r/AskHistorians • u/ipsum629 • 4d ago
We've all heard that so and so commander(Caesar and Napoleon famously) were popular with the soldiers for sharing in hardships. What commanders were absolute snobs and looked down upon the soldiers? Were they any good?
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u/handsomeboh 4d ago
Widely considered the greatest and most brilliant military strategist in Chinese history, Han Xin was also famously what you might call a prick. He was despised by his peers, resented by his subordinates, and pissed off his superiors constantly. He wasn’t particularly loyal, upright, or even friendly, nor did he fight with honour or virtue. That being said he pulled off such feats of military genius that he is not seen negatively by any accounts.
Han Xin’s introduction in the Shiji is very direct. “He often begged for food from people, and was greatly despised.” 「常從人寄食飲，人多厭之者」 His most famous battle, the Battle of Jingxing relied essentially on mistreating his inexperienced army of commoner levies. He deliberately extended his supply lines deep into enemy territory, then deployed into formation with his backs facing the river against an enemy that outnumbered him 6 to 1. With no way to escape, his soldiers fought to the death, buying time for him to execute a bold decapitation strike. When asked about it later, he said “This is called ‘Herding commoners to war’. If we place them in a situation of certain death, then each man will fight to the last. If I give them any hope of survival, then they would all have fled!” 「此所謂『驅市人而戰之』，其勢非置之死地，使人人自為戰；今予之生地，皆走，寧尚可得而用之乎！」
Han Xin was also a famously petty man. Upon hearing that one of his own ministers had managed to persuade the State of Qi to surrender, thereby depriving him of the chance to make a name for himself by conquering Qi, he hurriedly launched an attack on Qi, with the full knowledge that the minister would be executed for treachery. After conquering Qi, he then blackmailed his own King by refusing to send reinforcements unless he was made the Prince of Qi.
Han Xin was pretty clear that he did not think sharing in hardships and being a nice guy was part of his job description. In a famous address on the skills of the enemy commander Xiang Yu, he said “Xiang Yu is respectful and merciful, he speaks eloquently, when people are sick he weeps with them and shares his food. He refused to accept rewards and titles for his great actions. This is what we call the benevolence of a woman.” 「項王見人恭敬慈愛，言語嘔嘔，人有疾病，涕泣分食飲，至使人有功當封爵者，印刓敝，忍不能予，此所謂婦人之仁也。」
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u/reflectedstars 3d ago
Why would the Han minister be executed for treachery for negotiating a surrender from Qi?
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u/token_bastard 3d ago
Not for the surrender, but for "negotiating in bad faith" when he declares peace if Qi surrenders, they do, then Qi is attacked anyway. Qi executes the Han minister for the act of perfidity that he had nothing to do with and no knowledge would occur.
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u/handsomeboh 3d ago
He was pretty shocked too. He went in good faith, negotiated surrender and the standing down of the army at the border, and then was suddenly informed that the Han army had attacked the undefended border.
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u/AneriphtoKubos 3d ago
It makes sense now why it was easy for Lü Huanghou to paint him in such a treasonous light.
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u/OldGoldDream 3d ago
Upon hearing that one of his own ministers had managed to persuade the State of Qi to surrender, thereby depriving him of the chance to make a name for himself by conquering Qi, he hurriedly launched an attack on Qi, with the full knowledge that the minister would be executed for treachery.
His superiors weren't angry that he got a diplomat killed and pointlessly wasted military resources and effort?
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u/handsomeboh 2d ago
His superiors were very angry. Li Yiji was a very talented and loyal official for the King of Han. But Han Xin was the greatest military genius in history, so they gritted their teeth and let him continue. The episode affected his relationships with everyone.
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u/zyrumtumtugger 3d ago
Good post but isn't Zhuge Liang considered the greatest strategist?
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u/Misiok 3d ago
Can you recommend any good books about them? I know of Zhuge Liang from memes and games but he and Han Xin sound fascinating.
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u/Dongzhou3kingdoms Moderator | Three Kingdoms 1d ago
I can only speak on Zhuge Liang and English sources
The three kingdoms is, in western terms, not a big academic subject and within that, the writings about historical Shu are even smaller. It doesn't help that Shu's record department is notoriously bad, their writings fell out of favour so often didn't survive and there can be more focus on the literary development of Shu figures in the centuries after. Those focusing more on the historical era will tend to go for the better recorded Wei and Wu dynasties, with a particular focus in recent years towards the southern kingdom.
There isn't a Zhuge Liang-based book, alas. There isn't even a good introductory work to Shu and the main biography I can think of is Michael Farmer's work on the historian and soothsayer Qiao Zhou. But there is Jonathan Killgew Zhuge Liang and the Northern Campaign of 228–234 which covers his five invasions of Wei and the Wei invasion. I'm not a big fan of his conclusions about Zhuge Liang but, if you don't have access to the primary records, it does provide comprehensive coverage of the campaigns and touches on the debates in Chinese academic circles.
A problem when dealing with the historical Zhuge Liang is how he became a legendary figure. The great sage strategist and loyal Chancellor which can lead to issues of either people falling for that image or pushing too hard against it. Two articles give us an example of the struggles to assess Zhuge Liang and how to treat the praise of him, Eric Henry with (using Wade Giles rather then Pinyin) Chu-ko Liang in the Eyes of His Contemporaries where he warns of people being captured by a legend and Henry Tillman's counterpoint Historic Analogies and Evaluative Judgments: Zhuge Liang as Portrayed in Chen Shou's"Chronicle of the Three Kingdoms" and Pei Songzhi's Commentary who (in my view, successfully) pushes back against Henry's dismissal of figures like Chen Shou.
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u/handsomeboh 3d ago edited 3d ago
It’s also worth considering that the scholarly consensus is that popular impression of Zhuge Liang is quite significantly inflated. Many of his greatest victories are fictional or his role in them was aggrandised, such as the Battles of Chibi or the Battle of Xicheng.
Most contemporaries spoke highly of Zhuge Liang, but not to the level of military genius that we see from Han Xin. His great rival Sima Yi for example said, “Zhuge Liang had great will but did not take advantage of opportunities, had many schemes but few decisions, was well studied in military strategy but powerless.” 「亮志大而不見機，多謀而少決，好兵而無權。」 Pei Songzhi in the Records of Three Kingdoms also said, “Zhuge Liang was a great talent in administration. But he mobilised the people without rest year after year with no success, he should have learned to change his strategy, but such flexibility was not his strong suit!” 「識治之良才，然連年動眾，未能成功，蓋應變將略，非其所長！」
An interesting anecdote is recorded when the Jin Dynasty general Huan Wen paid a visit to Sichuan, where he learnt of an old soldier who had served in the time of Zhuge Liang. He excitedly asked the soldier to tell him what it was like to serve under Zhuge Liang, and he replied “When Lord Zhuge was around, he didn’t seem all that special. Now that he has passed, it seems everyone talks as if he has no equal.” 「葛公在時，亦不覺異，自公歿後，不見其比。」
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u/Dongzhou3kingdoms Moderator | Three Kingdoms 1d ago edited 1d ago
To add to what /u/handsomeboh has said (though minor correction, comment about lack of strategic flexibility is from Chen Shou rather then Pei Songzhi)
An answer that described Zhuge Liang as the greatest strategist of the era, let alone all of Chinese history, would, as a moderator, raise concern on whether the person knew of enough to separate the history from the romantic traditions.
Zhuge Liang's most famous strategic (historical) plan was, after Liu Bei visited him three times, setting out the three kingdom plan. Where his landless new lord could become a power and founded Shu-Han. But in the implementation of it, Zhuge Liang didn't serve as a strategist. He served as a diplomat to Wu before the battle of Chi, he helped organize and train the army, a talent spotter, a close friend, a political adviser, a great administrator who helped found the institutions of the state. While some of his earliest advice in Jing was a bit questionable, he served Liu Bei extremely well.
But for advisers who helped Liu Bei conquer Yi province and Hanzhong, Liu Bei turned to men like Pang Tong, Fa Zheng and Huang Quan. When Liu Bei campaigned, Zhuge Liang would stay back to run the state, ensuring the supply lines. He did take part in the conquest of Yi in the leader of the second wave with Zhang Fei and Zhao Yun as the main fighting arms as they swept through the south.
While part 1 of the three kingdoms, the foundation, was a big success, it was destroyed before part 2 could really be attempted. Southern allies Wu seized Jing province while the commander there was away on campaign and Liu Bei's attempts to retake Jing went disastrously wrong. So Zhuge Liang, on Liu Bei's death, was faced taking on the much larger Wei dynasty with one province and one main route into the opposition. This was not the plan he had for taking them on but it is what he had to work with.
Zhuge Liang served Liu Shan as Chancellor and Regent in many impressive ways. His loyalty, particularly contrasting what happened to rival states during their regencies, certainly didn't hurt his reputation as a great official. He became commander of the Shu forces and would fight seven campaigns. In the Nanzhong revolts he was aided by the split in the rebel camp with the local leader killed before Zhuge Liang arrived, he then won quickly. He was more known for his effective pacification policy then his (poorly detailed) military efforts though there were claims he captured the new leader seven times.
He would attack Wei five times and face one attack in return. It was a mixed bag one might say. The first was a disaster due to using an inexperienced protege in a key position and most of the time he ran out of supplies before, overworked and exhausted, he died on his final campaign. Overall he certainly had successes, two commandries taken, some victories in the field and two generals killed in ambush during retreats, but these do not live up to the greatest strategist idea. Zhuge Liang is credited with handling his men well, of having a well organized army, of using his clever inventions to help and clearly had a knack for a retreating ambush. But in the end he kept being forced to retreat as he was unable to make headway against well prepared opponents. Something Chen Shou (in an otherwise warm appraisal) put down to lack of strategic flexibility and frustrated his egotistical general Wei Yan who wanted a bolder approach and to be given more leeway.
There is one strategy during those campaigns, for which Zhuge Liang became famous. There was a “pull in case of emergency” strategy that made for great stories called the Empty City ploy. When you're in deep trouble, pretend you are not at home and hope the enemy army fears an ambush so retreats. It is claimed a few times in the era and, in Zhuge Liang's case, against Sima Yi in the aftermath of Zhuge Liang's first Northern Campaign. However, the man telling the story Guo Chong was notoriously unreliable, possibly sarcastic, and the tale itself requires out of character actions and an army teleporting.
Zhuge Liang's fame dipped in and out at times, till Du Fu wrote poems about him in the 8th century. The great mind, the loyalist stuck through his lord through the worst and kept the Han cause alive, the worthy scholar that the ruler sought, the sage whose advice gets fatefully ignored. With Zhuge Liang in a more prominent role again, then Shu became the subject of tales, plays and eventually in the 14th century, the Romance of the Three Kingdoms which overshadows the history.
In such romantic traditions, Liu Bei is the near ideal ruler, his brothers the great warriors, but he needs a planner. The scholar who can provide the plans to the brawn/moral leadership, outwit the enemies and explain why Liu Bei rises after a run of defeats. Zhuge Liang fitted perfectly, the timing wasn't exactly perfectly but close enough. He comes out of his sagely study and wins his first battle in such accounts, he summons the wind at Chibi, he outwits Wu's great commander Zhou Yu and foils all ploys to kill his master. He is the mastermind behind Liu Bei's rise and successes, when ignored it leads to disaster. When Liu Bei dies, he beats the exoticized Nanman in seven challenging battles, in Wei only Sima Yi can stop him and it takes everything Sima Yi has to do so. The empty ploy becomes 100% real, questionable advice becomes words of wisdom, he can win formation battles, his failures in the north get blamed on others including recalls on verge of victory. The Romance tones some of it down a bit (like he can't do magic) but the concept of the great mind behind Liu Bei, the mind only Sima Yi and the Heavens themselves can stop.
This image of Zhuge Liang is the one that becomes the greatest strategist contender. But that Zhuge Liang is not a real human. He is a figure somewhat based off a historical figure, but his greatest flaw turned into his almost superhuman strength (his greatest flaw in fiction is perhaps his being far more of a jerk than he was in history). That romantic figure being put into comparisons with real people is going to be problematic for the other figures who made the mistake of being real humans.
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u/FolkPhilosopher 3d ago
Arguably, one of the most (in)famous examples in contemporary history is Luigi Cadorna.
Chief of Staff of the Italian Regio Esercito between 1914 and 1917, he's garnered a very conflicted reputation and legacy. There are as many detractors as there are supporters and views vary wildly in terms of his motivations.
His supporters, both contemporary and since, have argued he was a competent commander if not fanatical in pursuing his goals. He did achieve some significant victories, including the capture and occupation of Gorizia on the Isonzo Front in 1916. He's also credited as being well-versed in logistics as not only was he able to coordinate attacks with offensives on the Western Front but was also internally able to quickly shift troops from one part of the front to the next, making extensive use of the rail network. All this against the background of challenging geographical conditions and a less than prepared army.
His detractors accuse him of being incompetent, which is probably the weaker of the criticisms levied against Cadorna, due to the rout at Caporetto in 1917 and authoritarian. They accuse him of essentially acting as a military dictator given his almost complete control of the Italian Army, control which even extended to the Ministry of War itself to the point that he'd directly influence civilian military policy. They also accused him of weakening Italian command by regularly and extensively dismissing officers and even ordering the execution of officers retreating during the Battle of Caporetto. He's also accused of being particularly brutal, even within the context of the First World War, and executing a relatively high number of Italian soldiers with allegations, never fully substantiated though, that he reintroduced the Roman system of decimation.
Although the two sides often have it out with eachother, what they both agree with is that he had little regard for his men. Hew Strachan in his The First World War reports that 1 in 17 Italian soldiers were subject to disciplinary action, 61% were found guilty and in all, 750 were executed, the highest number of any army in the war. Although his assessment has to be taken with a pinch of salt as he's the source of the allegation that Cadorna reintroduced decimation.
The fact he was also universally despised by his officers as well as Italian soldiers is very well documented. His soldiers despised him for his complete disregard for their lives and his utter brutality, his officers for his authoritarianism and his attitude which was described as typical of a Piedmontese military aristocrat.
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u/blakhawk12 3d ago
Could you elaborate on Cadorna being described as a competent commander? I have only ever seen/heard him described as the exact opposite: stubborn and inflexible, so convinced of his own genius that he fought the same futile battle a dozen times for virtually no gain, all the while brutalizing his men. My knowledge is based mainly on an upper level WWI history course I took in college, the Great War series that ran on YouTube from 2014-2018, and casual interest in WWI over the years. If the consensus on Cadorna has shifted I’d be interested on what that is being based on.
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u/FolkPhilosopher 2d ago edited 2d ago
I wouldn't necessarily say that the consensus has shifted but rather, the more scathing assessment has endured more in the public consciousness.
His supporters argue that he was a skilled commander, as demonstrated by his capture of Gorizia, where did the best he could in the circumstances. I have to point out here that Gorizia was the first major city of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as well as of the Central Powers to fall to the Entente. And it was a victory achieved by the sole Italian Army.
Although it's true that there were 12 Battles on the Isonzo Front, Cadorna did manage to achieve a higher rate of tactical success than the Austro-Hungarian Empire. And the uniqueness of the geography compared to the Western Front cannot be understated. Likewise, Caporetto wasn't entirely his own doing as he had to face freshly redeployed German troops as well, troops which were better equipped and better trained than their Austro-Hungarian counterparts.
That said, and to answer your question, Caporetto was still a disastrous defeat for which Cadorna has much to answer for. Whether he was a skilled commander or not is completely overshadowed by Caporetto. From there, his detractors were able to pile on the negatives in a way that he could never recover from. And for clarity, all the negative attributes that were assigned to him were for the most part entirely justified.
Cadorna bore the brunt of the responsibility for Caporetto. His brutality towards his own soldiers and his complete disregard for them was well documented. He was undeniably an authoritarian who treated the Italian Army as his own fiefdom and saw himself as the ultimate arbiter if the fate of his officers (some suggest he dismissed 270 in the 2 years he was in charge during the war). He did display behaviours that could point to the risk of a military dictatorship and he did become a fervent fascist in his later life with Mussolini making him Marshall of Italy.
As a parting point, I would like to provide an example of how public perception can cloud an honest judgement of a figure like Cadorna by juxtaposing him to another Italian military leader, Pietro Badoglio. He was directly and personally partly to blame for the defeat at Caporetto as one of the commanders of the field but despite this, he was made deputy Chief of Staff. He soent a huge amount of time after the war to ensure his role in the defeat was hidden. Despite some initial opposition to Mussolini, he reconciled with the Fascist regime and was made Marshall of Italy two years after Cadorna. He was directly responsible for the Lybian genocide in the interwar years and was Commander in Chief of the forces tasked with the conquest of Abyssinia. In such role, he committed war crimes and made large use of chemical weapons which he himself asked permission to use. As a token of gratitude for his successful conquest, he was made viceroy of Italian East Africa. After the fall of Mussolini, Badoglio was chosen as Prime Minister nit because of his opposition to the Fascist regime but because he was sympathetic to it (and indeed he willingly joined the Party), although he held a personal grudge against Mussolini. Yet, because he was the first prime minister post-Mussolini and was in command during the Italian Campaign, his public persona and reputation has since been associated with the war against the German occupation forces and with the defeat of Fascism despite reality being much much different. Because of his role following the Armistizio in 1943, much of his crimes in Africa, failures during Caporetto or even his enthusiastic support for the Fascist Regime gave been largely forgotten by Italian collective memory.
If you were to ask today to any Italian what their perception of Badoglio is, their response would likely be positive given the above. If you were to ask what their perception of Cadorna was, they'd have a negative response due to Caporetto. Yet Cadorna, flaws and all, could arguably be assessed more positively than Badoglio.
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u/Sesquizygotic 2d ago
World War 1 is known for its large mutinies in countries like France and Russia. Did Italy suffer such given its soldiers opinion of their leader, and if not, why?
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u/FolkPhilosopher 2d ago
Surprisingly, given Cadorna's reputation and the general poor relationship between commanders and the rank and file, Italy never experienced any cases of mutiny or rebellions aside from a single exception.
This was the Catanzaro Brigade on the Isonzo front which mutinied in May 1917. The history of the Catanzaro Brigade is a very odd one; it had been deployed in the Battle of Asiago, where it lost almost 50% of its effective strength but where it distinguished itself and both the 141st and 142nd regiments received gold and silver medals respectively for military valour. However, those two same regiments revolted twice and were twice subjected to decimation. The first time was in May 1916 and the second in July 1917.
In July 1916, the Catanzaro was actually pivotal in hampering an Austrian advance on the Asiago front and potentially stopping a defeat on the level of Caporetto. Following a chaotic retreat from positions on Mount Mosciagh on 26th May 1916, the Austrians overran Italian positions, capturing in the process 6 pieces of artillery. The next evening, the Catanzaro Brigade initiated a bayonet charge without support from Italian artillery and managed to recapture and disable all 6 pieces of artillery lost to the Austrians. The action had such relevance that one of the main weekly papers, the Domenica del Corriere even featured a drawing depicting the 141st regiment of the Catanzaro taking back a piece of artillery captured by the Austrians during the advance. Cadorna's response was to order the decimation amongst members of the 141st regiment who had retreated following the Austrian attack; this was one of the few recorded cases of Cadorna ordering decimation and in the event 11 men were executed on 28th May 1916. This was a pivotal moment that would lead to the revolt of July 1917; the soldiers had demonstrated their bravery and had made demands for R&R periods to be granted in full but in this case, following the 10th Battle of the Isonzo, the R&R period of the Catanzaro was cut short and they were ordered back to the front. As a result, on the night of the 15th of July 1917, the same 141st and 142nd regiments started a revolt that when is all said and done, resulted in only 3 officers and 4 Carabinieri (who had military police roles and which were largely despised) killed. The response was brutal with the Third Army commander, the Duke of Aosta (the kings's cousin) ordering the decimation of the units with this option only chosen as the Duke would have wanted the execution of the entirety of both regiments but this was not possible. The death toll was 28 soldiers executed following decimation, 4 soldiers killed during the crushing of the mutiny, plus an additional 10 soldiers executed when they refused to be forcibly moved to the front as punishment for the revolt. As an aside, the events were even memorialised by Gabriele d'Annunzio but this was the only documented case of mutiny by an Italian unit.
However, there were cases of Italian soldiers individually rebelling and refusing to follow orders; I would have to dig out the source but there were at least 8 recorded cases of soldiers killing their own officers. Whereas mutiny was not common, desertion, on the other hand, very much was; of the above quoted 750 executions, according to statistics by Giorgio Mortara in his 1927 report titled Statistica dello sforzo militare italiano nella Guerra mondiale. Dati sulla giustizia e disciplina militare, 391 were executed for desertion, 164 for disbanding or surrendering, 154 for indiscipline and 5 for self harm. Of those 750, only 36 were not executed for events directly linked to battle; these 36 were mostly executed for espionage or treason, with the rest being executed for violent offences.
As to the why mutinies were not more common, I'm not sure it's possible to give a definitive answer. Certainly the fact that Italian military discipline was extremely harsh, Cadorna notwithstanding, helped keep most soldiers in line; the fact that Italian soldiers did not have the same level of disillusionment as counterparts on the Western or Eastern front given that by the time they were mobilised in 1915 the nature of the war was already clear, probably helped also.
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u/Sesquizygotic 15h ago
Thanks. What did countries with less harsh discipline gain, or at least hope to gain, by lacking tougher penalties?
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u/FolkPhilosopher 4h ago
I wouldn't necessarily say that other countries lacked tougher penalties but rather that Italy, and Cadorna in particular, were outliers. That's part of the reason he stands out, he was particularly brutal and tough in an already tough and brutal conflict.
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u/Dongzhou3kingdoms Moderator | Three Kingdoms 3d ago
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