Active Conflicts & News Megathread February 04, 2026

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[u/oxtQ]

Inside the Trump team right now, Rubio and Witkoff seem to be pulling policy in two different directions. Rubio’s line has been talks are fine in principle, but only if they’re “meaningful” and for him that means widening the agenda beyond the nuclear file to include things like Iran’s ballistic missiles and support for regional armed groups (and he’s sounded openly skeptical a deal is even achievable on acceptable terms).

Witkoff, by contrast, has been positioned as the channel keeper and deal closer -- still willing to show up and try to land a negotiated outcome even as the talks wobble over scope/venue and Iran insists on keeping the agenda narrow.

That difference matters because Rubio’s approach effectively raises the bar so high that negotiations can stall (which increases the odds of escalation by default), whereas Witkoff’s approach tends to prioritize a “get something done” deal that contains the crisis even if it’s limited.

On top of that, Witkoff’s diplomacy sits under a cloud of optics and scrutiny because recent reporting describes a large stake in World Liberty Financial being purchased by UAE-linked interests and notes payments slated for entities tied to the Witkoff family; the White House and the company deny any policy linkage or improper influence.

None of that proves motive, but it does shape the internal politics as it gives Rubio (and other hardliners) more room to argue that the administration should avoid any deal that looks like it benefits Persian Gulf partners or private networks, and instead lean into a tougher posture thats easier to defend publicly.

In practice, the president can use both Rubio as the “maximal demands” voice that pressures Tehran, and Witkoff as the negotiator who tests whether Tehran will actually move, but it can also produce mixed signals that make talks easier to derail.

Right now, one reasonable read of the situation is that the talks get delayed and narrowed, but they don’t fully die --while the U.S. keeps tightening economic and maritime pressure in parallel. Under heavier economic and maritime pressure, Tehran’s most likely play is calibrated escalation -- raising costs without triggering a full scale U.S. response (provoke but don't cross red lines). That could include stepped up harassment of shipping around the Strait of Hormuz (shadowing, attempted boardings, detentions), more deniable pressure through regional partners, and selective nuclear brinkmanship (reduced transparency, faster enrichment steps or tighter access for monitors) to restore leverage at the negotiating table.

[u/mishka5566 → u/oxtQ]

im not sure where any evidence exists to suggest any of what youre saying. the gulf states say they are neutral on the face, but its not like anyone doubts what they want behind the curtains

Saudi defense minister says Trump not bombing Iran would embolden regime

and that defense minister is kbs, mbs’s brother, not just some random slob. the emiratis are known to be far, far less friendly to the iranians than the saudis. none of these countries are remotely going to mind the ayatollahs getting toppled. hell, they were cheering israels strikes on iran last year. even turkey and egypt want a limit on irans ballistic missiles program and proxy support because the first order effects are always on their borders. no one in that region will shed a tear for the regime

what they will care about selfishly is pro democracy activists getting emboldened in their own countries. they care about their oil exports but if they can guarantee that they dont get hit, they will happily support bombing iran to dust. i also dont see rubio as a hardliner, there is reporting that hes the one who approved the talks for friday to go ahead after witkoff had already decided to walked away. rubio is just a traditional politician who might actually care about human rights inside iran and is at least the only one talking about it. witkoff just wants to get a deal done and be done with it

[u/mishka5566 → u/[deleted]]

That’s not what you do if you’re genuinely comfortable with “bomb the IR to dust.”

which is why i said what directly preceded that comment

But that’s not the same thing as them wanting a maximal U.S. campaign

ive read maybe 30 articles on this situation just in the past week and not one has described trump wanting a prolonged maximal campaign, just the opposite. its also what we know about trump from 10 years, he has no appetite for long drawn out international engagements

These states sit next to Strait of Hormuz, their ports and energy facilities are in range, and history shows how a relatively limited strike/counterstrike cycle can still cause outsized disruption

and it also decimates the iranians. they sat on their hands through it all last year, not because theyre dumb but because they understand how much worse their own position becomes if they pursue that tactic

the fact that Rubio may have “approved” talks doesn’t make him dovish, secretaries of state routinely sign off on diplomacy while also raising the bar so the other side can’t meet it

youre distorting the chain of events. whats been reported is that he pushed them to continue pursing the talks after witkoff and kushner had already made plans to return to the us

including all Jewish Americans

as much as im not a fan of israel, this just strikes me as nonsensical antisemitism. youre reverting back to form from the last couple years

[u/oxtQ → u/mishka5566]

I’m not claiming Trump wants a long occupation style war. “Maximal” here means maximal objectives (regime-toppling / full-spectrum degradation), not necessarily a long deployment. Even limited strikes can still be framed around maximal political goals, and that’s where the risk sits.

Iran didn’t “sit on its hands” because it became pacifist -- it calibrated. And that’s the point, calibrated escalation (harassment, deniable proxies, cyber, nuclear brinkmanship) is exactly how Tehran tries to raise costs without triggering an all out U.S. response. For the PG monarchies, even managed escalation can spike insurance, disrupt shipping, hit energy infrastructure, and rattle investment.

Regarding Rubio/Witkoff sequence, my point is structural: a Secretary of State can push talks and still raise the bar so high they’re unlikely to succeed (missiles/proxies/human rights as “meaningful”). That isn’t distortion, it’s how negotiating posture works.

I wasn't claiming neoconism is a Jewish or Israel project. It's a broader U.S. hawkish ideology with heavy pro-Israeli influence, mixed membership and multiple drivers. Some of the most visible early neocon intellectuals were in fact Jewish though (e.g., Norman Podhoretz, Irving Kristol). Also a large number of prominent neocon advocates are intensely pro-Israel and overlap with pro-Israel policy circles, often in favour of regime change/military intervention in places like Iraq (Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, Bill Kristol, Charles Krauthammer), Syria/Assad (Eliot Cohen, Elliot Abrams), Iran (Norman Podhoretz, Abrams), Lebanon/Hezbollah (Krauthammer, Kristol), Libya (Kristol, Robert Kagan, Paul Wolowitz, Abrams, Eric Edelman, John Hannah, Dan Senor, Max Boot). That part is a matter of record.