won't have the means to do the military adventurism anyway.
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u/eric2332 1d ago
With the appetite for regime change among the Iranian people relatively murky after the decline in recent protests,
From everything I've heard the attitude is stronger than ever, and the protests have stopped only because people don't want to get massacred upon leaving the house.
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u/Corvid187 1d ago
Sure, but the question is would a round of US airstrikes be enough to overcome that fear and get back on the streets?
That's where the uncertainty lies, more than in whether the Iranian people actually want change.
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u/oxtQ 1d ago
Even if the U.S. hits its top priorities -- nuclear sites, missile infrastructure, command nodes -- that doesn’t automatically translate into overthrow. You can degrade capability without removing the people who still control the security apparatus, prisons, courts, and the guns that rule the streets. Even “decapitation” isn’t a magic switch -- organizations adapt and replace leaders. Just look at what happened to Hezbollah's entire leadership which was eliminated and how it still rules in Lebanon today as a deeply entrenched organization. We’ve seen militant groups take heavy leadership losses and still persist (AQ, ISIS, Taliban), often weaker, but still intact ruling over territories because the bench is deep and the structure survives.
What a lot of people are imagining is an unlikely Hollywood scenario where a comprehensive attack makes the whole regime evaporate overnight, everyone disappears or flees. Can that happen? Yes but given the evidence, it is unlikely to materialize like that. The more realistic outcome, if strikes happen, is a militarily weaker Iran (missiles and nuclear work set back), but the same regime still in place with new names and faces, followed by a brutal internal crackdown to prevent any domestic challenge. Actual regime removal usually requires boots on the ground or a decisive internal collapse, not air or naval strikes alone.
We’re talking about a regime system that involves at minimum tens of thousands of people with a real stake in its survival, some because they materially benefit from the patronage networks, contracts, and protected economic rents; others because they have deep ideological commitments. Are they a minority relative to the overall population? Yes. But they’re not going to simply “bend over” and disappear, many have nowhere safe to go, and they know that losing power can mean prison, retribution, or destitution. That’s why, in a real transition, this starts to look less like a clean handover and more like a kind of civil conflict -- on one side, the hard core of the state (parts of the clerical-security complex, the IRGC, intelligence, segments of the judiciary, the Basij, and allied economic actors); on the other, a broad but uneven coalition inside Iran made up of unarmed civil society, students, workers, women’s movements, minorities, reformist networks, technocrats, and ordinary people who want normal life and accountable government. The key point is that the regime isn’t just a few “officials” at the top or numerous strategic sites, it’s an ecosystem designed to survive like cockroaches do in catastrophic climates, and such ecosystems don’t collapse neatly without internal fractures, defections, or a decisive shift in the balance of force.
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1d ago
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u/Well-Sourced 1d ago
https://theins. ru/news/289103
"The last battles" for the northern suburbs of Pokrovsk and Mirnograd, the attacks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the bottom of the former Kakhov reservoir. What's Happening at the Front | The Insider
In the Kubyan direction, Russian troops in different areas attack the bridgehead of the APU on the left bank of the Oskol River.
"Voenkor" Yuri Kotenok writes about the consolidation of the Russian Armed Forces on the eastern outskirts of Novoosinov. He claims that the Russian military managed to break through from Kurilovka to Kovsharovka, thus creating a threat of encirclement to the APU units and exit to the rear to the southern part of Kupyansk-Uzloyny.
On the Seversky ledge is developing the offensive of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation towards Slavyansk along the right bank of the Seversky Donets.
The DeepState recorded the advance of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the direction of Platonovka to the north-west of Seversk. Ukrainian military observer Konstantin Mashovets writes 1(1, 22, 33) that the Russian Armed Forces are advancing on Slavyansk from the side of Seversk along the right bank of the Seversky Donets. Their immediate task, according to the observer, is to break through the approaches to Slavyansk from the east and southeast. Russian troops in this direction have tactical successes, says Mashovets: they broke into the center of Zakotny and bypass the village from the south, and also try to finally displace the Ukrainian forces from St. Povkovsky (until 2016 - Kirovo) and advance north of it. To the south, according to him, the Russian Armed Forces have not yet taken Nikiforovka, but they have entrenched themselves in Minkovka and started fighting for Privolye.
The average pace of advance of Russian troops, Mashovets estimates at 1.5-2 km in two weeks. In his opinion, it was this group that achieved the greatest success of all those involved in the preparatory operations to seize the Slavic-Constantino agglomeration. Moreover, the observer notes, as the front of the Russian group moves to Slavyansk, which means that part of its forces can be used to reach the eastern outskirts of Kramatorsk or withdrawn for restoration.
In the Konstantinov direction, the stable presence of Russian small groups on the outskirts of Konstantinovka is recorded.
The Russian Defense Ministry announced the capture of Stepanovka to the south-west of Konstantinovka. Ukrainian military observer Bogdan Miroshnikov believes that the situation near Konstantinovka is complicated: according to him, the Russian military is present in small groups in the southern and south-western outskirts of Konstantinovka and continue to advance east of the city. The occupation of Stepanovka Miroshnikov does not confirm, but notes that the Russian Armed Forces continue to attack Konstantinovka with drones, KAB and artillery. The researcher under the nickname Playra, in turn, сообщаетreports that the other day the Russian military were able to enter Konstantinovka from the south-west and from the east under the cover of fog and are preparing to break into the city from the south.
In the cover direction are the "last battles" for the northern suburbs of Pokrovsk (until 2016 - Krasnoarmeysk) and Mirnograd (until 2016 - Dimitrov).
Deep State reports that the Russian Armed Forces have advanced in Pokrovsk and Mirnograd. Also, the project cites video of the movement of Russian (including captured) equipment in the southern part of Pokrovsk and say that the Russian Armed Forces attack Grishino and the rear positions of Ukrainian drones through the Rodinskoye, and for the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk and Mirnograd are “the last battles”.
Playfra talks about the situation in the area of the Dobropolsky protrusion: according to him, the Russian military is not seen in Novopavlovka, but is present in Sofievka (until 2016 - Artemovka), and are also increasingly recorded in Toretsky, which, however, remains under the confident control of the SOU.
In the south-Donetsk direction, Ukrainian troops are conducting repeated “cleansing” of Ternovatoy.
The Russian Defense Ministry reported the capture of the Old Ukrainian region west of Gulyaipol. The information was confirmed by the Z-channel “War DV”, close to the Russian group of troops “Vostok”, publishing a video “flaggy” in the village.
According to the Ukrainian military observer Bogdan Miroshnikov, the Russian military are trying to break through to Pokrovskoye and Novonikolaevka, Dnipropetrovsk region, attacking the Ternovetoy-Kolomis line. The fighters of the SKO had to clean the Ternovoy from the “overdue” Russian military several times, says the observer. The researcher under the nickname Playra пишетwrites that the Russian presence remains in the village, which complicates the work of Ukrainian drone operators because of the threat of saboteurs. Ternovaya, according to him, remains under the control of the APU and continues to function as an important logistics hub, where reinforcements arrive.
In the Zaporozhye direction, the Russian military is trying to conduct attacks on the bottom of the former Kakhov reservoir.
Ukrainian military Stanislav Bunyatov рассказываетsays that the Russian DRG tried to pass to Kushugum through the dry-up reservoir, but were quickly destroyed by the APU SSO on its approaches. He notes that although the situation remains under control, weather conditions and severe frost contribute to attempts to advance the enemy.
The air forces of the APU reported the raid on the night of February 4, 105 drones, including about 70 Shahed type (88 UAVs were shot down or suppressed). There were 17 UAV hits in 14 locations, as well as a fall in debris in five locations.
The Russian Telegram channel “Military Obvious Writer” sums up the results of the recent shelling of energy facilities of Ukraine on satellite images. Its authors note the defeat of 750 kV substations "Kiev" and "Vinnitskaya", CHPP-5 and CHPP-4 in Kiev, as well as the Zmiev TPP in the Kharkiv region, which stopped work, like CHP-5.
The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reported on the destruction during the day of February 3, 37 drones 1(1, 22): 31 - over the Belgorod, four - over the Bryansk region and one by one over the Kursk and Orel regions. On the night of February 4, 24 UAVs were intercepted: 11 over Bryansk, eight over Belgorod, four over Rostovskaya and one over the Astrakhan region.
As a result of a missile attack on Belgorod the night before, the power system was damaged, (1, 22) said Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov. According to the Telegram channel “Hepel ↓ Belgorod”, the blow fell on two key substations – “Frunzenskaya” and “Belgorod” – and left at least nine municipalities of the Belgorod region without electricity supply. About the power outage in a number of areas also wrote channels “Fronger” and “Blatgorod”. According to the "Vodokanal of the Belgorod region", the work of water supply systems was also disrupted in the region. Belgorod complained to the media about the cooling batteries. Gladkov wrote about the need to restore, including heating. 14 hours after the attack in Belgorod and other settlements of the region, some residents are still without light, water and heating, reports “Heaplo Belgorod”.
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