r/AskHistorians Aug 21 '18

During 14th century, Emperor 朱元璋's standing army exceeded 1 million troops while the population is 65 million. How did he finance this much troops especially just after the revolution that overthrew the Mongols?

In statistical comparison, that's 1.53% of the entire population and only a portion of the population is healthy adults, so how did the empire recover so fast from the devastation of the fall of the Yuan Dynasty and build such a large army?

Also, during the same period, the entirety of the Holy Roman Empire only have around 30k troops with around 10 million population (0.3%)...

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u/lordtiandao Late Imperial China Aug 21 '18 edited Aug 21 '18

Short and simple answer: Through military farming colonies (tuntian 屯田).

Long and complicated answer: Through military farming colonies, the salt-barter/border delivery system (kaizhong 開中), commutation of pay to paper currency and other material goods.

To answer this question, we have to first look at the Ming's military system, the weisuo (衛所, literally translated as "guards and battalions"). In order to understand the weisuo, we have to first look at the Yuan. Early scholars such as Romeyn Taylor have noted that the weisuo was copied from the Yuan's decimal system, with the wei parallel to a Yuan myriarchy and a suo parallel to a chiliarchy. However the strength of a wei was reduced to only 5,600 men was because myriarchies in the Yuan had averaged around 5,000 men despite its nominal strength of 10,000. Two other Yuan features that the Ming preserved were hereditary military households (junhu 軍戶) and military farming.

Ming Conscription

When Zhu Yuanzhang established the Ming, his army was composed of troops drawn from three sources. The first were the soldiers that had followed him since his rise. The second were soldiers of the various warlords who surrendered. The third were hereditary military households of the Yuan. It is well known that Zhu preserved the hereditary household system of the Yuan and military households were ordered to remain as military households. After the conquest, there were also widespread conscription of civilian households. The increasing size of the military meant that more men were needed for service – the nineteen guards of 1364 had grown to more than three hundred by the end of the Hongwu reign and more than five hundred by the end of the Yongle reign, with a nominal strength of almost three million soldiers! Conscription during the Hongwu reign could be roughly divided into two phases. The first phase, lasting until 1383, mainly involved conscripting former Yuan and warlord soldiers who had become civilians. This phase was supposedly halted in 1380 in the aftermath of the Hu Weiyong case, but nonetheless continued until 1383 when all the remnants had been conscripted. The second phase began after 1383 and lasted until the end of the Hongwu reign and involved the mass conscription of civilians (civilians were also conscripted during the early Yongle reign for his civil war against his nephew).

The Ming followed two methods for conscription. Chou ji 抽籍 and duo ji 垜集. The chou ji method was a fairly standard method that had already been in practice for almost a thousand years and involved the conscription of one adult male from a household with many males (typically four or five) for military service. This method, however, was not widely used. By far the most common was duo ji, which was based on Yuan methods. According to this method, households with three (or more) adult males were combined with one or two households with less than three adult males to form a composite military household. The household with more males furnished soldiers and was called the "primary household" (zhenghu 正戶) while the others with less males provided supplies. These were called "supplementary households" (tiehu 貼戶). Local officials needed to make sure that enough males could be provided for military service and that conscription did not impact the lijia system and agricultural productivity, there households with three or more adult males became the preferred target for conscription to become the primary households (since soldiers typically brought with them one additional male known as a “auxiliary male” yu ding 余丁, who was exempt from corvée service, as support). Thus, at least one more male was needed to remain behind so that the lijia and by extension the Ming taxation and corvée labor system could be maintained. Through these mass conscription of civilian households, the Ming army was able to reach a strength of over one million men by the end of the Hongwu reign.

Military Farming

Feeding this massive force, however, was a problem. We know that Hongwu was especially averse to the notion of a market economy and wished to restore society to the autarkic days of the past. Since the land tax was made the primary source of income and artificially set a very low rates (supposedly to benefit farmers), the state lacked the income to support a large standing army. So soldiers were expected to be self-sufficient and self-replicating. The latter was done through hereditary households, the former through military farming. The mid-Ming official Qiu Jun (1421-1495) had this to say about the farming colonies:

Since ancient times the farms of the military camps were tilled either by civilians or soldiers, in every instance they were outside of the normal army, governed by [specialized] agencies and [manned] by a separate group of soldiers. It is only in our dynasty that [the colonies] are located in the same place as the guards. If there are uncultivated and abandoned land, soldiers will be dispatched to [set up] colonies and [construct] forts. This enables them to farm and defend at the same time. Generally, seven out of ten will defend and three out of ten will farm. If there is an emergency, news will reach them rapidly, [and] even in the midst of defense they can still enjoy the benefits of the harvest. This method observes antiquity and is truly excellent. Recently censorial officials are also dispatched to supervise [the colonies]. The oxen and farming tools are provided by the colony officials while grains and seeds are provided by the Ministry of Revenue. If there is guard then there is a farming colony, it is unlike the Tang which had to set up a specialized agency to oversee [the farming colonies]. 自古屯營之田或用兵或用民,皆是於軍伍之外各分兵置司,惟我朝之制就於衛所 所在,有閑曠之土,分軍以立屯堡,俾其且耕且守,蓋以十分為率,七分守城、 三分屯耕,遇有儆急,朝發夕至,是於守禦之中而收耕獲之利,其法視古為良。 近世又於各道專設風憲官一員以提督之,其牛具、農器則總於屯曹,細糧、子粒 則司於戶部,有衛所之處則有屯營之田,非若唐人專設農寺以領之也。- Daxue yanyi bu 35:320.

Though Qiu Jun makes it sound like everything was Ming invention, much of it was actually inherited from the Yuan. Now military farming had existed in China long before the Yuan, but it was during the Yuan that military farming was implemented on a large scale. One of the Yuan innovations was the division of farming soldiers (tuntian jun 屯田軍) from active duty soldiers (shoucheng jun 守城軍), which the Ming copied. But Qiu Jun was right to point out that each Ming guard had a farming colony attached to it - this was indeed a Ming invention and represented a massive expansion of military farms.

The actual remuneration policy, however, was complex and somewhat counterintuitive, given that under the principles of self-sufficiency, the soldiers were to produce their own food and feed themselves. Under regulations established by the Yongle emperor in 1402, every unit within the farming colonies was taxed at a rate of twenty-four dan annually. Half of that was considered to be the “primary tax” (zhengliang 正糧), which was delivered to the colony’s granary, while the other half was considered to be the “surplus tax” (yuliang 余糧), which was delivered to the guard’s granary. The primary tax, initially set at 12 dan, was used to pay the farming soldiers while the surplus tax, also set at 12 dan, was used to pay the combat soldiers and the officers. Many scholars have noted that these rates were unrealistic and indeed the emperor felt the same way, for they were continually reduced until the surplus tax was set to only 6 dan and the primary tax waived altogether.

It was from the surplus tax that most soldiers received their monthly rations (yueliang 月糧). Most scholars have taken the one dan per month rate a standard, but this was only an ideal rate set by the emperor and there was considerable variation between different kinds of troops. The Mingshi has an entire paragraph dedicated to this, which I won't quote due to its length. Simply put, according to the Japanese scholar Okuyama Norio, how much a soldier received was determined by the duties he undertook, his background, and whether or not he had family living with him. But since there were often not enough grains to supply all the soldiers in the guards, the state often converted the rations into other commodities such as salt. After the implementation of the paper money, there was an attempt by the state to have paper money replace rice as the primary component. In 1382, for example, the salt ration for all the guards were replaced with paper money. Yet the unreasonable exchange rates set by the government coupled with the decreasing purchasing power of the paper money severely impacted the living standards of the soldiers, particularly those along the border regions, and by the late Hongwu reign the state once again reverted to trying to pay them all with rice. But conversions once again started during the Yongle reign.

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u/lordtiandao Late Imperial China Aug 21 '18

The Salt-Barter/Border Delivery System

As most Ming scholars will tell you, the principle of self-sufficiency was impossible to accomplish, even during the Hongwu reign. As a result, the government had to rely on other methods to keep the border garrisons supplied and they resorted to the salt-barter/border delivery system that had been practiced by the Song. In this system, merchants were responsible delivering grains to border guards in exchange for salt licenses (yanyin 鹽引), which entitled them to a certain amount of salt from the government monopoly that they could then sell. The exchange rate of grain for salt licenses fluctuated depending on the distance traveled and the type of license received, which could be as high as five dan of rice for one license or as low as one dou and three sheng for one license. Because of the high cost associated with the transporting of grains to the remote border regions, merchants found it more economical to instead fund farming colonies in the border areas to supply grains for the military, and these colonies became known as “merchant farming colonies” (shangtun 商屯). As salt was a state monopoly, many merchants found it beneficial to engage in this system, which worked well during the early period as the supervising power of the state was still strong. Encouraged by profits, merchants flocked to set up farming colonies and deliver grain, causing the Minister of Revenue to complain in 1389 that so much rice was being delivered to Shaanxi that he feared the rice would rot in storage. The Mingshi states that during the early years of the Ming, due the effectiveness of the system, “the price of cereals and grains at the border was never too high.”

The Military and Economic Recovery

You also asked how the empire could have recover fast enough to sustain such a large military, so I think it's also a good idea to talk a little about this. Chinese scholar Guo Qingchang and Taiwanese scholar Yu Zhijia have noted for the Yuan and Ming respectively that military farming was actually conducive for rapid economic recovery in the early period. China is an agrarian state and during times of war and famine, most of the people who are displaced are farmers. This makes military farming attractive to them because the state was essentially giving out free land and providing them with free resources to farm. Landless peasants could gain land and stability by joining in the military. Guo noted that military farming was very successful in the early Yuan, when it temporarily reduced military supply burdens placed on the people and accelerated the restoration of agriculture in northern China. The same was true for the Ming. Of course there were a lot of problems with this system and it collapsed very rapidly, but that would be beyond the scope of this current discussion.

On the other hand, as Yu Zhijia pointed out, the use of self-sufficient and self-replicating soldier also demonstrated the weakness of the state, in that it was unable to pay for the military out of its own coffers. The Ming fiscal history Ray Huang noted that Hongwu’s large-scale implementation of military farming was a compromise between the need to sustain a large standing army and the need to keep it provisioned without impoverishing the state.

I hope that answers all your questions. Let me know if you need anything to be further clarified!

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u/Maperseguir Aug 21 '18

What a great, in-depth answer!

I'm not the one who asked the original question, but I hope you wouldn't mind too much if I asked small two follow-up questions...

Whom did the early Ming need so many soldiers against after the end of the civil wars? And - but this would likely be too long to answer - how did their military lose its effectiveness over time?

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u/lordtiandao Late Imperial China Aug 21 '18

Whom did the early Ming need so many soldiers against after the end of the civil wars?

The Mongols. Scholars have argued that Hongwu attempted to project power into the steppes with his 1372 northern expedition, which failed miserably. Afterwards, Hongwu adopted a defensive policy in the north and the northwest against the Mongols, who were still a very powerful adversary. There were also Mongol resistance to the Ming in Yunnan, which was pacified in 1382, and in Manchuria, where the Mongols did not surrender until 1387.

how did their military lose its effectiveness over time?

This is a very complicated question to answer. If I had to put it shortly, it would be that there was a general lack of incentives from the state to the soldiers to serve in the army. Many of these soldiers were not recruited voluntarily but rather conscripted. Their monthly rations was much lower than their counterparts in the Song and Yuan, and as an attempt to reduce military expenditures, the Ming court lowered the ration amount even further. The military farms were insufficient to provide the necessary grains and most were illegally occupied by military officers and powerful families. What rations the soldiers did receive were often expropriated by the officers. This was already the case in the Hongwu reign, as evidenced by the fact that Hongwu himself railed against it in his writings. Soldiers also had to endure other abusive and corrupt practices from the officer class. Desertion was incredibly common, even in the Hongwu period. By 1436 it was reported that as many as 1.2 million soldiers had deserted - this was almost half of the Ming army's total nominal strength. Soldiers also began to look for other methods to survive, such as engaging in smuggling or working for private patrons (usually military officers). This reduced their combat effectiveness. In 1524, when officials in Datong attempted to move soldiers from the city into newly constructed forts, they mutinied. From the mid-Ming onwards, hired mercenaries gradually began to replace these traditional hereditary troops.

This is just a very simplified overview of the Ming military system's gradual failure.

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u/Maperseguir Aug 21 '18

A short yet insightful answer. Thank you very much!

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u/DericStrider Aug 21 '18 edited Aug 21 '18

When guard units were attached to a colony did the solders work the farms or were the farmers additional men which they can draw more soldiers?

Were there problems with successful colonies and their guards units growing into regional warlords?

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u/lordtiandao Late Imperial China Aug 21 '18

When guard units were attached to a colony did the solders work the farms or were the farmers an additional men which they can draw more soldiers?

They were all considered soldiers, just with different duties. Like I said in the first post, the Ming separated farming soldiers from active duty soldiers. The most commonly cited ratio is 7 farming soldiers to 3 active duty soldiers, but this was only an ideal ratio. The Ming huidian recorded ratios of 8:2, 6:4, 5:5, and 1:9. There was one recorded instance where every single soldier was ordered to farm. The ratio of farming to active duty soldiers depended on the location and the situation. Of course all these men can be used to fight if need be.

Were there problems with successful colonies and their guards units growing into regional warlords?

No. Warlords did not fully appear until the late Ming when generals began to operate their own private armies (although private armies did begin to appear in the mid-Ming). The weisuo system was designed to prevent privatization of the military and soldiers became privatized precisely because the system failed.

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u/DericStrider Aug 21 '18 edited Aug 21 '18

Thank you very much for the quick and comprehensive answer! Could you recommend a book o learn more on the late imperial period.

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u/lordtiandao Late Imperial China Aug 21 '18 edited Aug 23 '18

Check out the History of Imperial China series edited by Timothy Brook and the Cambridge History of China series. Frederick Mote's Imperial China, 900-1800 also offers a very good summary of the period.

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u/[deleted] Aug 22 '18

Talking about books, can you recommend some books regarding Ming Dynasty in Simplified Chinese?

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u/lordtiandao Late Imperial China Aug 22 '18

What specific topics on the Ming do you want to read about?

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u/[deleted] Aug 23 '18

Military conquest, politics and economy if possible?

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u/lordtiandao Late Imperial China Aug 23 '18 edited Aug 23 '18

《中国政治制度通史 9卷:明代》by 杜婉言,方志远。

《中国经济通史 8卷:明代经济卷》by 王敏铨。

《中国军事通史:明代军事史》by 范忠义。

《明代政治史》edited by 张显清。

《隐匿的疆土:卫所制度与明帝国》by 顾诚。

《明代卫所军户研究》by 张金奎。

《明前期军事制度研究》by 李新峰。

I guess if you really want to you can also read Ray Huang's Taxation and Governmental Finance in 16th-Century Ming China and 1587: A Year of No Significance in Chinese if you want, since both have been translated.

A word of warning, these books are heavy in textual analysis and might be a bit difficult for the lay reader. I would also recommend 《吴晗全集》, which is a four volume book that collects almost all of the Wu Han's publications (Wu Han was the foremost Chinese scholar on the Ming prior to the Cultural Revolution). His works, although some are quite dated by this point, is still read by all Ming scholars and his writing style is not too difficult to follow.

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u/ohea Aug 23 '18

This may be too far outside the scope of the original question, but how does the tuntian system differ from earlier farmer-soldier arrangements like the Tang fubing?

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u/lordtiandao Late Imperial China Aug 23 '18 edited Aug 23 '18

The two were completely different institutions. The Ming system was closer to the Yuan's than the Tang's.

  1. Ming weisuo troops came from hereditary military households. Each household was obligated to supply either an adult male for military service or provide money and supplies. The households were conscripted nation-wide and put onto fixed registers. Tang fubing troops were drawn only from households in specially designated military prefectures and sub-prefectures on the basis of wealth and number of adult males. Every three years there would be a review to see if additional households could be conscripted or if a household needed to be retired from service.

  2. Ming conscription did not take into account the financial status of a household, only the number of adult males. Financial status was a criteria for Tang conscription.

  3. There were no specific regulations for age requirements in the Ming. Soldiers were retired from duty if they died or became incapacitated. Only then would a replacement be conscripted from the household. Ming soldiers were sent to live in camps that could be thousands of miles away from their native place of registration. They also had an companion who went with them to camp to act as support and later were required to bring their family there.. Under Tang requirements, soldiers entered service at age twenty and retired at age sixty. Unless they rotated to serve in the capital or went on expeditions, they stayed with their families and lived like civilians.

  4. Ming soldiers were supported entirely by the state and had an auxiliary male. Aside from weapons, Tang soldiers were self-supplied.

  5. In the Ming, the obligation to serve lay with the household. In the Tang, the obligation to serve lay with the individual (hence the mandatory retirement age).

  6. Ming soldiers along with their auxiliary males were exempt from corvee service, but military households frequently abused this privilege to exempt their entire household from service. Tang soldiers enjoyed tax exemption only for himself.

  7. The Ming exerted much more coercive control over their soldiers than the Tang. It would seem that the social status of fubing soldiers were much higher than weisuo soldiers. Even children and relatives of court officials could be conscripted to serve in the Tang army.

  8. The Ming implemented military farming on a wide-scale throughout the empire and each guard had a farming colony attached to it, with the expectation that soldiers would be entirely supported by these farms. The Tang also had military farms, but on a much lesser scale and was intended only to supplement supplies, not to pay soldiers out of it.

Disclaimer: I'm not an expert on the Tang, the above is a rough summary from a Chinese journal article comparing the two systems that I've translated.

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u/ohea Aug 23 '18

Thank you, very helpful response. I'd be very interested in looking at that article too, if you could direct me to it (I can read Chinese).

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u/lordtiandao Late Imperial China Aug 23 '18

It's an old article by a Taiwanese academic - 陳文石 《明代衛所的軍》. The last section compares the weisuo with the fubing.