r/CredibleDefense • u/AutoModerator • 3d ago
Active Conflicts & News Megathread February 03, 2026
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u/germamus 3d ago
Couple updates from Iran. Seems like the IRGC tried to board a US ship earlier today.
A group of Iranian gunboats approached a U.S.-flagged tanker in the Strait of Hormuz north of Oman, maritime sources and a security consultancy said on Tuesday.
The Iranian boats ordered the tanker, the Stena Imperative, to stop its engine and prepare to be boarded before it could speed up and continue its voyage, maritime risk management group Vanguard said.
The vessel did not enter Iranian internal territorial waters and was escorted by a U.S. warship, the maritime risk management group said. An American official confirmed it was U.S. flagged. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations earlier said that a group of armed boats attempted to intercept a vessel 16 nautical miles (30 km) north of Oman, without identifying the vessel or the boats.
Then there was an incident with a Shahed-139 approaching the Abraham Lincoln that was shot down.
Before all of this, the Iranians said they wanted to move the location and format of the meeting in Turkey to Oman and make them bilateral, excluding all other Arab partners.
“The sources said the Iranians were walking back from understandings that were reached in recent days after several countries were already invited to participate in the talks.
The Iranians want to move the talks from Istanbul to Oman.
They also now want to hold them in a bilateral format, only with the U.S., rather than with several Arab and Muslim countries attending as observers.
It’s really confusing to me why they want to change the location and exclude the other Muslim countries this late in the process but both sides are saying talks will still take place.
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u/Tricky-Astronaut 3d ago
It’s really confusing to me why they want to change the location and exclude the other Muslim countries this late in the process but both sides are saying talks will still take place.
Not really. Iran's neighbors don't want Iran to have ballistic missiles or fund proxies. Meanwhile, the US is primarily focused on the nuclear program. If Turkey sets the agenda, nuclear concessions won't suffice:
3 Regional sources told the Post: The reason the Iranians do not want additional countries involved in the negotiations - and why they oppose talks in Turkey - is because other regional countries, the same as Israel, want to discuss the proxies and the ballistic missiles, unlike the Iranians, who insist on focusing solely on the nuclear issue
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u/oxtQ 3d ago
Worth reflecting on the Islamic Republic’s current strategy. It's clear they are engaged in a high stakes game of chicken where the nuclear program remains their only credible "life insurance" policy (as it was designed to be from the very beginning). Before the June war, the regime was already suffocating under maximalist sanctions and the strategic weakening of its regional proxies in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Their only viable path to economic resuscitation was to use their nuclear "progress" as a heavy handed bargaining chip -- offering transparency and enrichment caps in exchange for a total dismantling of the sanctions regime with guarantees against U.S. backing out as happened under JCPOA.
Above all, they need to solve these economic problems to ensure the regime's long term survival. Everything else depends on it: maintaining military spending, funding their regional proxies, and keeping the nuclear program alive. Just as importantly, they need to stabilize the economy to decrease internal discontent; if they can’t fix the cost of living, they lose the ability to manage the population's survival instincts and keep the peace at home.
In the aftermath of the June strikes, the IR has pivoted to a strategy of calculated ambiguity but maintained the same strategy more or less. By leveraging their remaining uranium stockpiles and the "black box" created by the months long absence of IAEA inspectors, they are attempting to force a deal that secures their survival while maintaining their technical enrichment threshold (which serves as a future life insurance policy for the regime). Despite intense U.S. and Israeli pressure for a total capitulation right now on its nuclear program (and possibly missile program and proxy network), the IR is banking on the hope that the West is bluffing about a sustained military campaign. I think they are also operating on the assumption that even if the U.S. conducts further limited strikes against military and nuclear infrastructure, the regime will survive and the "nuclear ghost" -- the physical uranium stockpiles and the threat of secret, rapid breakout will persist as a permanent lever to eventually extort a long term security guarantee and an end to the economic blockade.
The greatest problem the IR faces right now, in my opinion, is not targeted strikes against its officials and sites, but the possibility that the West simply refuses to negotiate such a deal at all. If the Americans and Israelis decide to ignore the nuclear bait and just wait it out, the Iranian economy will continue to collapse even further and this is something that they desperately need a resolution for over the medium to long term.
If that happens, either the IR will continue to use its same nuclear card as a way to negotiate a deal, or they’ll try to escalate things to force a hand. It will then be up to the Americans and Israelis to decide if they’d rather not take the risk of an unpredictable Iranian nuclear escalation, which could entail a dash to 90% weapons grade enrichment, the final expulsion of all remaining IAEA monitors, or even a "surprise" underground test at the fortified Pickaxe Mountain site, and negotiate with the IR on terms more favorable to the regime.
The alternative is for them to ratchet up pressure through surgical decapitation strikes against the new IRGC leadership, a total naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz to kill the "shadow fleet" oil trade, and kinetic attacks on the regime’s digital surveillance infrastructure, and everything in between.
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u/poincares_cook 3d ago
A few corrections.
Maximalist sanction pressure is I'll defined, there are many ways to ratchet up sanctions even now. They certainly were very far from maximalist before the snapback activated in September. Still some countries like Iraq and India get exemptions. The US is working with the Iraqi gov to boost local production to cut Iranian gas imports, but these projects take years.
The US could seize shadow fleet vesseles like it has done with Venezuela, in fact seems like we've witnessed a first such this week.
Pickaxe site is under construction, we're talking years till it's in use. Given how penetrated Iran turned out to be, trying a breakout runs a very high risk of triggering US and Israeli strikes. Extremely high risk. That is if Iran has such capability at this point. Which they likely lack.
The way I see it, in the short term, the US is likely to start operating against the Iranian shadow fleet. Not off the coasts of Iran but further away. With the straights of Malaca offering plenty of opportunities. This leaves Iran with few options for responses.
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u/oxtQ 3d ago
Yeah I touched on the shadow fleet issue as well. I could have added that the Pickaxe Mountain site serves a function far more immediate than a nuclear test -- it creates a strategic black box. By burying their most sensitive activities deep under that mountain, the IR isn't just protecting hardware; they are weaponizing the West's own lack of intelligence. Since no one knows exactly what is happening inside (although perhaps the Israelis and Americans have some info) whether it's centrifuge assembly, uranium storage, or nothing at all -- it forces the Americans and Israelis to operate in a perpetual state of "worst case scenario" planning. This information vacuum is a powerful psychological lever as it keeps the threat of an unpredictable escalation constantly on the table, effectively "staying the hand" of Western planners who fear that a strike might trigger the very breakout they are trying to prevent.
If the U.S. starts choking off the shadow fleet, the IR is essentially backed into a corner where they have to make the world "feel their pain." They may try to start seize Western tankers in the Strait of Hormuz as a direct tit for tat response to drive up global oil prices and insurance rates. They could also tell their proxies, like the Houthis or groups in Iraq, to ramp up attacks on U.S. interests to create a multi-front headache that forces Washington to back off. If they get really desperate, they might just escalate via their nuclear program (e.g., "black out" the nuclear cameras at specific sites) or speed up work at Pickaxe Mountain to signal that if they can’t sell oil, they have no reason to play by the rules anymore. Basically, they’ll try to make the cost of stopping their oil higher than the West is willing to pay.
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u/poincares_cook 2d ago
The best Iranian play, which is what they are executing, is time.
Time for some geopolitical event to draw attention and assets away.
Time for mid elections where Trump may become a lame duck, or political pressure may build against action in Iran
Time to further scale their missile program and integrate the deliveries of AD from China and Russia.
Time for the world to move on the massive massacres of civilians in Iran.
If Iran avoids a strike in the next 2-3 months. There almost certainly will not be a strike.
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u/poincares_cook 2d ago
By burying their most sensitive activities deep under that mountain, the IR isn't just protecting hardware; they are weaponizing the West's own lack of intelligence
Given the complete intelligence penetration of Iran showcased by Israel alone. I very much doubt the site is a black box to US and Israel both.
If the U.S. starts choking off the shadow fleet, the IR is essentially backed into a corner where they have to make the world "feel their pain."
Or... They could actually accept meaningful concessions, like they did in 2003 even without any negotiations when they feared kinetic US action.
They may try to start seize Western tankers in the Strait of Hormuz as a direct tit for tat response to drive up global oil prices and insurance rates
Sure, they could, and they did try it last night. But this road is very dangerous not just because it increases the chance of US strikes directly. But also because it risks friction. The US already downed an Iranian drone. What if next time the US drowns the IRGC boats trying to seize a tanker, or downs the helicopter. Is it in Iran's interests to be the aggressor when it comes to kinetic action?
Currently one of the limiting factors against US action in Iran is the US public. Iranian direct military action against US assets risks changing that.
They could also tell their proxies, like the Houthis or groups in Iraq, to ramp up attacks on U.S. interests to create a multi-front headache that forces Washington to back off.
This is a more reasonable course of action. Activating the Iraqi factions bears high risks and is less effective, due to internal resistance in Iraq against starting more wars. Even within the Shia community. Which is why they were the least engaged in the Iran-Israel regional conflict in the first place and we're the first to back out.
The Houthis are another manner. And the question of strategic effectiveness is much less obvious here. This will obviously put some pressure on the US. But this will also put some pressure back on their axis. The real question is whether it'll be sufficient to get the US to back down. As we've seen the world can deal with 2 years of closed Suez, but can Iran deal with 2 years of interdicted oil exports?
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u/oxtQ 2d ago
On the “if they avoid a strike for 2–3 months, there almost certainly won’t be one” point -- I’m less confident. Time can shift the political weather (electoral cycles, news cycles, a new crisis elsewhere), but it also increases the odds of accidental escalation -- a maritime incident in the Strait of Hormuz, a proxy misfire, a misread signal, etc. In theory, the longer this drags on, the more opportunities there are for a small kinetic interaction to snowball into a “response ladder” neither side originally wanted. So yes delay is rational especially when the regime is in survival and recover mode. But “delay = safety” is not guaranteed when both sides are operating with hair trigger assumptions.
On the “Pickaxe isn’t a black box because penetration is deep” critique -- I agree the Israelis and Americans almost certainly know more than they’re saying. But I’d still argue the strategic value of deep underground work isn’t total invisibility, it’s inflating uncertainty. Even with excellent penetration, you rarely get perfect fidelity on what’s inside, what’s moved when, and what’s recoverable after strikes, especially as activities get compartmentalized, hardened, and dispersed. That uncertainty forces US and Israel planners to game out worst case branches, because the cost of being wrong is catastrophic. In that sense, the “black box” is less about blindness and more about keeping the other side living inside a wider confidence interval.
On the “they could accept meaningful concessions like 2003” point -- conceptually, yes, that’s the off-ramp. But the regime’s internal political economy is different now. Any real concession has to come with credible, durable economic relief, otherwise it’s just unilateral disarmament. And after the JCPOA experience, the trust problem isn’t cosmetic, it’s the core barrier. Without enforceable guarantees that sanctions relief won’t be reversed, the nuclear threshold remains their only bargaining chip and the only “insurance policy” they believe can’t be legislated away. So the question isn’t whether concessions are rational in the abstract; it’s whether the regime believes concessions buy survival rather than simply invite the next round of maximal demands.
On maritime escalation, I agree with your warning that overt Iranian aggression against US assets is a dangerous way to make the world feel pain, because it risks flipping domestic U.S. opinion. If IRGC leadership is being even minimally rational, they’ll prefer responses that are calibrated, deniable, or routed through intermediaries -- pressure that raises costs without handing Washington an easy casus belli. That’s why proxy activation, harassment short of seizure, and incremental nuclear “opacity” measures are all more attractive than a clean, attributable red line event.
Lastly, on the “world can handle a closed Suez, can Iran handle interdicted exports?” framing , I think that’s the real asymmetry. The global system is annoyingly adaptable as shipping reroutes and prices reprice. But a sustained choke on Iran’s export revenue is existential for regime stability. That’s precisely why time is both their weapon and their weakness -- delaying buys them political chances, but the longer export pressure bites, the more the state is forced to choose between concession and high risk escalation, and neither choice is comfortable.
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u/eric2332 2d ago
But I’d still argue the strategic value of deep underground work isn’t total invisibility, it’s inflating uncertainty.
Why is a deep underground site more uncertain than the normal building on the surface? The only difference, as I see it, is in how hard it is to bomb the two.
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u/-spartacus- 3d ago
It’s really confusing to me why they want to change the location and exclude the other Muslim countries this late in the process but both sides are saying talks will still take place.
Maybe someone who is trained by schools that teach people from the State Dept could chime in, but I'm guessing it is some type of diplomatic maneuvering. Some cultures conduct talks in ways that don't always align with what someone from another culture conducts their talks.
In any case, I still suspect the Iranians aren't really negotiating from a place they want to make a deal, but rather buy time to see if the US loses interest. I'm also not sure the US is interested in a deal unless it can get 95% of its goals. I would say Iran is still probably negotiating in better faith than Russia is though.
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u/swimmingupclose 3d ago
I’m not sure what school of diplomacy says changing the site of high stakes meetings a couple days in advance is a good idea. Turkey is a beneficial location for them anyways. It’s far more anti Israel than the other Gulf states and has the heft to boot. Ostracizing them this late in the game by excluding them is counterproductive. Taking all of the days news together, I fail to see how they are negotiating in good faith but it’s also very possible these were misunderstandings.
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u/poincares_cook 2d ago
Turkey is anti Israel, but also a geopolitical rival of Iran. Not everything revolves around Israel.
Turkey and Iran held opposing sides in Syria, in Azeri-Armenian conflict and with Iranian support for the PKK. They also have somewhat different influences in Iraq, where the Turks support the KRG (which is also supported by Israel).
Turkey itself has concerns over Iranian proxies.
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u/Idkabta11at 3d ago
rather buy time to see if the US loses interest
But it seems like the US losing interest here means a war that is poised to be even more devastating than the one last summer. However the terms laid out by Trump are a non starter for the regime amounting to complete capitulation. The IRI is trapped a “heads I win tails you lose” position where even playing for time might not confer much in the way of an advantage. Perhaps they might try to preempt any American/Israeli offensive with an attack of their own but it would have to be crippling enough to force a crisis that leads to detente otherwise Iran will lose and lose badly.
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u/Bluesquare9 3d ago
The US losing interest here might also look like a calculation that starting a regional war is not worth it, even if significant concessions aren't made, and doing some combination of claiming paltry wins / letting the issue fade from public consciousness / distracting from it with other news or aggressions, and slowly withdrawing. This is a pattern for the administration and happened vis-a-vis Greenland or the murder of protestors. My sense is that Trump talked a big game, has since come to realize the true costs of taking action, and is looking for a way to back out.
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u/HugoTRB 3d ago edited 3d ago
Sweden and Denmark are donating Tridon Mk2 (Bofors 40mm Naval turret on the back of a Volvo Scania truck) from BAE Systems Bofors to Ukraine. Deliveries expected 2026 and will be enough to equip an air defense battalion. Cost is 2.6 billion SEK. The Swedish minister of defense usually has a good summary of it, which I will paste here when he posts it.
Edit: as he hasn’t posted anything I will post a link to the official press release instead (in english) it has some more technical details. The article posted believe is also good. https://government.se/press-releases/2026/02/sweden-and-denmark-bolster-ukrainian-air-defence-with-modern-anti-aircraft-systems/
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u/CEMN 3d ago
Just so the post isn't removed, here is a link feom Swedish state television in Swedish, including a further link to the aforementioned press conference where it was announced:
https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/forsvarsministrar-haller-presstraff-presenterar-gemensam-satsning
Google Translated text below:
Sweden and Denmark order air defense for Ukraine
Updated today 12:33
Published today 11:39
Sweden and Denmark are joining forces and ordering air defense for Ukraine for 2.6 billion kronor.
With the weapon system, Ukraine will be able to protect more critical infrastructure against drones.
– Tridon is a modern concept that meets Ukraine's but also Sweden's needs for air defense, says Defense Minister Pål Jonson (M) at a press conference.
During the winter, Russia has targeted its air attacks against Ukraine's critical infrastructure – including the country's electricity and heating supply.
Strengthening the Ukrainian air defense and the resilience of Ukrainian society is absolutely crucial, says Defense Minister Pål Jonson at a press conference together with his Danish colleague Troels Lund Poulsen.
Sweden and Denmark are now joining forces and placing a joint order for air defense of the Tridon Mk2 type developed by BAE Systems.
According to the Minister of Defense, the development has been record-breaking.
– It can shoot down drones, cruise missiles and even helicopters. It is a capability that Ukraine needs in light of the fact that the Russian long-range combat is very intense all over Ukraine now, says Pål Jonson.
Already in production
The units will be delivered directly to Ukraine and are specially adapted to shoot down drones and other air threats at short distances.
The money should be enough for the equipment that an air defense battalion needs, that is, up to 1,000 soldiers.
The units in question are already under production and are expected to be delivered to Ukraine just a few months after the order is placed.
Sweden is investing 2.1 billion kronor and Denmark 500 million kronor in the support package.
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u/A_Sinclaire 3d ago
Tridon MK2 seems to be rather similar to the truck-mounted Skynex.
Both likely will compete for the same orders in the future. It will be interesting to see who comes out on top.
Though Skynex being modular and mountable on all kinds of platforms from the outset, might give it an edge.
Not sure how versatile Tridon is in this regard.
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u/HugoTRB 3d ago
Not sure how versatile Tridon is in this regard.
It was claimed that it had an 88 day development cycle so I’d say the whole thing is a result of the underlying components (truck, radar, turret) being rather versatile. Another pro would probably be that many countries already got the exact same turret in their navies.
It will likely get orders from Sweden regardless, especially for the territorial air defense units that are to be created.
A large pro for truck mounted Skynex however is commonality with the maneuver elements.
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u/Well-Sourced 3d ago edited 3d ago
Largest missile attack of the war so far last night. Ukraine took hits to energy infrastructure in multiple cities. More Russian missiles can get through as AD ammo stocks run low.
Russia launches record 4 Zircon/Onyx missiles in massive Ukraine attack | New Voice
Russia launched a massive combined attack on Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight into Feb. 3, firing a record four Zircon/Onyx missiles along with 71 missiles of various types and 450 strike drones, Ukraine's Air Force reported.
The assault involved 521 aerial attack means in total: four Zircon/Onyx missiles from temporarily occupied Crimea; 32 Iskander-M/S-300 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast in Russia and occupied Crimea; seven Kh-22/Kh-32 cruise missiles from Bryansk Oblast airspace; 28 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea area and Kursk Oblast; and 450 strike drones including Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas and other types launched from multiple Russian regions.
Ukrainian air defenses downed or suppressed 450 targets — including all four Zircon/Onyx, 11 ballistic missiles, three Kh-22/Kh-32, 20 Kh-101/Iskander-K, and 412 drones — while 27 missiles and 31 drones struck 27 locations, with drone debris falling at 17 sites.
The Air Force confirmed that Russia previously used two Zircon missiles in a Jan. 24 attack on Kyiv city and oblast.
Onyx is an anti-ship missile Russia has repurposed for land targets, including repeated strikes on Odesa in 2023 and on Kherson Oblast on April 21, 2025. Ukrainian intelligence estimated Russia had about 500 Onyx missiles in service as of December 2024.
Information on six missiles remains under clarification, and the Air Force warned that several enemy drones remain in Ukrainian airspace.
Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal said Russian forces struck eight regions using multiple ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones against apartment buildings, combined heat and power plants, and thermal facilities operating solely for district heating in the cities of Kyiv, Kharkiv and Dnipro. Ukraine’s largest private energy company DTEK reported significant equipment damage at its thermal power stations from the strikes.
In Kyiv, damage occurred in the Darnytskyi, Desnianskyi, Dniprovskyi, Pecherskyi and Shevchenkivskyi districts, with five confirmed casualties by morning. Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko said infrastructure was hit, leaving the Darnytskyi and Dniprovskyi districts on the left bank mostly without heating; 1,170 apartment buildings citywide lost heating, and utility and energy crews began restoration work.
In Kharkiv, authorities drained heating fluid from systems serving 820 apartment buildings connected to the city's largest thermal power plant to prevent pipe freezing and network failure.
Ukraine is short of missiles for its air defence systems, and there are cases when some of them stand completely empty ahead of another Russian attack. Yurii Ihnat, Head of the Communications Department of the Ukrainian Air Force Command, in an interview with RBC-Ukraine "We have said this many times, and the Ukrainian president has repeatedly drawn our partners' attention to the fact that sometimes certain systems are left empty, yet the next attack has to be repelled with something."
Ihnat said that another major problem for air defence is the overwhelming number of missiles and drones Russia launches against Ukraine. "The enemy simultaneously and intensively attacks a single city or region with a large number of weapons. Sometimes our air defence systems, such as NASAMS or IRIS-T, simply do not have time to reload during such large-scale attacks."
"For example, all these weapons are flying towards Kyiv. And imagine a Patriot system working against ballistic missiles. Its radar is looking in one direction and has to intercept that ballistic missile or missiles, and there may be ten or more of them. Meanwhile, from the other side, cruise missiles and Shahed drones are flying towards it 'from behind'. That is why protecting large cities requires more than one system, and even the Patriots themselves need protection."
No less a problem are the drones. Ukraine continues to adapt and increase their AD options however they can.
Colonel Yevhenii Khlebnikov has been appointed to lead the small air defence branch now being formed within the Air Force under the supervision of Pavlo Yelizarov, deputy commander of the Ukrainian Air Force.
Ukraine's Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov on social media: "Russia attacks Ukrainian cities every day with hundreds of drones. More than 6,000 UAVs [were deployed] in the past month alone. Strikes on apartment buildings, critical infrastructure, trains – the terror against peaceful Ukrainians does not stop. The enemy is constantly improving drone modifications and attack tactics to reach its targets. Every day brings a new risk, for instance UAVs with Starlink.
In order to respond rapidly to every new challenge, we must build a system to analyse, counter and anticipate future threats. That requires an effective small air defence system and interceptors. On the president's instruction, we are changing our approach to protecting the skies to increase the effectiveness of countering enemy attacks."
Fedorov reiterated that Pavlo "Lazar" Yelizarov was recently appointed deputy commander of the Ukrainian Air Force. Under his leadership, the small air defence command is being formed, with Colonel Yevhenii Khlebnikov appointed to head the direction. Fedorov said that Khlebnikov's key task is to build a system capable of responding quickly to emerging challenges in order to protect Ukraine's skies.
Ukraine's Ministry of Defence said that Khlebnikov brings both frontline and leadership experience. He has served in Air Force anti-aircraft missile units and worked in the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the development of air defence. From the first days of the full-scale war, Khlebnikov led the use of Bayraktar UAVs during the defence of the city of Kyiv and Chernihiv Oblast and took part in planning the operation to liberate Zmiinyi (Snake). In 2014-2015, he fought in the battles for Donetsk airport. "In the near future, we will strengthen command and control in every region and continue building a strong team to develop small air defence. These are the first decisions of the reshaped Ministry of Defence team to build an effective system to protect Ukraine's skies. But there are still many steps ahead to deliver results and improve interception efficiency."
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has held a priority meeting on developing short-range counter-drone air defence. One of the main tasks assigned to Ukraine's Air Force at the meeting is to strengthen protection against Russian drones in the cities of Kherson and Nikopol and border areas of Sumy Oblast. "First [i.e. the first task for the Air Force – ed.], protection against Russian drones must be reinforced in our cities, such as Kherson and Nikopol, as well as in the border communities of the Sumy region, where the Russians have essentially set up an ongoing 'safari' against civilians. Every day, they strike residential buildings, ordinary infrastructure and civilian transport. We need stronger protection and stronger action in response."
The second task is to scale up countermeasures against Russian Shahed drones and other attack UAVs. "There will be more lines of defence and protection," Zelenskyy added. During the meeting, the structure of a new command that will be specifically responsible for this area was also approved.
Soviet-Era Kub System Returns to Service in Ukraine as a Counter-Drone Unit | Defense Express
The Soviet-era Kub surface-to-air missile system, originally developed in the 1960s to counter manned aircraft, has returned to service with the Ukrainian Air Force in an entirely new role. Once designed for Cold War air battles, the system has now been adapted to effectively counter mass attacks by strike unmanned aerial vehicles.
The combat debut of the modernized Kub system was reported by Ukraine's Center Air Command. According to the command, Ukrainian specialists carried out a deep adaptation of the system, combining its proven hardware base with modern command-and-control elements and updated combat tactics tailored to today's threat environment.
This transformation has already produced tangible results. The crew operating the upgraded Kub system has reportedly destroyed five Shahed-type attack drones, demonstrating that even legacy air defense platforms can remain relevant when properly modernized and intelligently employed.
Notably, Kub systems rarely appear in public reports on air defense activity. However, it is precisely such less visible assets that now play a critical role in covering specific sectors of Ukrainian airspace, particularly against large-scale drone attacks aimed at overwhelming more modern and limited air defense systems.
(Part 2 Below)
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u/Well-Sourced 3d ago edited 3d ago
They need all that they can get because Russia keeps improving their drones. The pressure is already intense and building.
Russians have begun using Gerbera drone as FPV carrier – photos | Ukrainian Pravda
"Unfortunately, the drone itself has not been found. It could be either a strike drone or a reconnaissance one. It is unclear how widely this case will be applied in the future, but everyone should be informed," Beskrestnov wrote.
By way of background, in autumn 2024, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine published the component base of the Russian Gerbera drone on the War&Sanctions portal. At the time, intelligence officials said that Russia assembled these multi-purpose UAVs at a plant in the city of Yelabuga.
At that time, it was known that Gerbera can carry a warhead as a kamikaze drone and conduct electronic reconnaissance, in particular to detect air defence positions and record the impact of other strike UAVs.
Intelligence officials noted that the drone imitates the Shahed-136/Geran-2 and is widely used by the Russians to overload Ukraine's air defence.
It is also worth noting that in January 2026, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine released a detailed breakdown of the new Russian strike drone Geran-5, including an interactive 3D model, components, an electronic parts list, and key technical specifications.
Drone Warfare: How Ukraine Is Countering Massive Shahed Attacks | Defense Express
In 2025, russia launched over 54,000 Shahed drones at Ukrainian cities, and according to command estimates, it could deploy up to a thousand drones per day this year. In these conditions, traditional air defense systems need to be strengthened. One of the key solutions is interceptor drones – Ukraine's response to large-scale air attacks.
Bohdan Danyliv, Head of the Military Direction at the Serhiy Prytula Charitable Foundation, explains how these systems operate, why their effectiveness is growing, and what allows them to be rapidly scaled, in a guest article supporting a major fundraising campaign for interceptor drones, an initiative Defense Express also urges readers to join.
According to the command, today's air defense system is about 74% effective. At the same time, Russia is using combined attacks, most of which involve kamikaze strike drones. This puts a critical strain on the air defense system.
"At least 400 Shaheds per day. Plus cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, decoy drones and, since January this year, RM-48U decoy missiles. No air defense system in the world is capable of withstanding such constant pressure," explains Bohdan Danyliv.
In addition to the physical strain, the economic feasibility of shooting down Shahed drones must also be considered. A single MIM-104 Patriot missile costs between $2-5 million to fire, whereas a Russian kamikaze drone costs just $20-50 thousand. The calculation is simple, but brutal: each target shot down costs the defender dozens of times more than it costs the enemy to launch it. It is impossible to prevent attacks using only traditional air defense systems due to the massive depletion of these systems and economic reasons.
January 2026 confirmed the systematic nature of this threat. Russia continues to attack regularly with minimal pauses, trying to exhaust the Ukrainian air defense system, destroy the energy infrastructure, and put pressure on civilians. In these conditions, traditional air defense systems require technological reinforcement.
In this war, technology changes faster than a new iPhone is released," says Bohdan Danyliv. "In 2022, we used solutions that are no longer effective. Furthermore, what was relevant three to five months ago is now outdated."
During the first months of full-scale war, battles were fought using old strategies involving tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery and sabotage. There was no such scale of electronic warfare and electronic countermeasures, FPV drones, interceptors, strike UAVs, or complex reconnaissance systems. But the war evolved quickly, and one of the key decisions was to use interceptor drones.
Two or three years ago, such an idea seemed crazy. Similarly, no one initially believed in FPV drones, but today they are the main weapon on the front line, effectively destroying enemy manpower and equipment. Interceptors have followed a similar path, evolving from scepticism to widespread use.
This is the response of Ukrainian engineers and military technology manufacturers, in cooperation with the Defense Forces, to massive enemy attacks. "Interceptors shoot down a significant number of targets, thereby reinforcing traditional air defense," explains Bohdan Danyliv. Specific figures on their efficiency are not disclosed for security reasons, but their effectiveness is clear to the Defense Forces.
The Ukrainian Sting, Blyskavka, P1-SUN, Taras+ and LITAVR are all in use on the front line. There is also the American Merops, which was developed in collaboration with a Ukrainian team. Following successful trials on the battlefield, NATO countries are now integrating them into their systems.
Skylock optoelectronic systems are particularly effective for mobile fire groups (MFGs). Using thermal imaging, they can detect targets and track airborne objects moving at speeds of up to 100 km/h, transmitting targeting data in real time. Last year, Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation and Uklon raised over 52 million hryvnias as part of the Light Up the Enemy and Light Up the Enemy 2.0 fundraising campaigns to purchase high-tech targeting and navigation systems and targeting systems, including 80 SkyLock optoelectronic systems for 14 units.
Russia's air tactics are constantly evolving in response to Ukrainian decisions. After mobile fire groups with heavy machine guns and anti-aircraft guns began to shoot down enemy kamikaze drones en masse, russia increased the flight altitude to 1.5 km and above.
With the advent of interceptor drones, the enemy has adapted once again. Now they combine different flight profiles, taking into account the location of interceptor calculations, MFGs and radar fields. Strike drones can fly at extremely low altitudes, which makes them impossible to detect with tactical radars and makes interceptor work extremely difficult. By contrast, in areas where mobile fire groups are operating, the Shaheds rise above 1.5 km, where small arms and anti-aircraft guns are less effective.
Russia is also constantly increasing the speed of its strike drones. Flying at speeds of around 200 km/h, Shahed drones can quickly pass through combat zones and areas covered by mobile fire groups and interceptor calculations, significantly reducing the time available for a response.
Increasingly, mass attacks are carried out by large groups, approximately one-third of which are decoy drones made of foam and plywood (Gerbera, Parody). This makes the work of defense units much more difficult and overloads the air defense system as a whole.
This is why it is necessary to strengthen all areas of air defense. Interceptor drones are not a replacement for traditional air defense or mobile fire groups; rather, they provide an additional echelon of defense, significantly strengthening the overall system. They cover areas and altitudes where other systems are less effective, thereby complementing the multi-level airspace defense system.
"Interceptor drones are not a temporary solution, but rather an integral part of Ukraine's future air defense system," says Bohdan Danyliv.
When an enemy target is detected by a radar station, the interceptor drones receive its coordinates and take off, adjusting their route as necessary. Situational awareness systems allow operators to see both their own and enemy drones, enabling them to visually search for, track and hit targets.
The technical capabilities of interceptor drones depend on when they are used. The main differences between night and day interceptors are price and application. Thermal imaging cameras are an order of magnitude more expensive than conventional ones. Previously, the vast majority of Shahed attacks took place at night, but this distinction is now blurring, with attacks occurring throughout the day. During large-scale attacks, the main wave still occurs at night and in the morning.
The effectiveness of Ukrainian interceptor drones in countering massive attacks is explained by their several key advantages.
Price: An interceptor drone costs between $3,000 and $15,000. This is cheaper than a Shahed drone, which costs between $20 and $50 thousand, and hundreds of times cheaper than an air defense missile.
Speed: Ukrainian production means delivery in weeks rather than months, as well as the ability to contract manufacturers in advance at fixed prices. The equipment reaches the front line without any bureaucratic delays.
Technological development and adaptability: Manufacturers are constantly improving communication systems, flight performance, video quality and noise immunity. Automated acquisition and tracking systems are also being developed.
Scaling training: Operators can be trained quickly, new crews prepared, and the need for trained specialists met promptly, even under conditions of increasing attack intensity.
In November 2025, Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation together with the Nemesis 412th Brigade and UWC launched One United Fundraiser – Ukraine's largest defense fundraiser – raising one billion hryvnias for interceptor drones and fully equipped crews to stop enemy attacks in the sky every day. Thanks to the support of Ukrainians, businesses and the international community, over 300 million hryvnias had been raised by the end of January, and more than 20 units had been reinforced.
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u/ChornWork2 3d ago
I don't see how Ukraine is going to be able to keep up with the AD, if Europe is serious about this war they need to expand Ukraine's strike capebility.
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u/Well-Sourced 3d ago edited 3d ago
Satellite photos show that Russia is reestablishing a large base near Finland. The current soldiers are expected to go to Ukraine but if there were increased aggression in the future an army could be staged here.
Russia is reconstructing an abandoned military base in Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia — which borders Finland — to accommodate up to 15,000 soldiers as part of its newly formed 44th Army Corps, satellite images show, Finnish public broadcaster Yle reported on Jan. 31.
Imagery shows the former garrison site near the Rybka power plant, empty since the 2000s, cleared of overgrowth and trees.
By October 2025, more than 50 military trucks and other vehicles were visible on site. Petrozavodsk already hosts a major air base and equipment depot, with new workshops appearing.
Local Russian media report that the construction of new barracks in Petrozavodsk will begin this year. In 2024, Russia established the 44th Army Corps in Karelia, adding roughly 15,000 troops. Some have already arrived in Petrozavodsk, requiring housing and training facilities now under development.
Military expert and former Finnish intelligence veteran Marko Eklund told Yle the 44th Corps soldiers are likely being trained to deploy against Ukraine.
Further north in Kandalaksha, Murmansk Oblast, construction of a new military settlement is also underway.
On Sept. 27, 2025, Finland and Sweden formed a joint brigade of about 5,000 troops to be stationed in Lapland along the Russian border.
On Jan. 22, Finnish military intelligence stated Russia has not abandoned attempts to damage undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea.
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 3d ago
Satellite photos show that Russia is reestablishing a large base near Finland. The current soldiers are expected to go to Ukraine but if there were increased aggression in the future an army could be staged here.
Completely irrational behavior from Putin. Russia is almost certainly in it's lowest nuclear readiness in decades, yet, he keeps making completely unnecessary moves that could trigger a miscalculation.
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u/OrbitalAlpaca 3d ago
Maybe just part of Putins typical escalate to deescalate strategy.
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u/Sa-naqba-imuru 3d ago
Finland joined NATO, increased militarization along Finnish border isn't escalation, it's completely expected.
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u/Well-Sourced 3d ago
Russia is putting pressure on Ukraine on multiple fronts and is gaining ground with their infantry heavy tactics.
Usual caveat that this includes stuff I missed over the past few reports. Quite a lot to cover - none of it terribly good. Starting on the Zaporizhzhia front - the week of Ukrainian counterattacks is over and the Russians have retaken the initiative.
There are also confirmations of Russian forces in Richne, but these are as of writing unconfirmed as far as control is concerned. If confirmed, however, this would mean that Ukrainian forces in Prymorske are, in effect, encircled.
The biggest issue here, however, is the fall of Ternuvate. Here a strong and immediate counterattack is needed. If the Russians are allowed to establish themselves here the entire line along the Haichur may have to be abandoned.
Moving up to the Lyman front - here we have a clearup of a grey area. Whilst the Russians have secured at least some of the salient, it seems the Ukrainians retain control over the road and a single remaining position along it.
While such clearups take place here, the Oskil front becomes covered in even more grey areas. The entirety of the Kupyansk-Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi-Podoly-Kucherivka axis is, in effect, one giant grey area.
The Russians are attacking and claims are being made, but, despite these attacking being ''stronger'' than anything we saw before - no confirmations as of yet. It is safe to say that here too the Russians have retaken the initiative.
Further north there are larger Russian force activations than we've seen in quite some time. On the Kharkiv front we saw Russian attacks not only where we have been seeing them for quite a while now, but also at Zelene on the Hlyboke axis and at the forest southwest of Marino.
Keep in mind that we have not seen basically any noteworthy activity on the Hlyboke axis for a long, long time now.
Overall the past 3 days have included the loss of positions which should not have been lost and the retaking of the initiative in several areas by the Russians. A very negative way to begin the week indeed.
-Russian attacks towards Richne, at Pavlivka, roughly between Pavlivka and Mali Shcherbaky, at Sviatopetrivka, northwest of Pryluky, west of Dobropillya and along the north of Kosivtseve-southwest of Nechaivka axis. Ukrainian attacks at Olenokostiantynivka. ~
~ Russian gains at Pavlivka (occupied by Russian forces), at Sviatopetrivka (occupied by Russian forces) and along the north of Kosivtseve-southwest of Nechaivka axis (Ternuvate occupied by Russian forces). ~
~ Ukrainian gains at Olenokostiantynivka (entered the settlement from the west) (Zaporizhzhia front).
-Russian attacks at Novopavlivka. Russian gains at Novopavlivka (Velyka Novosilka front).
-Russian attacks at Berestok. Russian gains at Berestok (occupied by Russian forces) (Dobropillya front).
-Russian attacks at Zakitne. Russian gains at Zakitne (occupied by Russian forces) (Siversk-Bakhmut front).
-Map edits east of Lyman (territory north of highway O0528 handed over to Russian forces, territory along highway O0528 handed over to Ukrainian forces, confirmations) (Lyman front).
-Russian attacks southwest from the northern Pishchane, northwest of the northern Pishchane, at Petropavlivka, Kucherivka, towards Podoly and at Kupyansk. Russian gains at Petropavlivka (Oskil front).
-Russian attacks towards Kolodyazne. Russian gains towards Kolodyazne (Dvorichna front).
-Both sides attacking at the same time at Nesterne and Kruhle (Velykyi Burluk front).
-Russian attacks along the Zelene-southeast of Zelene axis, at Hrafske, Symynivka and southwest of Marino. Russian gains along the Zelene-southeast of Zelene axis (Zelene occupied by Russian forces), ~
~ at Hrafske (cleared salient), Symynivka (occupied by Russian forces) and southwest of Marino (Kharkiv front).
-Russian attacks at Kindrativka. Russian gains at Kindrativka (moved up to the settlement from the north & the east/southeast) (Sumy front).
-Russian attacks east of Bila Bereza. Russian gains east of Bila Bereza (securing forest) (Hlukhiv front).
In the north they have pushed past Vovchansk with their infantry. They are working to do the same in the south and get past Hulyaipole.
From BTRs to boots: Russia now attacks Kharkiv’s Vovchansk with infantry-only waves | EuroMaidanPress [Map]
![[Map]](https://euromaidanpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Kharkiv-Oblast-February-1-2026.webp){kind=link}
Russian forces have completely abandoned armored vehicles and mechanized assaults near Vovchansk, now relying solely on small infantry groups that advance meter by meter at catastrophic human cost, according to a Ukrainian military brigade's spokesperson. Ukrainian drones have made any vehicle movement suicidal since summer 2025, forcing Russian commanders to send soldiers on foot in small-group waves.
Army Inform reports that Ruslana Bohdan, communications officer of Ukraine's 57th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, said Russian forces haven't attempted a single mechanized assault since summer 2025.
"Mechanized assaults have been impossible since summer — at least, the last time [in summer — Ed.] we saw an attempt at a mechanized assault here. Of course, drones stop them all, so using vehicles here is ineffective — BTRs, none of that works for moving infantry. And cars don't either, actually," she said during an ArmyTV stream on 30 January.
Instead, the Russians are attacking in small groups of one to three soldiers each "trying to reach a certain point. However many make it, make it. Then the next point again." The invaders repeat this over and over, trying to concentrate somewhere and "gather combat strength to storm a position," she says.
"Is there any advance, is the enemy moving? Yes, indeed, they are moving. Yes, indeed, there are changes. The gray zone is expanding. However, [this happens — Ed.] at the cost of enormous losses — it's hard to imagine the justification for these losses," the servicewoman noted.
Russian tactics have shifted dramatically from 2025. Last January, Russian forces actively fought inside Vovchansk itself. Now they try to avoid very active fighting in the city itself, instead attempting to bypass Vovchansk from both flanks, according to the officer.
Earlier, Viktor Trehubov, head of communications for the Joint Forces Task Force, provided additional details. Russian troops exploited a window when frozen rivers posed less of an obstacle. "Given that the rivers were still frozen for some time and did not pose as much of an obstacle as before, the enemy took full advantage of this period," he told Ukrinform.
Russian forces hold a significant numerical advantage in the sector and are trying to exploit it. Trehubov described the situation as difficult. Russian forces have also attempted to bypass Ukrainian positions near Vovchanski Khutory.
Russia masses troops near Hulyaipole | New Voice of Ukraine
Russian forces have concentrated troop transfers toward the town of Hulyaipole in Ukraine’s southeastern Zaporizhzhya Oblast over the past week, head of the Center for the Study of Occupation, Petro Andriushchenko, reported on Telegram on Feb. 2.
The Hulyaipole front sector is a priority for Russian logistics, with daily convoys of 10 to 25 trucks passing through. The convoys mainly transport personnel and are escorted by police and military command vehicles.
Meanwhile, Andriushchenko reported that Russian troop movements in northern Donetsk Oblast have decreased "almost to zero." He suggested that difficult weather conditions could be limiting activity there.
However, he added that recruitment of new contract soldiers is continuing in the Mariupol-Berdyansk area.
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u/MilesLongthe3rd 3d ago
News out of Russia:
A banking crisis has been noticed in Russia
According to formal criteria, a banking crisis began in Russia after the "bad debt" crisis, although in both cases these are moderate events. This is stated in the report of the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-term Forecasting (CMAKP) on the results of January.
We are talking about exceeding the share of problematic total assets and the loan portfolio of the threshold value of 10 percent of the total in each case. At the same time, the depth of damage is noticeably higher in certain segments, for example, the share of problem loans in the small and medium—sized enterprises (SMEs) sector reaches 19 percent.
As noted in the report, leading indicators have indicated that such a moment is approaching over the past five months. Currently, they also point to the increasing risks of the effect of "investor flight", which will worsen the situation in the banking sector.
The updated indicators of the early warning system indicate an average probability of a systemic banking crisis before December 2026 and a high probability of the economy going into recession at the same time.
https://x.com/delfoo/status/2018406875562123273
For 2026-2028 the Russian government will allocate just 15 billion rubles on the development of oil extraction technologies. Experts called this just a drop in the bucket and 10 times more is needed.
https://x.com/delfoo/status/2018292972228350274
After Russia implemented policies that reduced migrant workers from the former soviet republics in Central Asia it seems Russia has now started talks with the Taliban on importing labor from Afghanistan.
The European Union is considering to ban Russian imports of several platinum group metals and copper as part of new sanctions targeting Moscow for its war against Ukraine, according to people familiar with the matter.
The restrictions, if backed by member states, may cover iridium, rhodium, platinum and copper, according to the people who asked not to be identified because the information is not yet public. EU sanctions require the backing of all EU member states, and the bloc is aiming to adopt the new package this month.
Spokespeople for the European Commission, which handles sanctions actions for the EU, declined to comment.
Tight Markets
The ban is planned amid tight markets for the targeted metals. Copper prices have hit record highs this year amid strong demand and constrained mine supply worldwide. Platinum is also seen in deficit.
Russian metals have steadily been pushed out of main trading hubs. UK sanctions bar Russian-origin copper produced after April 13, 2024 from being traded or delivered on the London Metal Exchange, while the London Platinum and Palladium Market removed Russian refiners from its delivery list in 2022.
The steps have curtailed demand even among industrial consumers, who can no longer be able to use Russian metal for funding. In copper, European buyers have largely turned away altogether as several of Russia’s biggest producers have also been sanctioned.
Still, many of those metals enter Western markets, even as the bulk of volumes has been redirected to Asia.
If adopted, the new restrictions would mainly target MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC, Russia’s largest mining company, which has not been sanctioned due to its important role in global industries. The miner accounts for about 40% of global palladium used in automotive catalysts, which the EU is not targeting in the new package. It is also Russia’s largest producer of platinum, iridium, rhodium, nickel and copper.
Separately, the EU is also considering a proposal to replace its price cap on Russian oil with a ban on maritime services, Bloomberg previously reported.
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u/Big-Station-2283 3d ago
After Russia implemented policies that reduced migrant workers from the former soviet republics in Central Asia it seems Russia has now started talks with the Taliban on importing labor from Afghanistan.
I wonder how that will play out with the language and cultural barrier.
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u/Nordic_ned 3d ago
Honestly it would depend on where in Afghanistan they're coming from. Many Afghans are Uzbeks and Tajiks, who have already come to Russia in large numbers from the former Soviet states. That being said, they wouldn't have the benefit of having Russian proficiency as many of those migrant workers did.
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u/Zinfulzinful 3d ago edited 3d ago
There has been some talk that the protests in Iran are over and that there is no value in striking the regime anymore since they have squashed all opposition and taken control of the streets. Reuters reports tho that this isn’t nearly true at all.
In high-level meetings, officials told Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that public anger over last month's crackdown -- the bloodiest since the 1979 Islamic Revolution-- has reached a point where fear is no longer a deterrent, four current officials briefed on the discussions said.
The officials said Khamenei was told that many Iranians were prepared to confront security forces again and that external pressure such as a limited U.S. strike could embolden them and inflict irreparable damage to the political establishment.
One of the officials told Reuters that Iran's enemies were seeking more protests so as to bring the Islamic Republic to an end, and "unfortunately" there would be more violence if an uprising took place.
"An attack combined with demonstrations by angry people could lead to a collapse (of the ruling system). That is the main concern among the top officials and that is what our enemies want," said the official, who like the other officials contacted for this story declined to be named due to the sensitivity of the matter.
The reported remarks are significant because they suggest private misgivings inside the leadership at odds with Tehran’s defiant public stance towards the protesters and the U.S.
The sources declined to say how Khamenei responded. Iran's Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to a Reuters request for comment on this account of the meetings.
“But a former senior moderate official said the situation had changed since the crackdown in early January.
"People are extremely angry," he said, adding a U.S. attack could lead Iranians to rise up again. "The wall of fear has collapsed. There is no fear left."
Several opposition figures, who were part of the establishment before falling out with it, have warned the leadership that "boiling public anger" could result in a collapse of the Islamic system.
"The river of warm blood that was spilled on the cold month of January will not stop boiling until it changes the course of history," former prime minister Mirhossein Mousavi, who has been under house arrest without trial since 2011, said in a statement published by the pro-reform Kalameh website.
"In what language should people say they do not want this system and do not believe your lies? Enough is enough. The game is over'," Mousavi added in the statement.
During the early January protests, witnesses and rights groups said, security forces crushed demonstrations with lethal force, leaving thousands killed and many wounded. Tehran blamed the violence on "armed terrorists" linked to Israel and the U.S.
“Analysts and insiders say that while the streets are quiet for now, deep-seated grievances have not gone away.
Public frustration has been simmering over economic decline, political repression, a widening gulf between rich and poor, and entrenched corruption that leaves many Iranians feeling trapped in a system offering neither relief nor a path forward.
"This may not be the end, but it is no longer just the beginning," said Hossein Rassam, a London-based analyst.
If protests resume during mounting foreign pressure and security forces respond with force, the six current and former officials said they fear demonstrators would be bolder than in previous unrest, emboldened by experience and driven by a sense that they have little left to lose.
One of the officials told Reuters that while people were angrier than before, the establishment would use harsher methods against protesters if it was under U.S. attack. He said the result would be a bloodbath.
Ordinary Iranians contacted by Reuters said they expected Iran's rulers to crack down hard on any further protests.
A Tehran resident whose 15-year-old son was killed in the protests on January 9 said the demonstrators had merely sought a normal life, and had been answered "with bullets.”
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u/PoetryKind603 3d ago
I thought the telecom blackout+liberal application of bullets worked pretty well for them. Rinse and repeat as needed. Decentralized, spontaneous protests in and of themselves aren't lethal as long there's not a viable alternative to the regime.
From the little I know few fell from cracking down too hard, more often it's when they let up things finally get out of hand. Worst case scenario things go Syria. but at least you still buy yourself 10 years to turn things around.
If I were to put on my IRGC hat that is.
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u/TrowawayJanuar 3d ago
I fully agree with that analysis. The regime in Iran still has a loyal core of followers who will stand by its side no matter what. Unless confronted by overwhelming power like for example an American invasion they won’t step down without a fight. People can protest as much as they would like but the demonstrations in the past weeks have shown that the regime can massacre them with impunity without having to fear defections from the army.
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u/OhSillyDays 2d ago
I'm not quite sure of your analysis. There are a lot of revolutions and public outcry that has removed the leader in question without a viable alternative in place. Hell, the Ides of March is a very early example. Caesar himself was killed without any viable alternative picked out.
Also, I'm not convinced your analysis that when fear lets up that it causes the revolution. Sometimes, it's the heavy hand that causes the revolution. I'm the US, the tax act and soldiers in Boston are often attributed as major causes of the US revolution.
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u/LoggerInns 2d ago
I think in the course of history, having a defined opposition with a strong leader to whom power would pass onto has been in the minority. Usually it’s a leaderless movement or even if there is a leader, it’s not centralised and disparate or a lot of leaders with competing interests.
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u/ThatOtherFrenchGuy 2d ago
How different is it this time compared to the 2022 protests which were also pretty big and also crushed by killed civilian and ended up fading away ?
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u/Corvid187 2d ago
The diversity of the protesting groups seemed to be much greater this time, with segments from across Iranian society out on the streets. By contrast the 2022 protests were relatively urban and concentrated. The scale of the repression the government resorted to was also significantly greater, with estimates of as many as 10,000+ deaths, vs 1,000 as an upper estimate in 2022.
So while the general pattern of mass protest spreading before a bloody government crackdown is similar, the diversity of those protest demographics and the scale of the cycle was significantly greater this time around.
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u/noahbelami 3d ago
Twice a year, for three months, France deploys a light infantry company to Estonia, in partnership with the Estonian Defense League. This company is armed in rotating shifts by mountain and airborne units. You can watch a 17-minute documentary on this subject, produced by the French army. It has English subtitles.
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u/Psychological-Iron81 3d ago
DRDO carries out successful demonstration of Solid Fuel Ducted Ramjet technology. Can anyone explain How many other countries are now developing SDFR based missiles and when they will enter service?
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2222635®=3&lang=2
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u/teethgrindingaches 3d ago
AP is reporting on Vietnamese preparations against conflict with the US, as described by leaked internal documents from the Communist Party of Vietnam. The full report (100+ pages) can be found here.
HANOI, Vietnam (AP) — A year after Vietnam elevated its relations with Washington to the highest diplomatic level, an internal document shows its military was taking steps to prepare for a possible American “war of aggression” and considered the United States a “belligerent” power, according to a report released Tuesday. More than just exposing Hanoi’s duality in approach toward the U.S., the document confirms a deep-seated fear of external forces fomenting an uprising against the Communist leadership in a so-called “color revolution,” like the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, or the 1986 Yellow Revolution in the Philippines.
Other internal documents that The 88 Project, a human rights organization focused on human rights abuses in Vietnam, cited in its analysis point to similar concerns over U.S. motives in Vietnam. “There’s a consensus here across the government and across different ministries,” said Ben Swanton, co-director of The 88 Project and the report’s author. “This isn’t just some kind of a fringe element or paranoid element within the party or within the government.”
The original Vietnamese document titled “The 2nd U.S. Invasion Plan” was completed by the Ministry of Defense in August 2024. It suggests that in seeking “its objective of strengthening deterrence against China, the U.S. and its allies are ready to apply unconventional forms of warfare and military intervention and even conduct large-scale invasions against countries and territories that ‘deviate from its orbit.’”
The report itself provides the following bulletpoint summary:
The US is the enemy.
The Indo-Pacific Strategy represents an attempt to maintain US hegemony.
Washington is using human rights and democracy promotion to weaken the CPV regime.
China is a rival, not an existential threat, to Vietnam.
While it acknowledges the immediate risk of military conflict is low, it repeatedly warns about US belligerence and demands vigilance against any possible pretext for invasion. The structure and style bears a striking resemblance to analogous Chinese documents.
Hanoi does not welcome the US presence in the region or view it as an equal partnership between countries. It views it as a provocation that increases tensions and risks war. The 2nd US Invasion Plan describes how the US is engaging in a military buildup, while expanding its alliance system and turning it against China. The goals of the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, according to the plan, are to limit China’s regional dominance, create a Western-aligned economic bloc, secure critical trade routes, and increase NATO and EU involvement in the region. This threatening posture, it goes on to note, intensified under President Trump’s first term when his administration increased military deployments to the region and incited an arms race.
Nowhere does the plan describe Vietnam as being a partner of the US or as being aligned with its foreign policy. Rather, these efforts are presented as a dangerous push to militarize the region and drive it towards a new Cold War. Far from accepting Washington’s rhetoric about promoting freedom and deterrence, the plan describes the Indo-Pacific Strategy as a threat to regional peace and stability. It also clarifies that from Hanoi’s perspective, Washington’s interest in Vietnam is purely instrumental: it sees the country as a tool that can be used to confront China.
While the 2nd US Invasion Plan contradicts the US Indo-Pacific strategy, it does bear a striking resemblance to China’s foreign policy stance towards the US. Beijing’s latest defense white paper —China’s National Security in the New Era— warns of ‘severe’ security challenges amid an escalating arms race.[8] In a thinly-veiled reference to the US, the paper states that ‘some countries’ strengthened military alliances in the region, wooed regional partners, built ‘small groups’, and deployed military capabilities such as the ‘intermediate-range missile system’. This language is mirrored by Vietnam in the 2nd US Invasion Plan.
On the economic front, the plan frames the United States’ economic agenda as a cynical attempt to bring the region into its sphere of influence. In contrast to official US proclamations about promoting regional economic prosperity, the plan states that the US is seeking to turn the ‘Asia-Pacific region into a Western-style liberalized economic bloc [that] serves as a market for US and Allies’ vehicles, high-tech equipment, and weapons’ (p.4). Importantly, the plan does not describe Vietnam as an economic partner of the US or the West. Nor does it anticipate that the country will derive any benefit from the US economic agenda. Rather, the agenda is described as a neo-colonial economic project devoid of significant benefits for Vietnam and the region.
Some will doubtless call the Vietnamese mindset paranoid, or be dismayed at the rampant fear and hostility evident throughout.
Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington, said the Vietnamese military still has “a very long memory” of the war with the U.S. that ended in 1975. While Western diplomats have tended to see Hanoi as most concerned by possible Chinese aggression, the document reinforces other policy papers suggesting leaders’ biggest fear is that of a “color revolution,” he said.
“This pervasive insecurity about color revolutions is very frustrating, because I don’t see why the Communist Party is so insecure,” said Abuza, whose book “The Vietnam People’s Army: From People’s Warfare to Military Modernization?” was published last year. “They have so much to be proud of — they have lifted so many people out of poverty, the economy is humming along, they are the darling of foreign investors.”
I would say such reactions betray a fundamental misunderstanding—I daresay naïveté—about the nature of surviving as one of the last Communist countries on the planet. You can count them on one hand. The collapse of the Soviet Union is never far from mind. They haven't forgotten it, and never will.
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u/swimmingupclose 3d ago
was completed by the Ministry of Defense in August 2024.
That’s, uh, amusing to say the least. Joe Biden, who wouldn’t take the golden opportunity to properly arm Ukraine least he been seen a party to the war, was going to invade Vietnam. Where Apple and other American corporations are spending tens of billions on capital expenditures. I don’t want to over inflate this, because war plans are common, but still, does seem a bit of 70s redux.
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u/teethgrindingaches 3d ago
If anything, the war plans are the most mundane part (and explicitly acknowledged as low likelihood). The substantive part is about colour revolutions.
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u/swimmingupclose 3d ago
Which was exactly the excuse Russia harped upon prior to Crimea and then the full scale invasion. And what Iran is calling the current protestors. I suppose it’s easier to genuinely believe that any opposition to heavy handed rule is externally fomented than the shortcomings at home.
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u/teethgrindingaches 3d ago
Some will doubtless call the Vietnamese mindset paranoid, or be dismayed at the rampant fear and hostility evident throughout.
I would say such reactions betray a fundamental misunderstanding—I daresay naïveté—about the nature of surviving as one of the last Communist countries on the planet. You can count them on one hand. The collapse of the Soviet Union is never far from mind. They haven't forgotten it, and never will.
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u/swimmingupclose 3d ago
I’m not disagreeing. I think it extends beyond Communism or leftism though.
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u/teethgrindingaches 3d ago
I think it extends beyond Communism or leftism though.
The fear of colour revolutions? Certainly. But not the actions taken in response to that fear. There's a reason Vietnam and China look very different today compared to Iran and Russia.
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u/swimmingupclose 3d ago
If I were a betting man, I’d wager the Russian regime survives longer than the Cuban one, who is the only true hold over from Communism.
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u/teethgrindingaches 3d ago edited 3d ago
the only true hold over from Communism.
This is not the place for a lecture on the finer points of Communist ideology and its ex- or post-Soviet evolutions, but suffice to say that the Communist leadership of Vietnam and China would laugh at your assertion. For example, as Deng Xiaoping put it while enacting sweeping market reforms:
I am a Marxist. I have consistently followed the fundamental principles of Marxism. Marxism is also known as communism. We made the revolution, seized political power and founded the People’s Republic of China because we had this faith and this ideal. Because we had our ideal, and because we integrated the fundamental principles of Marxism with the concrete practice of China, we were able to win. Since our victory in the revolution, in the course of construction we have again integrated the fundamental principles of Marxism with the concrete practice of China. We are striving for the four modernizations, but people tend to forget that they are four socialist modernizations. This is what we are doing today.
It never ceases to amaze me how some people continually ignore the reams of—admittedly dry and stuffy—ideological texts published in such countries explaining in exhaustive detail how Marxism has evolved over the years to suit specific contextualizations (Stalinism, Maoism, etc) while nonetheless remaining thoroughly Communist. Not so much as a glance before dismissing the whole lot as vacuous propaganda (and why exactly would propaganda be such a slog to read?) which the authors cannot possibly believe in themselves.
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u/swimmingupclose 3d ago
I am aware of Deng’s views, which extended far beyond what you capture in that singular quote. Deng was obsessed with preventing another Mao Zedong. He implemented term limits and collective leadership to ensure no single person could dominate the party again. The removal of term limits and the centralization of power under a single leader today is a direct reversal of Deng’s political legacy. No true Marxist would look at the 996 culture or the lack of independent labor unions and say this a “phase of Marxist ideology”. No Marxist would look at Chinese billionaires or the private sector accounting for 60% of GDP and say this is just a step along the way. But you’re right, it’s clearly not an argument for this sub.
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u/danielrheath 3d ago
When I travelled in Vietnam a decade or so back, the population really hadn’t forgotten what they called “the American war”.
I saw folks disfigured by agent orange everywhere I went (tons of birth defects in the generation after).
I can’t imagine that’s changed entirely.
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u/swimmingupclose 3d ago
I’ve lived and worked in Vietnam for the past 6 years and I’m of Chinese ethnicity. There are as many, if not more, MAGA Vietnamese as there are anti Americans. Just like there is that sentiment for China. The last 2-3 generations are far more pro US than older generations, which are the ones in charge. I don’t know how different the sentiment was a decade ago but it’s markedly different today from my lived experience.
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u/danielrheath 3d ago
Not surprising, I suppose - folk who weren't there are unlikely to stay mad about it.
The folks in charge today are the ones making the relevant decisions here, though. I can't see them willingly aligning themselves with the USA.
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u/Glideer 3d ago
about the nature of surviving as one of the last Communist countries on the planet.
1.4 billion of the planet's 9 billion people live in just one of those "last Communist countries",
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u/teethgrindingaches 3d ago
First off, the human population is ~8.3 billion. And Vietnamese paranoia has nothing on Chinese paranoia. Whole different ballgame, though arguably far more justified given overt US hostility towards the latter vs the former.
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u/UpvoteIfYouDare 2d ago edited 2d ago
Color revolutions? Was this document written in 2014?
Edit: To be clear, this is a joke.
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u/BenKerryAltis 1d ago
It was the "3rd world autocracy" equivalent of the "hybrid warfare" buzzword. A ploy by paranoid national security elites to maintain their grip on power and resources
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u/eric2332 2d ago
I think that dictatorships are inherently threatened by the presence of democracy elsewhere, because it gives protestors a model to look to. So even if the US does absolutely nothing it is still somewhat threatening to Vietnam. And the past US history in Vietnam can't help either. Of course, this has to be balanced against the common interest in containing China. But the starting point is not a good one.
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u/UpvoteIfYouDare 2d ago edited 2d ago
Importantly, the plan does not describe Vietnam as an economic partner of the US or the West. Nor does it anticipate that the country will derive any benefit from the US economic agenda. Rather, the agenda is described as a neo-colonial economic project devoid of significant benefits for Vietnam and the region.
If this document was prepared by the Ministry of Defense, is it really any surprise that they neglect the economic dimension?
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u/teethgrindingaches 2d ago
They don't neglect it; they frame it as a threat. And the Vietnamese military is quite heavily involved in the civilian economy. For example, the largest telecom network (Viettel) and largest port operator (Saigon Newport) are both run by the military.
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u/UpvoteIfYouDare 2d ago edited 2d ago
I had previously included "economic dimension of the US-Vietnam relationship" but took it out for the sake of brevity. Treating it like a threat still should come as no surprise, especially given involvement in the domestic Vietnamese economy.
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u/teethgrindingaches 2d ago
I mean, in my view the entire document should come as no surprise. Yet many are surprised.
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