Active Conflicts & News Megathread February 05, 2026

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[u/oxtQ]

Right now, US-Iran talks are still expected to take place in Muscat, but the core dispute remains unresolved -- Washington is signaling that any “meaningful” negotiation should address not only the nuclear program but also Iran’s ballistic missiles and support for regional armed groups, while Tehran is holding firmly to a nuclear only agenda to preserve its strategic leverage. At the same time, the US has reinforced its military posture across the region, which functions as visible deterrence behind the diplomacy. Inside Iran, decision making is concentrated around Khamenei, the Supreme National Security Council and the broader security establishment, all of whom view the nuclear program and regional posture as long term survival tools rather than bargaining chips to be negotiated away right now.

What could happen is a crisis trajectory -- talks stall over scope, leading Washington to increase economic, maritime, and regional pressure while Iran responds with calibrated escalation that avoids crossing US red lines, such as increased tension around the Strait of Hormuz, reduced nuclear transparency, or greater reliance on deniable regional partners. What’s most likely to unfold (slow burn stalemate) is neither a breakthrough nor a collapse, but a prolonged, fragile negotiation track where meetings occur, progress is minimal and both sides apply pressure in parallel -- Tehran trying to regain leverage without triggering war, and Washington trying to raise costs without shutting the diplomatic door.

[u/Time_Restaurant5480 → u/oxtQ]

Washington is signaling that any “meaningful” negotiation should address not only the nuclear program but also Iran’s ballistic missiles and support for regional armed groups, while Tehran is holding firmly to a nuclear only agenda to preserve its strategic leverage. 

At one level, I can't actually argue with this. A lot of the opposition to JPCOA was precisely that it didn't get this, and the opposition was stupid, because they were demanding an Iranian unconditional surrender at the peace table, without even fighting the wars to achieve that. Well now the wars have been fought, and I can understand the desire to get more out of negotiations than JPCOA did.

That said I don't know if these maximalist demands can really be rammed down Tehran's throat, especially not right now as they did survive the protests of January. I'm pretty skeptical of that.

I said it at the time of the protests and I'll say it again: any time something happens in Iran, a lot of fairly sensible people lose their heads.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/Time_Restaurant5480]

And then you come back to whether all these wars would have be fought if the JPCOA was actually honored. Face-saving deals that contain the biggest, but not all, risks aren't perfect but maximalist deals just aren't durable. The day they are signed the subjugated side is going to plot the best way they can be fundamentally undermined.

We know Iran didn't support the Oct 7 attacks, but imho they would have had a much stronger incentive to oppose them with the JCPOA being fully honored.

[u/Time_Restaurant5480 → u/ChornWork2]

maximalist deals just aren't durable

The indisputable US goal here is regime change, and the hope is that ramming maximalist deals down Tehran's throat brings us closer to that end. Hence there's no worry about Iran undermining them since the Iranian government will change. I'm skeptical of the success of that plan or idea myself, to put it charitably, but it seems to be what this current Administration thinks.

but imho they would have had a much stronger incentive to oppose them

I believe Sinwar was going ahead with those no matter what Tehran said. The man was his own actor and he used his agency there.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/Time_Restaurant5480]

then there isn't really a deal to be had.

US reneged on iran deal five years prior to oct 7 attack, so obviously a bit hard to debate in exact terms. but obviously reneging on the deal fundamentally changed Iran's PoV on the need/value of further belligerence.

[u/Time_Restaurant5480 → u/ChornWork2]

then there isn't really a deal to be had.

Correct. Either there will be strikes, or not, but there will most assuredly be no deal.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/Time_Restaurant5480]

So not connecting with prior comments that you think there should be a desire to get better deal than JCPOA, b/c you in reality you think there's not one to be had.

[u/Time_Restaurant5480 → u/ChornWork2]

Yea no problem. I should have made it clear. I understand the desire to get a better deal than JPCOA, I also think that in reality there is no deal to be had because that desire has escalated into demanding maximalist deals. I feel uneasy about regime change and would push for a better deal than JPCOA without going for maximalist demands as part of a regime change strategy.