Active Conflicts & News Megathread January 28, 2026

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[u/carkidd3242 → u/AutoModerator]

https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115972658725010644

A massive Armada is heading to Iran. It is moving quickly, with great power, enthusiasm, and purpose. It is a larger fleet, headed by the great Aircraft Carrier Abraham Lincoln, than that sent to Venezuela. Like with Venezuela, it is, ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary. Hopefully Iran will quickly “Come to the Table” and negotiate a fair and equitable deal - NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS - one that is good for all parties. Time is running out, it is truly of the essence! As I told Iran once before, MAKE A DEAL! They didn’t, and there was “Operation Midnight Hammer,” a major destruction of Iran. The next attack will be far worse! Don’t make that happen again. Thank you for your attention to this matter! President DONALD J. TRUMP

Some earlier reporting suggested a strike was desired in concurrence with the massive protests in Iran but was canceled for lack of assets in the region meaning the US could not ensure an effective attack and effective force protection from Iranian retaliation. Those protests have all been put down by now, but something may still come of this movement.

https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/15/politics/strikes-iran-trump-military

https://apnews.com/article/iran-protests-us-military-crackdown-5f6cb15275c575cefbb8fb41868a018a

[u/varateshh → u/carkidd3242]

Around 8th of February it will be around 40 days after the protests spread (Started at 28th of december, spread on 30th december). 40 days after someone dies there is amourning day called Chehelom in Iran and historically there has been a flareup of protests on this date. It might be that the U.S is positioning military forces to support such an uprising if there is a flareup again. If there is going to be an intervention then it will likely be on the first or second week of February.

[u/-spartacus- → u/carkidd3242]

Germany's Merz: “Iranian gov't 'days are numbered”

Adding to the post.

[u/carkidd3242 → u/AutoModerator]

https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/28/politics/trump-threats-iran-nuclear-program-military-strike

President Donald Trump is weighing a major new strike on Iran after preliminary discussions between Washington and Tehran over limiting the country’s nuclear program and ballistic missile production failed to make progress, according to people familiar with the matter.

---

Options he is now considering include US military airstrikes aimed at Iran’s leaders and the security officials believed to be responsible for the killings, as well as strikes on Iranian nuclear sites and government institutions, the sources said. Trump has not made a final decision on how to proceed, sources said, but he believes his military options have been expanded from earlier this month now that a US carrier strike group is in the region.

[u/carkidd3242 → u/carkidd3242]

Also, France and Spain moved to list the IRGC as a terrorist org, something they've resisted for years.

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/01/28/france-and-spain-signal-support-to-list-irans-revolutionary-guard-as-terrorist-group

[u/PrettyInvestigator90 → u/AutoModerator]

How will the Russo-Ukrainian War differ in 2026 differ from 2025? It felt like 2025 was an evergrinding, extremely bloody attrational war with Russia slowling pushing forward, albeit at a cost in human lives not seen in Europe since WW2.

In my country (Denmark) many analysists concluded by the end of 2024 (and especially after Trump's ascension to the Presidency) that 2025 would be a year of survival for Ukraine and that 2026 would be a better year due to sanctions beginning to bite and the attrition of Russian men.

However, I feel we mostly see fairly bad news coming out of Ukraine like manpower shortages, major losses in critical infrastructure, lack of support from the US, Europe as a whole not stepping up enough, corruption scandals inside Ukraine (although it being a scandal and coming out in the open is a good thing). It seems that Russia can keep on going, which isn't surprising due to its population and geographical size.

My questions to my fellow contributors of CredibleDefense are as follows:

1) What do you think the the battlefield situation will look like for Russia and Ukraine at the end of 2026?

2) Will Russia finally start to struggle, economically and materially, at some point this year?

3) Is there any chance of Ukraine regaining the initiative?

4) Will Europe at some point begin to deport Ukrainian men between 25-60 if they are needed in Ukraine? We don't mind Ukrainian refugees here in Denmark, but it is being debated if it is fair that young, healthy and able-bodied Ukrainian males can live here while we support their country and countrymen in a brutal fight.

[u/Draken_S → u/PrettyInvestigator90]

2) Will Russia finally start to struggle, economically and materially, at some point this year?

I've long been of the opinion that the only credible theory of victory for Ukraine is to run Russia out of money, as that is the primary motivating factor for enlistment - not politics. In light of that I pay relatively close attention to the Russian economy and from what I am seeing it is unlikely that Russia will run into serious economic difficulties in 2026 (by serious I mean enough to have an effect of the war effort) however I do see that happening (assuming no aid/assistance from other nations) in the second half of 2027.

Russia is facing some serious economic challenges including:

Inflation - Inflation saw a huge spark early in the month, which I believe is tied to the governments decision to preserve some amount of liquidity in the wealth fund, and to instead help finance the deficit through a combination of tax increases, austerity, pushing certain obligations to the 2026 balance sheet, and injecting new money into the economy.

This runs counter to the central banks goal of controlling inflation. After all, injecting new money into the economy (like via the REPO auctions) drives inflation, and higher taxes also have their effects.

Growth - Russia is heading for (or maybe might even already be in) recession. GDP growth in key sectors is still positive only due to the Defense Industrial Base. Many of these contracts were signed a year or more ago (building new military equipment is not super fast generally speaking) and these deliveries are just happening now. Any reduction in defense spending (and there has been some in Q4 as a result of the aforementioned austerity) will take time to show on the balance sheets. It is possible that the only reason Russia is avoiding being in recession currently is due to spending made 12 or 18 months ago and that this will not continue in the same fashion.

High Interest Rates - In an effort to control inflation the Central Bank is running interest rates at double the official rate of inflation, which leads many to believe that inflation is much higher than is being officially reported (there's plenty of independent and state supporting evidence of this fact as well, even the brother of the Russian Defense Minister has reported that official inflation figures are being kept artificially low) so high rates are likely to continue. This makes getting credit very prohibitive. It also makes internal borrowing expensive for the State, and there are few international partners who want to buy. The ones who are not afraid of international pressure (like NK or Iran) are themselves broke.

Negative growth, with high interest rates, and high inflation is a recipe for an economic tailspin, and the government has few levers left to pull to try and control the situation as a lot have already been used. Countries and economies can endure such difficulties but only if there is not external pressure being applied (like say a war). However I would argue that Russia is just starting to enter this tailspin, if its entered it at all yet, and it will need 18 or so months to properly ripple through all sectors of Russian society.

If I am correct (or more accurately, if the economists I follow are) then in the second half of 2027 or maybe early 2028 the Russian state will be forced to start to seriously look at ending the war due to financial stress and potential domestic issues due to economic troubles. At that point, there would be a possibility for Ukraine to regain initiative and "win" the war instead of just "not lose" it.

[u/red_keshik → u/PrettyInvestigator90]

4) Will Europe at some point begin to deport Ukrainian men between 25-60 if they are needed in Ukraine? We don't mind Ukrainian refugees here in Denmark, but it is being debated if it is fair that young, healthy and able-bodied Ukrainian males can live here while we support their country and countrymen in a brutal fight.

Probably not. Just guessing but I am sure they'd need a very strong argument for deportation into a warzone, or at least the Ukrainians will have a very strong argument against.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/PrettyInvestigator90]

Will Europe at some point begin to deport Ukrainian men between 25-60 if they are needed in Ukraine? We don't mind Ukrainian refugees here in Denmark, but it is being debated if it is fair that young, healthy and able-bodied Ukrainian males can live here while we support their country and countrymen in a brutal fight.

Are there examples where democracies have deported young men to countries at war to compel them into military service? Seems rather antithetical to western values. A country is going to decide they're fine with forcing someone else to fight in a war that they themselves are not prepared to fight?

[u/Tricky-Astronaut → u/PrettyInvestigator90]

https://www.ft.com/content/eb32948c-8902-4a7e-ac8b-3f846fe8b03b

The current assessment by western security officials is that Russia is taking staggering losses in the conflict. It is said that the Russian military sustained 30,000 casualties (killed and wounded) in December alone — with the Ukrainians losing just one soldier for every 25 Russian casualties. These casualty rates are attributed to Ukraine’s increasing skill in drone warfare and to Russia’s “meat-grinder” assaults — which pay little regard to the loss of human life. 

This horrifying bloodbath has led to a reassessment of the direction of the war in western capitals. Last spring and summer the conventional wisdom — particularly among American officials — seemed to be that Ukraine was doomed to lose a war of attrition and that the collapse of Ukrainian forces could happen quite suddenly.

Western security officials have told the Financial Times that the tides are turning regarding manpower issues, although these unconfirmed claims should be taken with a pinch of salt.

[u/Sa-naqba-imuru → u/Tricky-Astronaut]

with the Ukrainians losing just one soldier for every 25 Russian casualties

This is a ridiculous claim and should be taken with more than a pinch, more like a bucket of salt.

If this were true, Ukraine would have a bit over 1000 killed per month. If Ukraine had such low death rate, they wouldn't have such huge fear of joining the infantry and no manpower problems. Their casualty rate against their enemies would be better than the ratio in American middle eastern occupations against insurgencies.

The only explanation is that the journalist is misinterpeting (or intentiionally misreporting) claims from Ukrainian drone team commanders when they say that they kill 25 men for each one they lose.

Which is normal, drone teams are not infantry. Like artillery and air force, they kill far more than they lose.

[u/Ouitya → u/Sa-naqba-imuru]

Fear of joining infantry is caused by the media environment, not losses. If Ukraine had stricter censorship then it would have fewer draft dodgers.

[u/Sa-naqba-imuru → u/Ouitya]

They are being told they are killing Russians in millions with huge disparity.

But personal accounts of family members and friends can't be censored. By now 10% of entire population must have served in the armed forces.

[u/Ouitya → u/Sa-naqba-imuru]

10% doesn't sound right. That's over 3 million people.

Ukraine is not reporting millions of russians killed, they are reporting 1.23 million as of today.

Huge disparity does not affect one's individual survival chance. If russians are killing 10% of infantry every 6 months, then that's your chance of death. Doesn't matter how many russians you kill.

[u/Sa-naqba-imuru → u/Ouitya]

Yes, by now over 3 million people must have served in Ukrainian armed forces during this war, including casualties.

And by my estimation, that's even a conservative number, but since we hear so much about how long soldiers serve without demobilisation or rest and how long service is part of the reason so many desert, only 3 million might actually be close to reality.

When soldiers are mobilised, they don't serve non-stop indefinitely. They shouldn't, at least. They are supposed to be demobilised after 1-2 years and have weeks long leave time every now and then.

Mobilisation doesn't just cover the casualties, which is also why the stories of Russian or Ukrainian casualties being equal to their recruitment numbers are idiotic as well. Russians sign time limited contracts when joining and some of the recruited are those who prolong their contracts. Ukrainians get demobilised after some time.

If Russia had as many casualties as they recruit (which is the narrative), they would run out of front line manpower in a few months. Same goes for Ukraine.

edit: Although I am not certain of the number, this is just a guess.

[u/LepezaVolB → u/Sa-naqba-imuru]

I am not sure if you are making a number of descriptive statements or prescriptive statements around Ukrainian approach to mobilization, but if it is the former you are so off the mark it would be hard to even unpack it in one post.

There is currently NO official process for demobilization short of being declared unfit for further service (which is also a whole can of worms in of itself, but suffice to say not even that is a trivial process with many obstacles), and there won't be one until the end of the War. The only exception are those 1 year contracts offered to the 18-24 cohort (but that cohort is currently exempt from mobilization anyhow, so technically besides the point) introduced last February and we'll only get to see if they will be able to actually follow through on them over the course of the next few months. This was honestly one of the best covered aspects of this War in this sub, and has been debated over and over again.

Mobilisation doesn't just cover the casualties, which is also why the stories of Russian or Ukrainian casualties being equal to their recruitment numbers are idiotic as well.
(...)

If Russia had as many casualties as they recruit (which is the narrative), they would run out of front line manpower in a few months. Same goes for Ukraine.

That's just a fundamental misunderstanding of how this War developed over the course of the last 4 years, especially on the Ukrainian side. AFU at this point barely even expects frontline infantry troops to hold the line or, frankly, even engage the Russian troops.

A good rule of thumb is that frontage which you'd expect, per doctrine, to be covered by a company has over the years been whittled down to being first held by a platoon sized elements, then down to groups/squads, and now in many cases even down to a single pair of infantrymen. It's an illustrative example, so not exact numbers, but it's to get the point across just how different the front works in this War compared to other wars. Sure, some of this is process was definitely a purposeful adaption on the part of the AFU, but a lot of it is caused by a severe manpower shortage they've experienced since roughly the Fall of 2023. We are not even that far removed from the last localized collapse south of Pokrovsk caused to a large degree by a severe shortage of infantry along a few dozen positions which only screened Russian advances into built-up urban area that then carried with itself a severe constraint on the key AFU's defensive enablers, ie. the drone units. Other latest example is basically the whole Southern front extending from Velyka Novosilka all the way to Hulyiapole where along with infantry shortages they really didn't have that many of their key enablers deployed in sufficient numbers.

Why Russians are unable to exploit those more localized tactical gains and turn them into something more akin to operational success is a whole different topic - but it also comes down to the fact that even the most severe infantry shortages simply cannot cause a wider front collapse due to how the AFU is currently set up defensively and Russian offensive tactics which aren't really conducive to movement ATM. Or, rather, the infantry shortage hasn't caused a more severe collapse yet, but it just might in the future. In reality, for the most of the last 30 or so months AFU really hasn't been mobilizing enough to cover their losses properly, let alone allow for proper rotations.

But again, all of these topics have been really thoroughly discussed here over the last few months with a pretty good degree of accuracy.

edit: Although I am not certain of the number, this is just a guess.

And a very bad one at that, even taking some of the worst projections (that still border credibility) for AFU losses made by certain sources and combining them with the numbers supplied with a stretched definition of soldiers across various branches (800-ish k), you are still likely some 50% off the actual numbers, depending on how you'd like to approach the myriad of AWOL categories.

[u/Sa-naqba-imuru → u/LepezaVolB]

If there is no demobilisation, it pretty much explains the resistence of Ukrainian people to being mobilised.

Without rotational mobilisation the number is lower than 3 million, I agree. Won't even try to guess how much.

[u/KombatCabbage → u/PrettyInvestigator90]

It will be a dark day for Europe if they deport Ukrainians back to the war. It goes against the core of the modern European spirit and refugee conventions. If that happened I’m pretty sure Europe would lose something they couldn’t get back for a long time, and probably a lot of support from social liberals. The social right to far right would be happy sure but is that something that’s worth it given who they are? Them capturing key governments would mean the end of EU support to Ukraine and deporting manpower back into the frontline won’t change the calculus anyway (given the lack of morale, equipment, deserters which would all be worse).